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Abstract 
Vietnam undertook its first steps towards economic reforms at the beginning of the 
1980s. As a result, it moved away from a strictly centrally-planned to a 'modified' 
planned economy. However, Vietnam failed to stabilize the economy. The so-called 
'price-salary-money' reform in 1985 resulted in annual inflation accelerating to several 
hundred percent. Since the market-oriented reforms in 1989, however~ Vietnam has 
succeeded in bringing inflation under control. The subsequent inflation stabilization and 
rapid economic growth has indeed been considered one of the most remarkable 
turnarounds in economic history. 
This thesis analyses the process of inflation stabilization in. Vietnam focusing on the 
1985-reform, the stabilization policy package in 1989, and the market-oriented reforms 
since then. 
First, the thesis explains the failure of the 1985-reform and the success of the 1989-
reform. The explanation is based on the theory of 'repressed ' inflation in a centrally-
planned economy and on the consideration of the increasing role of the parallel market 
resulting from the microeconomic reforms introduced in the early l 980s. The thesis 
argues that the disappointing outcome of the 1985-reform was mainly due to the 
government's failure to deal with the public deficits, while exaggerating the problem of 
~monetary overhang', leading to unnecessary confiscatory monetary measures1. The 
much greater focus on the problem of public deficits m the 1989-reform together with 
the increased credibility of government policies were the key factors in explaining the 
success of inflation stabilization in 19 8 9. 
i The new domestic currency (Dong) replaced the old Dong at a rate of one to ten, and the immediate 
exchange was limited. 
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The thesis also examines a wider range of factors that could be imponant for 
understanding the inflationary movement since the 1989-reform: from the financial 
reform and the ability to control money supply by the central bank, to the lillderlying 
determinants of inflation. the dynamics of inflation and the conditions for stability of 
inflation. Up to now, public finance has played a very important role in money supply, 
and the underdevelopment of the financial sector still constrains the efficient use of the 
market-based monetary instruments. The key determinants of inflation rate haYe been 
found to be money growth rates and the factors reflecting the attractiveness of the 
domestic currency such as the ( expected) depreciation rate and the deposit interest 
rate. Another main finding is that the relatively low inflation in recent years has tended 
to be stable; howeveL the process towards :financial stability is not yet firmly 
established. 
Based on these findings. the thesis suggests a policy package for sustalnmg a low 
inflation rate. It is important for the central bank to strengthen its independent role in 
conducting monetary policy and to implement more market-based direct conrrol over 
money supply while gradually gaining experience with the use of indirect monetary 
instruments. In particular~ the policy package should maintain the existing conditions 
for the stability of inflation, and aim at keeping the economy at a lo\ver inflation 
equilibrium. In that sense, a firm commltment to price stability and a more rigorous 
adjustment of public finance are essential elements in the policy package. This also 
creates an easier condition for pursuing more reasonable interest rate and exchange 
rate policies~ that is, policies to reduce the costs of economic activities~ while keeping 
the attractiveness of the domestic currency. 
Vl 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
'The rejection of central planning by so many countries in 1989 represents 
one of the truly extraordinary events in the history of economics. But the 
transition to the market also presents economists with formidable 
challenges because the path has never been trod before. The issues raised 
will remain at the top of the economic agenda for many years to come' 
(Socialist Economies and the Transition to the Market: A Guide' (Jeffries 
1993: i)). 
Although the transition debate still continues, there is now consensus about the 'nuts 
and bolts' of transition, which encompasses three sets of reforms: liberalization and 
stabilization; institutional changes that support market exchange and shape ownership; 
and the establishment of social programs to ease the pain of transition 1• The 
maintenance of macroeconomic stability is considered an essential complement to 
liberalization and vital for transition since it ensures the gains from market-oriented 
reforms and provides the necessary condition for sustained growth. Moreover, in 
economies characterized by a heavy distortion of resource allocation, poor incentives, 
and poor information as in the centrally-planned economies (CPEs), consistent 
policies, combining liberalization of prices and trade, and freedom of entry into 
markets, while stabilizing the economy, can achieve a great deal even when clear 
1See, for example, Ahrens (1994), Balcerowicz and Gelb (1995), Blanchard et al. (1991 ), Fischer and 
Gelb (1991), Lipton and Sachs (1990), Nordhaus (1990), and \Vorld B ank ( 1996). 
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property rights and strong market institutions are still lacking (vVorld Bank 1996, 
Chapter 2). 
The process of macroeconomic stabilization in Vietnam is unique amongst the 
transitional economies. Since the radical reform in the spring of 1989, Vietnam has 
brought inflation under control, while maintaining high rates of economic growth. The 
result is very impressive in comparison to the experiences of many transitional 
economies in Eastern Europe, although the liberalization and stabilization measures 
used were similar to these economies (Riedel and Comer 1996, World Bank 1996). 
But the success did not come overnight. Unlike China, \vhich has had relative success 
in implementing the piecemeal and partial reforms (Chen et al 1992), Vietnam had to 
pay a high price for this kind of economic reform in the 1980s. High inflation with 
devastating effects became a disease of the economy throughout the 1980s. The study 
of Vietnam's stabilization during both the periods of the 1980s and 1990s, therefore, 
directly addresses the issue of radical reforms versus 'gradualism'. 
1.1. Economic reform and the outcomes of inflation stabilization in 
Vietnam 
Prior to the 1980s, Vietnam followed the Soviet economic model closely. The 
characteristics of the Vietnamese economy were essentially those of a traditional CPE, 
namely, state ownership of means of production; government administered physical 
input, output, and prices; a single government bank and a passive financial system; 
relatively autarkic trade with heavy reliance on trade withi n the former trade block of 
socialist countries , the Council of Mutual Economic A.ssis tance (CMEA); and a heavy 
2 
industry orientation in investments. As a result, the Vietnamese economy suffered 
from persistent shortages with low levels of per capita consumption and inefficiency of 
in vestments. By the end of the 1970s, industrial production had stagnated, food 
production had fallen to very low levels , forcing Vietnam to import large amounts of 
rice, and the balance of payments position worsened (Fforde and Vylder 1988, 
Lipworth and Spitaller 1993). The failure of the centrally planned system had become 
apparent and pressures for reform increased substantially. 
Figure 1: Economic Reforms, Growth, and Inflation (%-change p.a.), 1976-95 
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Note: Inflation is December-December percentage increase in the consumer price index (CPI); Growth 
is percentage change of real national income (NI) for 1976-88 and of real GDP for 1989-95. 
Source: For inflation rate, from SPC (1994) and World Bank (1992, Table 6.l,p.146); for data of NI 
and GDP. from Kimura (1989, Tables 1-2,p. l 1), SPC (1994) and World Bank (1993,Table 2.1,p.235). 
Revised data of 1994 and 1995 are provided by the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM, 
Hanoi). 
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During 1980-88, the economy was a kind of 'modified' planned economy (MPE). Some 
partial reforms undertaken within the framework -of a CPE made only a marginal 
difference since they did not attempt basic changes. However, there were some 
significant initiatives undertaken such as 'fence breaking'2 and reforms, from the 
bottom'. In 1981, the Vietnamese government tried to create incentives in the 
agricultural sector through the contract system which permitted households to sell a 
certain proportion of their products at the 'free~ market price. Within the state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) sector, the so-called 'Three-plan system' was also introduced. Under 
this system, the SOE plan consisted of three parts: state-assigned output manufactured 
with state-supplied inputs (Plan A); above-plan output sold to the state but using inputs 
procured by the enterprise itself (Plan B); and unplanned 'minor' output which was free 
from outside contra 1 and for sale in the free market (Plan C). Market forces were 
enhanced under Plan B and Plan C, resulting in an increase in voluntary and 
decentralized interaction between individual agents, in the dual price system, and in the 
strengthening of the parallel economy. 
On the other hand~ there were no significant changes in macroeconomic management, 
particularly in the triangular relationship involving the state budget - central bank- SOE 
sector. The 'socialist organized' market was still emphasized, and there were not yet 
major changes in attitude to the private sector. The financial reform in 1985 addressed 
the issues of price, salary, and money, but proceeded without addressing the 
fundamental problems of resource misallocation and imbalances in the economy: 
2The attempts of the economic units (agricultural cooperatives, state-owned enterprises) to operate 
outside the plan without seeking permission. 
4 
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Although the output expansion was somewhat improved, high rates of inflation 
emerged, and in the mid-1980s, accelerated to several hundred percent (Figure 1 ). 
In the spring of 1989, Vietnam adopted a comprehensive reform package aimed at 
stabilizing the economy, removmg inefficient administrative control~ and enhancing 
freedom of choice for economic units and competition so as to change fundamentally 
the economic management system in Vietnam. The reform measures included almost 
complete price liberalization, large devaluation and unification of the exchange rate, 
~ 
increases in interest rates to positive levels in real terms, substantial reduction in 
subsidies to the SOE sector, encouragement of the private sector and a return to family 
farming on tI?-e basis of long-term leases. 
Since then the transition to an economy driven by market forces has been well under 
way. The government has already instituted many of the specific reforms in pricing 
policy, the external sector, agriculture, fiscal policy, the SOE sector. the financial 
sector and the labour market, which have been necessary to effect this change. Some 
of the most fundamental economic prerequisites of a market economy have been 
established. They include generally unregulated, market-determined prices~ a legal basis 
for property rights and commercial transactions, a significant role for the non-state 
sector, independent firms motivated by economic considerations and a harder 
currency3. Vietnam has also taken some important steps on the road to a more market-
oriented financial system. 
3 
For economic requirements of a systemic transformation from a CPE to a market-based economy. 
see Ahrens (1994) and Ericson (1991). 
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Table 1: Some Macroeconomic Indicators (1989-95) 
1989 1990 1991 _ 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Inflation (CPI, % ) 34.7 67.5 67.6 17.5 5.2 14.4 12.7 
GDP growth(%) 8.0 5.1 6.0 8.6 8.1 8.8 9.5 
-Industry -4.0 3.0 8.6 13.3 12.9 13.0 14.0 
-Agriculture 6.9 1.5 2.2 7.2 3.8 4.5 4.7 
-Services 17.6 10.8 8.6 7.2 9.4 12.5 12.6 
Gross Investment (% GDP) 11.7 11.7 15.0 17.6 20.5 23.8 25.6 
Gross D. Savings (% GDP) 3.4 7.5 10.1 13.8 14.8 16.6 18.0 
CA a balance(% GDP) -8.3 -4.2 -4.9 -3.8 -5.7 -7.2 -7.6 
Export (Mill. US$) 1320 2404 2087 2580 2985 4060 5200 
(in % change) 80.1 82.1 -13.2 23.6 15.7 36.0 28.1 
Import (Mill. US$) 1670 2752 2338 2540 3924 5800 7500 
( in % change) 18.3 64.8 -15.0 8.6 54.5 47.8 29.3 
Openness(Trade/GDP) 0.45 0.78 0.59 0.52 0.54 0.61 0.61 
Note: a- CA= Current Account. 
Source: The estimation and data are based on data from SPC (1994) and World Bank (1994a: Table 
2.1,p.4). Revised data of 1994 and 1995 are provided by the CIEM (References to data in Dang Due 
Dam (1995a), GSO (1994) and Le Dang Doanh (1995) also are made). 
As a result, Vietnam entered a new phase of economic development. This is reflected 
in the impressive improvement in the macroeconomic -performance (see Table 1 ). 
Between 1989 and 1995, the economy's growth was strong with real GDP increasing 
at an annual average rate of 7.7%. The initial stages of trade liberalization, and the 
unification and devaluation of the exchange rate in 1989 led to an extraordinary surge 
in exports, which grew by more than 80% in both 1989 and 1990. Since 1992, the rate 
of growth of exports has been high, at an average of 25.8% per year, despite the 
appreciation of the exchange rate. A substantial increase in both domestic saving and 
foreign capital inflows has supported a large increase in investment, from 11.7% in 
6 
1989 to nearly 26% of GDP in 1995. But bringing inflation under control may be 
regarded as the government's greatest success (Riedel and Comer 1996). By 1989, 
inflation was down to 34.7%. Although the annual inflation rate surged again to more 
than 67% in 1990 and 1991, the years associated with a temporary reversal of reforms, 
it has declined to single-digit and moderate double-digit levels since 1992: In terms of 
economic growth and inflation control, Vietnam has had a very impressive 
performance in comparison to many other CPEs (see Tables 1 and 2). At present, 
Vietnam seems to be progressing toward financial stability and sustained growth. 
Table 2: Countries in Transition: Real GDP and Inflation (%-change p.a.) 
GDP growth rate Change in CPI 
Country 90 91 92 93 94 95 90 91 92 93 94 95 
Albania -10.0 -27.7 -9.7 11.0 7.4 6.0 0.0 35.5 225.9 85.0 28 .0 8.0 
Belarus -2.S -1.5 -10.1 -9.0 -21.5 -12.C 4.5 83.4 969 1188 2200 800 
Bulgaria -9.1 -11.7 -6.0 -4.2 0.0 3.0 22.0 333.5 82.0 72.8 89.0 62.0 
Croatia .. -15.1 -12.8 -3.2 1.8 2.0 135.6 249.5 938 1516 98.0 4 .1 
Czech Republic -1.2 -14.2 -6.4 -0.5 2.6 5.0 10.8 56.7 11.1 20.8 10.2 9.1 
Hungary -2.5 -7.7 -4.3 -2.3 2.5 2.0 29.0 34.2 22.9 22.5 19.0 28.2 
Kazakstan -4.6 -6.8 -13.0 -15.6 -25.0 -9.0 4.2 91.0 1610 1760 1980 180.0 
Mongolia -2.0 -9.9 -7.6 -1.3 3.3 6.3 0.0 208.6 321.0 183.0 145.0 75.0 
Poland -11.6 -7.6 2.6 3.8 5.5 7.0 586.0 70.3 43.0 35.3 32.2 27.8 
Romania -5.6 -12.9 -13.8 1.3 2.4 7.0 5.1 174.5 210.9 256.0 131.0 32.3 
Russia -3.6 -5.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.6 -4.0 5.6 92.7 1353 896 303.0 190.0 
Slovak Republic -2.5 -14.6 -6.2 -4.1 4.8 7.0 10.8 61.2 10. l 23.0 14.0 9.9 
Ukraine -3.8 -12.0 -12.5 -7.2 -24.3 -12.C 4.0 91.2 1210 4735 842 375.0 
Sources: World Bank (1996, Tables A2 and A3, pp.173-4). 
Vietnam is, however, still facing many problems typical of low-income countries. 
Although liberalization has been quite broad and fast , significant restrictions remain , 
for example, in the areas of trade and market entry. Moreover. the reforms of the 
7 
SO Es and financial sector are not keeping pace with economic · development (World 
Bank 1996). In particular, Vietnam is regarded as an 'under-banked' country with a 
lack of confidence in the financial system. In general, Vietnam can be seen as a market-
based developing economy. Therefore, there is still some way to go in transforming 
Vietnam from a poor to a prosperous country, comparable to the oth~r rapidly 
growing countries in the Asian region. 
1.2. Objective, approach and organization of the study 
The objective of this thesis is to explain the outcomes of the efforts to stabilize the 
economy in the years 1985, 1989, and in the first half of the l 990s. 
The failure of the 1985-reforms, the success of the 1989-package, and the apparently 
sustained low inflation since 1992 makes Vietnam's macroeconomic stabilization 
experience unique amongst transitional economies. The renovation in Vietnam has 
been essentially a process of 'learning by doing' and characterized by gradualism. The 
radical ref arm in 19 8 9 was an exception, but so far it is considered the mo st successful 
since the basic conditions were created for the transformation into a market economy 
(Le Dang Doanh 1994). At present, the efforts to continue to stabilize the economy, 
keep a low and manageable inflation rate, and ref arm the financial system as the means 
of intermediation between savings and investment are playing a crucial role. This will 
ensure the efficiency of resource mobilization and allocation: and hence, Vietnam can 
continue to sustain high economic growth 4. 
4
During 1989-95. the Incremental Capital-Output Ratio (ICOR) was low, in the range of 2.0-2.5: in 
comparison to the typical range of 3-4 for developing countries. Several factors explain Vietnam's 
high growth rate of GDP with low ICOR ( Dollar 1994, World Bank 1993 ). First, some large. fixed 
8 
A number of studies have already been undertaken to examine the issue of inflation 
stabilization in Vietnam. Preliminary assessments of the 1985 and 1989-reforms are 
given in Van Brabant (1990b) and Wood (1989). The study by Kolodko et al (1992) 
provides a more comprehensive explanation of the success of the 1989-reform. This 
study, however, did not emphasize the reasons behind the difference in outcomes of 
the two sets of reforms in 1985 and 1989. Recently, the inflation stabilization in the 
context of the overall reforms has been described by the World Bank ( 1993 and 
1994b ), Dollar ( 1994 ), and Riedel and Comer ( 1996). Also, the possible effect of the 
change in the exchange rate on inflation has been a major bone of contention among 
Vietnamese economists (see, for example, Le Viet Due and Tran Thi Thu Hang 
(1995), Nguyen Cong Nghiep and Le Hai Mo (1995), Vu Ngoc Nhung (1995)). Partly 
due to the difficulties of obtaining and interpreting Vietnamese statistical data~ these 
earlier studies focused mainly on the institutional changes and/or policy issues, and 
rarely used quantitative analyses. 
By combining both economic theory and econometric techniques, this thesis aims to 
provide a better understanding of the process of inflation stabilization in Vietnam 
throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. The thesis, thus, can assist in the 
design of an appropriate anti-inflation program for Vietnam. 
investments of the mid-1980s (during the period of Soviet aid) have been coming on line in the early 
1990s, so that some of the increments to GDP have been based on these earlier investments. Second. 
the initial response of economic activities to the removal of previo us distortions permitted :i. large 
increase in output based on only minor additional investments. T he institutional changes in fav our of a 
market oriented and more export-oriented economy, of course, have made a decisive contribution to 
this response. As projected, in the medium and longer term, however. Vietnam will need much gre a ter 
investment and higher ICOR if it is to continue to sustain the ~mnual growth rate at 8-9%( Dollar i 994. 
Le Dang Doanh 1995 , and World Bank 199-1-b) . 
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The approach adopted here was used recently by Dodsworth et al (1996) and Ngo Huy 
Due ( 1995 and 1996) in order to investigate some aspects of the inflation issue in 
Vietnam in the first half of the 1990s. The study by Dodsworth et al ( 1996) examines 
the influence of money on inflation through the estimations of a polynomial lag model 
and the impact of the changes in rice price on inflation by using an error-correction 
model (ECM). Ngo Huy Due (1995 and 1996) has used the transaction cost model of 
demand for money as a base for testing the degree of dollarization and then, the 
effects of dollarization on inflation. 
In this thesis, the focus is on the relationship between the financial system and 
government finance as fundamental to an understanding of the Vietnamese economy 
in the 1980s and 1990s. The reasons are as follows: Firstly, since the reform of a CPE 
is, in essence, a monetization of economic transactions and decision making, the 
financial sector should play a key role in this process. Secondly, the features 
associated with the financial system and the behaviour of the SOEs under a CPE, like 
repressed inflation associated with 'monetary overhang' and chronic shortage, are 
problems that tend to plague many CPEs in transition. Due to these special features 
and the large distortions in the economy, price liberalization and stabilization may 
also require additional measures over and above the standard stabilization package of 
reductions in fiscal deficit and control of money supply (see, eg. Blanchard et al 
1991 ). Finally, even if the structure of a modem financial system reform is in place, 
the problem of quasi-fiscal deficit cannot be easily solved, given the close relationship 
between the SOE sector and the state-owned banks that still dominate the financial 
system. This is particularly the case in Vietnam, where ' the government has accepted 
10 
the necessity of a market economy, but seems to prefer one it can control and 
command' (Riedel and Comer 1996). 
In view of the above considerations, this thesis addresses the following questions: 
What are the key factors explaining the failure of the 1985-reforrn and the. success of 
the 1989-reform? What policies should be adopted to keep inflation under control and 
to sustain a low inflation rate from now on? The answer to the second question, again, 
depends on how the following questions will be answered: First, how can the central 
bank effectively control money supply? Second, what are the underlying determinants 
of inflation? And third, is the new relatively low inflation rate stable? 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 discusses the Vietnamese experience of price reform and stabilization in the 
1980s in the framework of the theory of the financial sector under a CPE. The first 
section of the chapter highlights three elements of this theory: the origins of 'monetary 
overhang' and repressed inflation in a CPE; the possible impacts of price 
liberalization and the implications for stabilization measures ; the measurements of 
repressed inflation (Evidence from some CPEs is also briefly given). The Vietnamese 
experience is examined in the second section. The issue of 'monetary overhang' and 
the associated repressed inflation is examined, in addition to monetization of the 
budget deficit and deficits of the SOEs. The difference in outcomes between the 1985-
and 1989-reforms is then explained in the light of this analysis. 
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Chapter 3 considers firstly the process of financial reform, the current financial 
structure in Vietnam and the capability of the central bank (State Bank of Vietnam) to 
use existing monetary instruments to control the money supply. Based on the 
monetarist versus structuralist approaches to the causes of inflation, the chapter then 
overviews the possible links between inflationary movement and other 
macroeconomic variables such as budget deficit, monetary aggregates, interest rates 
and exchange rates, and output since 1989. 
Chapter 4 develops a simple dynamic model of seigniorage, inflation, and expectation 
for Vietnam. The model consists of three equations reflecting ( a) the public finance 
through seigniorage, (b) the real demand for domestic money, and (c) the dynamic 
behaviour of the expected exchange rate in relation to inflation. The choice of this 
model depends not only on the key features of the financial sector and inflationary 
movement discussed in Chapter 3, but also on the consideration of the types of 
theoretical models which have been used to examine the inflationary phenomenon in 
developing countries and in transitional economies. The model can explain the 
dynamics of inflation rate together with the (expected) depreciation rate and shows the 
condition necessary for a stable inflation equilibrium (in steady state) . Two cases are 
analysed within the framework of this model: when fiscal policy dominates monetary 
policy and vice versa. 
Chapter 5 uses econometric analysis to provide insight into the determinants of 
inflation in the aftermath of the 1989-reform and to ascertain whether the ne\V 
relatively low inflation rate is stable. To find the determinants of inflation and their 
effect on inflation rate, a distributed-lag model is used. The answer to the question of 
12 
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inflation stability depends on the estimates of the parameters of the model specified in 
Chapter 4. 
Chapter 6 discusses the options for an appropriate anti-inflation program, based on the 
analyses of the three preceding chapters. The discussion focuses on the following 
problems: the issue of the inflationary target; the role of the central bank, and the 
effective use of monetary instruments and the choice of monetary aggregates; and the 
choice of policy instruments in sustaining low inflation rates. In regard to the last 
problem, policy instruments such as monetary policy, fiscal policy, interest rate policy 
and exchange rate policy, are considered. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the main contents and findings of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Price Reform and Inflation 
Stabilization in Vietnam in the 198Qss 
2. 1. A theoretical consideration of the problem of repressed inflation 
under centrally-planned economies 
2.1.1. The financial system and money supply in a centrally-planned economy, 
In Vietnam, the first steps in reforming the banking system were taken in mid-1988 
with the transfer of commercial functions from the State Bank to four 'specialized' 
banks. Only in May 1990 were two decree-laws enacted, setting the basis for a market-
oriented banking system. During the period before 1989 the banking system was, in 
essence, typical for a CPE. 
The distinguishing characteristics of such a financial system in a CPE are well 
documented (see, for example, Holz 1992, Nuti 1986, Wolf 1985) and can be 
summarized as follows: 
• a banking system consisting only of the government state bank with no 
independent commercial banks ( the so-called 'monolithic' banking system); 
• a totally accommodating or 'passive' role for the state bank with regard to SOEs. 
This means that the SOEs were given credit at zero or very low interest rates in 
5 This chapter is based on my own paper (Vo I 995) ~rnd the paper coauthored with Dr. Suiwah Leung 
(Leung and Vo 1996). 
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order to purchase raw materials and inventories to fulfil the planned production 
stipulated by the state. On the other hand, deposits with the state bank on the part 
of the SOEs could not be used by the SOEs without specific direction from the 
planners. This represents the so-called 'enterprise circuit' of the money supply 
process, and is associated with a 'credit plan'. Credit is supposed to grow at the 
same rate as output, and is therefore presumed to have no inflationary effects; 
• households dealing only in cash. They were paid by enterprises in cash, and 
purchased goods and transacted amongst th ems elves using cash. This is the so-
called 'household circuit' of money supply process, and is associated with a 'cash 
plan'. Operationally, the cash plan specifies factors resulting in injections and 
withdrawals of currency in the banking system. For example, wage and salary, 
purchase of agriculture product, and government transfers to households represent 
injections; the sale of consumer goods and services to the households as well as the 
household deposits in the state bank ( a very minor item in reality) represent 
withdrawals. The aim is to keep a balance between the cash injections and 
withdrawals. Once the prices and quantities of consumer goods and services are 
determined under the physical plan, the cash plan sets the target for currency in 
circulation which is implemented by the state bank. 
Formally, the model of the financial system in a CPE can be summarized in two 
identities of the nominal flow supply of currency in circulation: 
fiCU = F + WN +T- PQ-fiHD 
6CU = ruVDCg + MIDCe + fiR - 6HD 
( 1) 
(2; 
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Here CU is currency in circulation, F is procurement payment for agricultural 
products, WN is the total wage bill paid to households, T is government Lransfers to 
households, PQ is the value of consumer goods purchased by households, HD is net 
household deposits at the state bank, NDCg and NDCe are the net domestic credit of 
the government and enterprise sector respectively, R is international rese~ves, and ~ 
denotes the change in the corresponding variables. The flo\v variables on the right~ 
hand side of Equation ( 1) determine the balance of money incomes and expenditures 
of the population, whereas Equation (2)- nothing but a balance sheet of the state bank-
shows how the sources such as the budget deficit and the change in credits to 
enterprises, 6 could be channelled to the household monetary circuit. 
Given the formulation of the credit plan and cash plan in the light of the physical input 
and output plans, interest rates virtually had no role in allocating financial resources. 
Moreover, the quantitative plan was usually 'taut', ie. the targets were not objectively 
feasible with the resources at hand (Van Brabant 1990a). Since output plan fulfilment 
was the prime criterion against which enterprise performance was evaluated, the easy 
credit at virtually zero interest rate meant that there was a strong incentive for 
enterprises to borrow from the state bank in order to pay for more materials and labour 
inputs than currently needed so as to ensure their availability for future output growth. 
Enterprises in this situation have been described as operating under a 1soft budget · 
constraint' . Kamai points to the negotiability of tax rates, soft subsidies from the 
government budget, and soft credit as possible sources of an enterprise's soft budget 
constraint (1 980 Chapter 13). As a result, there was a tendency for t:JVDCg + 6...VDCe 
6Given the role of official exchange rates mainly as accounting devices to enable con\·crs io n b-ctween 
foreign and domestic prices to be made consistently, the change in net international re scrYes need not 
imply net hoarding or dishoarding in e ither the enterprise or household secto rs (\Volf 198~1. 
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to be greater than that in the plan , and this, in turn, became channelled to the 
'household circuit'. 
Since most households did not keep accounts at the state bank (either through non-
availability of this facility generally or through lack of interest rate incentives), there 
was no mechanism by which an excess of money holding in the population could be 
eliminated by lending to enterprises. Furthermore, because of the heavy industry 
orientation of the CPEs, consumer goods were generally in short supply (Winiecki . 
1988), so that it was impossible to keep the cash withdrawals from the household 
circuit balanced with the cash injections into that circuit. This resulted in 'forced' 
money holdings on the part of the households , with the accumulation of these holdings 
giving rise to a 'monetary overhang' . The manifestation of this overhang of money 
stock is th,e persistent shortages in consumer goods, with controlled prices to avoid 
outbreaks of inflation; that is, a situation of 'repressed' inflation. 
2.1.2. Impact of monetary overhang and implications for price liberalization 
Figure 2a illustrates the impact of a growing monetary overhang. At initial 
equilibrium, with aggregate demand of AD and aggregate supply of AS, the general 
price is fixed below the clearing level and the excess 9f desired spending over output is 
given by ab. Point c is the 'true' price that could be reflected in the costs of waiting, 
bribing, and using influence. As the public deficit (that is, in our terminology, MDCg 
+ MDCe, or the 'monetized' budget deficit and the net credit extended to enterprises) 
increases the monetary overhang, AD rises to AD'. The ex-ante shortage becomes 
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wider and grows to ab' and the true price rises to c ' . Note that any increase in official 
prices may not be enough to eliminate excess demand and hence may lead to dualism 
in inflation ( open and repressed inflation), that could be observed in many CPEs or 
MPEs. 
Figure 2: Impacts of monetary overhang and price liberalization 
Price level 
Figure 2a 
AD' 
Output 
Figure 2b 
Price level 
ggregat~ Suppl)'r 
D A 
Output Output 
loss(SR) gain(LR) Output 
Now suppose that the economy is characterised initially by aggregate demand ICB, 
aggregate supply with full employment AC, and a general shortage AB. When prices 
are liberalized, the general price rises toward point C in Figure 2b. In the short run, 
however, the general price may rise further toward I due to the contr~ction of 
aggregate supply: the inefficient enterprises become loss making in those parts of the 
economy where relative prices have fallen. Also, the contraction in loss-making 
enterprises would initially produce a slump in aggregate demand, and this may reduce 
output and employment in those markets where relative prices have risen due to the 
spillover effects across sectors. However, in the longer run when the ne\v profit 
opportunities and market incentives begin to be exploited by entrepreneurs and 
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macroeconomic stability is achieved, the decline of output (AD) is gradually reversed 
and the economy ends up at point J with full employment output.7 
The analysis, however, does not rule out the possibility of an increase in output even in 
the short run. In the MPEs with the substantial role of a parallel market, the economy 
may quickly respond to the 'price matter' when price liberalization has taken place, 
and hence the output gains in some sectors, particularly in the emerging private sector, 
may offset the losses in some SOE subsectors. 
What are the implications for the stabilization measures as prices are liberalized? The 
above consideration suggests that the pressure on the overall price level to increase 
over time, originates in 'flow' and 'stock' problems. The 'flow ' problem is related to 
the public deficit; the 'stock' issue is the phenomenon of monetary overhang, a 
growing mountain of money in the face of controlled prices and excessive demand. 
Because of the monetary overhang, governments may fail to achieve macroeconomic 
balance by simply stopping money creation. It is essential to remove the overhang, and 
7That is why it is often assumed that the process of transition follo\vs a I-curve phenomenon. Several 
economies in transition (see Table 2, Chapter 1, Section 1.1) seem to have experienced this 
phenomenon. However, the adjustment_ from A to J (permanent gain) \ia D (temporary loss) in Figure 2b 
may or may not increase the present value of output. To see this clearly, suppose that ouput falls from 
the initial level by 6. Y from t=O to t=T, and then exceeds its original leYel by 06. Y from t=T to t=infinity 
where 0 is some positive constant. Then the present values of the output loss and gain respectively are 
T.. 
J /j_Ye-pr dt = /j_f(l- e-pT) Ip and J 0/j_Y e- pt dt = e~Ye- pT I p where p is the discount 
0 T 
rate. The net gain can be found by subtracting the first equation from we second: 
/j_Y((l+8)e-pT -1)/ p whichispositiveif (l+8)e-pT)l orT<ln(1+0)/p . 
If, for example, 0=2 and p=O.O5, the structur~l adjustment would yield a positive net gain as long as it 
took 22 years or less (For more information, see Gylfason (1993)). 
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this can be done in one or more of the fallowing ways (see Blanchard et al 1991, 
.. 
Dornbusch and Wolf 1990, Fischer and Gelb 1991, and Hinds 1992): 
• Completely de-control prices so that the real value of money holdings declines to 
the desired level. However, this could lead to a temporary reduction in output, 
which would exacerbate the inflationary problems, adding to political pressures 
towards re-controlling prices. 
• Sell financial assets such as government bonds or increase deposit interest rates to 
absorb a part of the money held by the population and sterilize the proceeds (that 
is, not spend or give credit with the proceeds). But this would be expensive 
because the interest has to be paid. The selling of nonmonetary public assets such 
as houses, land, or enterprises is another option, which is regarded as most 
compatible with the desired direction of market reform. However, these processes 
would take a long time because of legal and technical problems. 
• Undertake confiscatory monetary reform: either a forced conversion of currency, 
1
'1: usually at unfavourable rates to existing moneyholders, or the blocking of bank 
accounts. Experience shows that this option is quite effective in dealing with 
monetary overhang. Moreover, the option may well be justified on income 
distribution grounds. So confiscation is often regarded as a favoured option. As 
will be seen in Section 2.2 below, this method was used in Vietnam, however with 
adverse consequences. 
These methods will at best solve the stock problem but will leave the flow probiem of 
public deficit untouched. The standard stabilization package of dealing with the flow 
problem is to cut back both kinds of deficits, namely, the government budget deficit 
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largely financed through money creation because of the absence of a well-established 
government securities market, and the deficit of the SOEs financed by cheap credit. 
Note that the focus on the budget deficit only may lead policymakers to miss another 
underlying cause of monetary expansion: the budget deficit could fall without resulting 
in a reduction of monetary expansion because of 'soft' credits extended to 
enterprises. 8Gi ven the short-run limitation on ra1s1ng revenue due to the collapse in 
output of the SOE sector and the weak tax system, a key aspect should be the reduction 
of government expenditure and here, the elimination of subsidies should be a high 
n 
priority. At the same time, the easy-money policies of the central bank, in 
accommodating the insatiable demand for credit should be tightened. As Vocke ( 1948, 
quoted in Dornbusch and Wolf 1990) mentioned, 'soft measures do not create hard 
currency'. 
2.1.3. Measurement of repressed inflation and the evidence from some CPEs 
The traditional views based on the 'ideal-typical' model of a CPE, that a CPE exhibits 
pervasive, chronic macroimbalances and repressed inflation, are challenged by several 
other explanations related to money holding behaviour, both in theory and pra~tice. 
The Barro-Grossman disequilibrium model ( 197 4) predicts that the effects of 
rationing in the goods market and price controls may also lead to a reduction in labour 
supply. The multiplier effect of this will further reduce output. As a result, the 
economy may move toward a constrained equilibrium at a lower level of income and 
8The anomalous situation of high inflation with the budget in surplus had been experienced at some 
poi nt by Poland and Yugoslavia (T,rnzi, 1993). 
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employment ( or labour effort). Another possibility, emphasized by Kornai ( 1980 
Chapter 18) is 'forced substitution' of other goods for the goods in shortage. 
Moreover, the existence of micro-rationing and 'poor' information may lead 
consumers (and also economic units in MPEs like Vietnam in the 1980s) to hold larger 
amounts of cash by carrying around precautionary inventories of money to take 
advantage of opportunities to buy goods (Blanchard et al 1991, Hartwig 1983). 
The greatest criticism is that the traditional analysis of a CPE does not include the 
increasing role of the 'parallel' market. The 'second economy' activities could 
eliminate both the macro- and micro-level disequilibria. A further point is that the 
range of financial and real assets that play the role as a store of value is broader than 
the traditional view assumes. These assets include, for example, foreign currency, gold 
and jewellery, and durable goods. 
The view that there exist no pervasive disequilibria in the CPEs is supported by some 
theoretical analyses that take into account the role of the parallel market. Stahl II and 
Alexeev ( 1985) used the model of optimizing behaviour to prove that with a parallel 
market in which individuals can trade commodities acquired through the official 
economy by queuing, an equilibrium of parallel market prices and waiting times exists; 
further, the equilibrium price _is equal to the official price plus an implicit wage rate 
multiplied by the queuing time. By including the same kind of parallel market, the 
cash-in-advance model developed by Lin (1993) shows that there may be no monetary 
overhang in a CPE. The study by Lane (1992) also used a cash-in-advance model, but 
with a parallel market in \vhich informal trade in both goods and foreign exchange is 
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common. The study suggests that equilibrium in household money holdings may be 
achieved despite shortage. 
Given the importance of the problem of repressed inflation for the reform measures 
and the theoretical controversy associated with this problem, it is worth testing 
whether repressed inflation (monetary overhang) significantly exists in a particular 
country. The definition of repressed inflation suggests two main ways of measuring 
repressed inflation: one is directly related to the relationship between demand and 
supply; the other asks for disequilibrium in the money m-arket. In both cases, the 
empirical findings are quite mixed. 
The first method applies a disequilibrium framework consisting of the estimations of 
the household demand for consumption Cd,, the planner's supply CS,, and the 
observed quantity of consumption Cobr that satisfies the minimum condition: Cobr = 
min( CDr,, CSr), Then, repressed inflation exists if CDr is significantly greater than CSr 
conditional on the observation Cobr. 
Using disequilibrium-estimation techniques , Portes and Winter ( 1978), for example, 
rejected the hypothesis of sustained excess demand in the market for consumption 
goods between the mid- l 950s and mid-1970s in four CPEs (Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany, Hungary, and Poland). Similar conclusions have been drawn by Portes et al 
(1988) for Poland for 1955-80 and Van der Lijn (1989) for East Germany for 1957-85. 
But the est~mation by Cottarelli and Blejer ( 1992) of the chronic overhang 
accumulated since the mid- l 960s in the former Soviet Union suggests that the 
undesired holdings of wealth in this country at the end of 1990 amounted to about 20 
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percent of GDP and one third of existing financial assets. As a result, a price increase 
of 40-50 percent would have been necessary to wipe out these excessive monetary 
holdings. 
The second common test for a repressed inflation problem is the estimation of the 
demand for money. The idea is quite simple. Because of the monetary overhang 
problem, the common assumption made for market economies that the money market 
tends to be in equilibrium, may not be appropriate for the CPEs. This means that the 
change in money supply could not be related systematically to the changes in scale 
variables and opportunity costs of money holding. Thus, if plausible specifications of 
demand functions fit very poorly, it might be suspected that we are not estimating a 
demand function at all and there could be significant monetary overhang and hence 
repressed inflation. Conversely, good fit and stability of a money demand function 
suggests that data are generated by this behavioural relation operating close to 
equilibrium, and there could not be a serious repressed inflation problem. 
Recently, the study of household demand for money in Poland over the period from 
Decemberl979 to October 1988 by Lane ( 1992), has contradicted the view associated 
with the notion of a liquidity overhang. However, Feltenstein and Ha ( 1996), using 
quarterly qata from 1980 to 1990, conclude that prior to 1991, there was strong 
evidence of considerable repressed inflation in Poland, whereas this was not the case 
for Czechoslovakia. The studies of the demand for money in China have also reached 
different conclusions about the significance of repressed inflation . Feltenstein and 
Farhadian (1987) conclude that during the period 1954-83 , the true inflation rate was 
approximately 2.5 times the official inflation rate. Also, for part of the post-reform 
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period. when a dual price system existed in China, there was evidence to suggest that 
repressed inflation was important in that country (Feltenstein and Ha 1988). 
Nevertheless, the estimations, with quarterly data, for the period 1983-88 in the study 
by Burton and Ha (1990) provide indirect evidence against the existence of substantial 
repressed inflation. 
Another useful way to determine the problem of monetary overhang is to calculate the 
velocity of money (or the money-to-income ratio). According to the identity, V = Py/M 
(where Vrepresents the velocity of money, P the price level, y real income, and M the 
money stock), if there was a substantial increase in money supply relative to the output 
in the context of regulated prices~ then the velocity of money would decline ( or the 
money-to-income ratio would rise). For example, the decline in the velocity of money 
in China during the 19 80s (Blejer et al 1991) and the increase in the ratio of household 
liquid assets to disposable income in the former Soviet Union from the 1970s to 1989 
(Nordhaus 1990) may reflect the existence of repressed inflation. This method, 
however, is only suggestive9 . In the case of an MPE, the dynamics of the velocity of 
money also correspond to the process of monetization, the expectation and credibility 
of government policies. 
In summary, the analysis of the problem of repressed inflation should not be based only 
on the results of the 'pure ' formal estimations. A consideration of the real behaviour of 
the economy, particularly the role of the parallel market and household savmg 
behaviour, is necessary to convince us of the existence of repressed inflation. 
9See the main critiques in Cottarelli and Blejer (1992). 
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2.2. The Vietnamese experience 
2.2.1. The empirical findings of repressed inflation in Vietnam 
This section will first look at the causes that could lead to monetary overhang, namely, 
public finance and shortages in the consumer goods market. Then, to test the question 
of monetary overhang in the period before 1989, the demand for money and the 
velocity of money will be examined. 
Figure 3 presents Vietnam's Government budget structure. As a percentage of GDP, 
the budget deficit was high throughout the 1970s and 1980s. It was in the range of 7-
9% between 1977 and 1981, rose to 12% in 1985 and was still high at 7.2 and 7.6% in 
1988 and 1989, respectively. Up tq 1984, foreign assistance made up two-thirds of the 
revenue which financed the budget deficit. During the period 1985-89 more than 60 
per cent of the budget deficit was financed by borrowing from the central bank. Note 
that the budget revenue had declined over time, from the end of the 1970s until 1988. 
One reason for this was the lower revenues from the SOE sector due to the difficulties 
this sector experienced under central planning during the period 1978-80 (see Chapter 
1, Section 1. 1 ). A second reason was the weak taxation system during the 1980s after 
the Three-plan system was adopted. Although revenue had constrained budget 
expenditure, subsidies remained at a high level, in the range of 3 to 5.3% of GDP 
during the period 1984-88 (World Bank 1992: 141). 
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At the same time, domestic credit expansion has accelerated since 1981. The increase 
was 90% in 1981, then rose to peak at 430% in 1986, before falling to 248% and 3959a 
'-' 
in 1987 and 1988, respectively (Figure 4 ). Given the passive, accommodating role of 
the banking system, and apart from the budget deficit source, the credit expansion was ., 
due to the 'hunger for investment' by the SOEs. As in any CPE, there was a strong 
tendency for managers to hoard inputs and to accumulate real assets so as to maximise 
output (regardless of cost), and to oppose acquiring financial assets because of very 
low interest rates. In the 1980s, the SOEs became more sensitive to 'price matters' and 
market demand, but demand for credit continued to be insatiable even though the plan 
targets were seen to be more realistic (see Table 3 below). One reason was that credit 
for the SOEs was heavily subsidized. 10 Another reason relates to the Three-plan 
system. As the SOEs needed to acquire inputs on the free market for plans B and C, 
demand for working capital rose. The accelerating inflation, of course, made the 
problems of 'hoarding input' and demand for credit more serious. The credit expansion 
was channelled to the sharp increase in currency in circulation that was held by 
households and enterprises (the correlation between the rates of change in currency in 
circulation and in domestic credit for the period 1978-88 was 0.99). 
10For example, in early 1988, the rate of interest applied to credit for working capital was 1.8% per month 
whereas the monthly inflation rate was more than 1-+%. 
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Figure 3: Government Budget Structure(% of GDP) 
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Source: For 1977-83, the estimation is based on Kimura (1989 Tables 1-1 p.9 and 1-11, 
p.24) and GSO (1991 Table 12, p.18); for 1984-85, World Bank (1992, Table 5.1, p.141); 
for 1986-93, World Bank (1994b, Table 5.1, p.118). For 1994-95 (also in Figures 4 and 5), 
data are provided by the State Bank of Vietnam and CIEM. 
Figure 4: Cash in Circulation and Domestic Credit 
( December-December Basis Change from Previous Year) 
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Note: CU- Currency in circulation; DC- Domestic credit 
Source: For 1977-85, The estimation is based on the IMF data taken from Fforde ~nd Vylder 
(1988, Tables 6.3, p. 135 and 6.5, p.139) and IMF (1983, Table 11, p.27): fo r 1986-88, 
World Bank (1994b, Table 4.1, p.117); for 1989-93, World Bank (1994a, Table 1. p.92). The 
1985 data are adjusted for consistency between IMF and World Bank datasets. 
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Figure 5: Retail Price (December-December Basis Change from Previous Year) 
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Note: With the price reform in 1989, there is no longer any distinction between 
official and free market prices (The prices in parallel market) 
Source: For 1976-88, World Bank (1992, Table 6.1, p.1-+6); for 1989-93, World Bank 
(1994a, Table 2.1, p.4). 
In general. the consumer goods market was also characterized by shortages that 
originated due to the heavy industry orientation at the expense of consumer goods and 
agricultural production. One aspect of the major economic crises during the period 
1976-88 was the acute shortage of food. One thing that should be noted is that more 
than 70 per cent of household income was spent on food (Fforde and Vylder 1988: 53-
4). The incentives created by the contract system and the attempts to re-orient 
resources toward agriculture, consumption and export after 1986 could not solve the 
problem of food shortages. The staple food imports reached 5.6 million tons for the 
whole period 1976-80, fell to one million tons for the whole period 1981-85. but 
increased again to about one million tons for each of the years 1986 and 1987 (Tran 
Trong Kim et al 1991 :27 and Fforde and Vylder 1988:93). 
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The shortage of other essential goods was eased after 1980 as industrial output grew 
rapidly and the SOEs became more sensitive to market demand. Table 3 indicates the 
considerable reduction in the gaps between planned and actual production of some 
consumer goods (note that the planners could fail to estimate demand correctly, but · 
the plans always had an impact on mo~ey supply). At the same time, however, official 
state prices of some essential goods co-existed with free market prices which tended to 
be five to ten times as high (Fforde and Vylder 1988:9). The failure of the 1985-
reform, with the attempt to replace the subsidized ration certificates by wage and some 
other transfer payment increases, led again to the reintroduction of rationing for some 
basic necessities in 1986 and of some forms of control over the parallel market. 
Table 3: Economic Plans and Performance, 1980 and 1985 
Industry 1980 1980 (2)/(1) 1985 1985 (4)/(3) 
plan ( 1) actual(2) % plan (3) actual( 4) 9a 
Foodgrain m.t 21.0 14.4 68 19-20 18.2 94 
Sea fish m.t 1.0 0.38 38 0.47-0.5 0.57 119 
Pigs m. head 16.5 10.0 61 13 11.8 91 
Electricity bn.kWh 5.0 3.7 74 5.5-6 5.2 89 
Cement m. t 2.0 0.6 30 2.0 1.4 65 
Fertiliser m. t 1.3 0.31 23 0.35-0.4 0.52 114 
Cloth m. m2 450.0 175.3 39 380-400 367.1 96 
Paper 000 t 130.0 46.8 36 90-100 69.5 77 
Source: Beresford (1989: 190) 
The economy during the period before the 1989-reform is often described as a 
'bureaucratic administrative-subsidy system' with aggravated shortages. As a result, 
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waiting lists, forced substitution, inventories above norm, rationing, and two-tiered 
prices, could be observed. Some economists believe that the economy exhibited both 
open inflation and severe shortage after 1981 (Kolodko et al 1992:116). Van Braban 
( 1990b) believes that monetary reform in 1985 cut down sharply on the existing 
monetary overhang. There are, however, arguments against the existence of repressed 
inflation associated with monetary overhang in Vietnam (McCarty 1994). First, a 
parallel market had always played a significant role in the economy. Its share ranged 
from 44 to 60% over 1976-84 and from 24 to 34% over 1985-87. 11 Second, official 
prices followed the parallel market to some degree after the 1981-reform (Figure 5) 
and the very high inflation during 1985-88 could have eliminated monetary overhang. 
These arguments suggest that the problem of monetary overhang in the l 980s could 
have been quite minor. This proporsition will be tested by the examination of demand 
for money and the velocity of money. 
The estimation of the demand for money is based on the partial adjustment model 
(PAM) (see Appendix, Part A, for discussion of the use of PAM, the choice of the 
independent variables, and for the details of the estimation): 
log m 1 = const.+c1 log Yr+ c2 zr + c3 log m1_ 1 + ur (3) 
Here logmr is the natural logarithm of household deposits (HD), currency in circulation 
( CU), and narrow money (here M 1 =HD+CU) deflated by free market price indexes 
(denoted as Ioghd, logcu, and logml, respectively); logy1 is the natural logarithm of 
real national income. indexes (logni); and Zr is the opportunity cost of holding money, 
11 Since the General price index of Figure 5 is a weighted average of the Official and Free market 
indexes, it is possible to calculate the Free market share. 
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measured as if =ni(l +n-), where .7r is the inflation rate (the changes in free market 
prices). 
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: The PAMs of Demand for Money 
Model I (loghd) II (logcu) III (log ml) 
Sample 1978 - 91 1977 - 91 1978 - 91 
Constant -14.427 -13.674 -14.377 
(-3.817)*** (-4.191)*** (-4.167) *** 
logni 2.644 2.391 2.603 
(3 .648) *** (4.181)*** ( 4.170) *** 
if ( =n/( 1 +n)) -1.841 -0.663 -0.966 
(-2.895) ** (-1.821)* (-2.490) ** 
Lagged dependent 0.476 0.351 0.348 
variable (2.731)** ( 1.899) * (1.874)* 
•••••••••••• ••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••• .. ·-·········-----··-············· •••••••••• ••• ·- ••••• ··········-············································- •••••• • •• • ••••••••••••••••••••••••• ·····---. --R-bar-squared 0.776 0.836 0.835 
Overall F-test F(3,9) = F(3,10)= F(3,9) = 
14.850*** 23.127*** 21.251 *** 
S.E. of regression 0.361 0.234 0.245 
Diagnostic tests: 
Autocorrelation X2(l) 2.537 0.035 0.077 
Functional form X2( 1) 0.503 0.682 0.008 
Normality x2c2) 0.006 0.071 0.975 
HeteroscedasticityX2( 1) 0.758 0.070 0.006 
Cusum-Sq test pass pass pass 
Note: *, **,***-significant at the 10%, 5% and 1 % levels respectively. SE of regression is the standard 
error of the regression. The figures in parentheses are t-ratios. 
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Given the small number of annual data (14 or 15 observations), the estimations are 
quite acceptable in terms of the explanatory power, the other diagnostic tests, and the 
signs and significance of the explanatory variables . In particular, the demand for 
money responded well to the real income and the change in the inflation rates. The 
money market, thus, seemed to have been close to equilibrium. However, all monetary 
aggregates responded more significantly to income than to the opportunity cost 
variable and also, income elasticity was very high. In the case of demand for real }dl 
and CU, the high income elasticity may indicate the following: 
• First, this most probably shows the rapidly 'monetized' process of the economy 
under 'fence breaking' and the reforms since the end of the 1970s, as the 
coordination of economic activities increasingly took place through the free 
market. 
• Second, the high income elasticities might reflect the very low ratios of money to 
income in Vietnam during that period. The ratios of M 1 to GDP during 1981-88 
were below 10 per cent; the ratios of M2 ( defined as currency +deposits in 
Dong+deposits in foreign currency) were also very low by international standards 
prior to 1989 (Table 5). 
' ,., 
j.) 
Table 5: The Ratios of Monetary Aggregates to GDP ( % ) 
78-80 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 
Ml/GDP ::::14 8.4 9.2 8.3 7.9 9.9 7.8 9.2 15.2 16.4 13.5 
HD/GDP ::::5.3 2.1 2.2 1.6 1. 1 1.3 1.2 1.5 5.3 5.6 4.0 
M2/GDP 17 15 19 26 27 26 
Source: For income, from the source indicated in Figure I (Chapter I, Section I. I) (Note: in the case 
of Vietnam before 1989, GDP is calculated with the ad hoc assumption of the proportions between NI 
and GDP); for nominal CU, as indicated in Figure 4; for HD, from IMF ( 1983, Table 11, p. 27), 
Fforde and Vylder (1988: 139), World Bank (1992, Table I.I, p. 5); M2/GDP are taken from World 
Bank (1993, Table 4.1, p.242) and reestimated for 1989-91 (see also Table 9, Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.2). 
The above points apply to the case of insignificant involuntary money holdings. 
However, the very high income elasticity of money demand, particularly in the case of 
the estimation for household deposits (HD), may also reflect the rising degree of 
'forced savings' associated with real income growth. Another test would therefore 
seem desirable. Here, the velocity of money is calculated as the ratios of national 
income to Ml and CU . There is, however, no evidence of a long-term decline in the 
velocity of money during 1978-88 (Table 6). At the same time, the trend of the 
velocity of money is quite consistent with public perception: velocity rose sharply 
during 1981-84, consistent with falling credibility in the government's 'price' policy; 
the lower velocity after 1984 reflects the process of 'monetization', which was seen to 
be very rapid at that time. Then again, there was increasing lack of confidence 
associated with the rise in velocity during 1985-88 (For a detailed discussion of 
economic reform during the 1980s, see section 2.2.2 belo\v). Perhaps only the market-
oriented reforms in 1989 really gained public credibility. 
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NI/CU 
NI/Ml 
78 79 
8.1 8.2 
5.1 5.1 
80 
8.5 
5.3 
Table 6: Velocity of Money 
81 
12.1 
8.5 
82 
12.4 
9.3 
83 
11.6 
8.8 
84 85 86 87 88 89 
12.3 8.4 7.2 9.3 9.5 6.9 
9.8 7.3 6.2 7.9 8.0 4.5 
Source: as indicated in Table 5. 
Figure 6: Trends of Prices, Real National Income and Money 
(Index numbers in natural log, 1982 = 100) 
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Source: For (general) retail price index, from the sources indicated in Figure 5; for other data, 
as indicated in Table 5. 
Moreover, Figure 6 suggests that the increase in money supply was offset by the 
increase in prices. Also, the ratios of household financial assets such as Ml or HD to 
income exhibit quite well the household savings behaviour. Throughout the l 980s 
prior to 1989, when real interest rates were negative, these ratios were very low 
compared to the period 1978-80 and since 1989 (see Table 5 above). This stable 
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savings behaviour is confirmed by the test for stability, which shows that the demand 
for deposits was rather stable with the only 'broken point' being in 1989. The savings 
behaviour indicates that the flight from domestic currency was important and the fact 
that in Vietnam, US dollars and gold have been widely hoarded as a specific safeguard 
of minimum financial standing and a reserve for the future. 
On balance, the empirical case for the existence of significant monetary overhang and 
the associated repressed inflation throughout the period before the 1989-reform is not 
convincing. The analysis much more supports the notion that the economy had mainly 
expressed open inflation. This should, thus, give encouragement to efforts to liberalize 
prices. As the main pressure on inflation has been a flow problem, the main task for 
stabilizing the economy has been to reduce public deficits. Also, the policy changes 
before 1989 had very little effect on the ' negative attitude' to the banking system. 
Thus, in the short-run, only a 'shock' solution could change the asset portfolio choices 
of the public and hence, attract considerable household deposits. 
2.2.2. The failure of the 1985-reform 
The year 1985 was not the first time Vietnam introduced reforms related to prices, 
wages, and money. As a result of the microreforms in the agricultural and SOE sectors, 
official prices sharply increased in 1981 in order to narrow the disparity between 
official and free market prices. The government also devalued the currency (from 2.8 
old Dong to 9.1 old Dong to one US dollar) and revised upward wages and salaries 
plus allowances. The result was inflation peaking at 65% and 92 % in 1981 and 1982 
respectively (Figure 5, Section 2.2.1 ). In the 'black' market, just after the 
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government's devaluation took place, the Dong fell from 37-40 to 60 to the dollar 
(Kimura 1989:43). In 1983 and 1984 the price and related reforms were reversed 
somewhat and there were attempts to strengthen planning control. 
Certainly the 1985-reform was interesting since Vietnam for the first time tried to 
stabilise the economy and abolish an important part of the existing system of state 
subsidies. The major components of the 1985-reforrn included wages, prices, and 
money. Regarding wages, the aim was to abolish the rationing system and to replace 
consumer price subsidies by monetising in-kind payments. The higher wages with 
minimum levels were set to compensate for the drop in real wages and to encourage 
labour productivity. 
The price reform was mostly related to the operation of the SOEs. State prices of many 
inputs were raised to levels more closely reflecting their scarcity. Enterprises could 
now set prices based on profits and costs , but according to the same formula that had 
been used in the CPEs: the cost-plus computation of fiat prices. The enterprises would 
have control over their own finance, and in capital formation enterprises would obtain 
credits from the banking system instead of relying on the budget allocation. However, 
aside from their function in setting fiat prices~ the central planners continued to have 
control over . salaries and the significant part of outputs and inputs (Van Braban 
1990b). 
Perhaps the most important element was monetary reform. Early 1985 saw the massive 
official devaluation of ( old) Dong against the US dollar, from about 12 to 100 Dong to 
the dollar. But at that time the exchange rate in the 'black' market had already 
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depreciated to 350-370 Dong to the dollar (Kimura 1989: 54). Believing in the 
existence of very 'excessive' currency in circulation and attempting to control inflation 
so as to avoid a further drop in real wages as well as a collapse of the exchange rate, in 
September, the government implemented a kind of confiscatory monetary reform. The 
new Dong replaced the old at a rate of one to ten. Immediate exchange \Vas, however, 
limited and the excess had to be kept at the State Bank for a substantial period of time. 
The main aim of this measure was to penalize the free market traders. In fact, however, 
the impact on private wealth seemed to be strongly blunted as the two \veeks' advance 
warning allowed the marketeers to get rid of the old Dong and hoard gold and hard 
currencies. In contrast, this measure destroyed the Dong assets of the SOEs since they 
used cash widely to purchase scarce inputs (Jeffries 1993: 215). As a result, the 
government had to make up a cash shortage to keep SOEs in operation. At the time of 
the currency conversion, the new Dong exchange rate to the US dollar \vas fixed at an 
appreciated rate of 15 to 1, but the 'black' market immediately pushed the new 
currency down to 40-50 Dong and then to 115 Dong to the dollar (Kimura 1989: 55, 
and Le Dang Doanh 1992). There was little sign of public credibility in the reform. 
In 1985, the government failed to cut off subsidies.Wages plus subsidies continued to 
rise as a percentage of GDP. The capital expenditure sharply increased to fulfil the 
five-year plan (1981-85), leading to a record deficit of 12% of GDP, about 60 per cent 
of which was covered by borrowing from the State Bank (Table 7). The drop in real 
wages due to high inflation forced the government to return to the rationing system as 
from 1986, and the subsidies rose again to substantial ievels in 1987 and 1988. Due to 
the poor performance of the revenue from the SOE sector, the budget deficits were 
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high even with the reduction in capital expenditures. At the same time, the SOEs 
continued to face 'soft budget constraints'. Moreover, the increase in wages and 
salaries and in the prices of inputs created more reasons for the SOEs to bargain over 
cheap credits and over the. contribution to the budget. 
Table 7: Budget , Domestic Credits and Inflation, 1984-89 
Budget (% of GDP) 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Revenue 14.5 14.5 13.2 12.2 11.3 14.0 
-SOE Transfers 10.5 11.2 9.5 9.2 7.2 8.1 
-Tax revenue 3.1 2.3 2.9 2.2 2.9 3.9 
Current expenditure 13.5 18.0 12.9 12.7 14.0 15.6 
-Wages & Salaries 0.5 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.7 4.6 
-Subsidies 5.2 4.7 2.9 4.9 5.3 0.0 
Capital expenditure 4.1 8.2 5.9 3.9 4.4 5.8 
Primary balance -3.1 -11.8 -5.7 -4.3 -7.0 -7.3 
Interest 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Overall balance -3.3 -12.0 -5.8 -4.4 -7.2 -7.6 
Financing 3.3 12.0 5.8 4.4 7.2a 7.6 
-Foreion b 2.3 4.9 2.2 · 1.4 2.4 1.5 
-State Bank 0.6 7.1 3.6 2.9 2.9 6.9 
-Gov't securities 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.8 
Domestic credit (%-change) 41 301 429 248 395 175 
- Gov't (net) .. .. .. 321 736 370 
- SOE sector .. .. .. 221 355 111 
- Other & Privateb .. .. .. 347 235 95 
Inflation ( % ) 65 92 487 301 308 35 
Note: a- arrears= 1.7; b - Before 1992 most credits had gone to the cooperative sector 
Source: For budget structure, World Bank (1992, Table5.l, p. 141); for domestic credit 
and inflation , see Figures 4 and 5 (Section 2.2.1 ). 
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The predictable outcome of the budget and the SOE situation was a rapid increase in 
domestic credit and as a result, soaring inflation to unprecedented levels during 1985-
88 (see also Figures 4 and 5, Section 2.2.1). The rampant inflation had not only 
destroyed liquid wealth again, but also undermined real wages and the effectiveness of 
the public sector. It also destroyed the effectiveness of the contract · system in 
agriculture. Food production stagnated, and this also contributed to the acceleration in 
inflation . 
The severe consequences of the 1985-reform were the failure to stabilize the economy. 
The government had failed to deal with the flow problem - the public deficits, while it 
had exaggerated the stock problem- the monetary overhang, which led to unnecessarily 
strong measures of confiscatory monetary reform. The failure, of course, had 
originated in the attempts to control the economy in the manner of the CPEs while the 
economy increasingly exploited the free market channels. The lack of credibility in the 
' 
government policies on the the · part of the public also undermined the process of 
stabilization. 
2.2.3. The success of the 1989-reform 
The failure of the efforts to stabilize the economy until 1989 and of the last attempts to 
control the free market during the period 1985-88 showed that there was no way for 
Vietnam to return to the previous managerial system. In March of 1989, Vietnam 
enacted a radical reform that sought to combine stabilization with strong moves toward 
a market economy (Dollar 1994, Lip\vorth and Spitaller 1993, World Bank 1993). 
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Budget and monetary policies played a fundamental role in the stabilization package. 
The budget constraint for the SOE sector, which up till then had to take into account 
all market prices for cost-profit accounting, was hardened by stopping direct subsidies 
and by allowing the interest rate on loans to the enterprises to become positive in real 
terms, although lower than the interest rate paid to households. The household demand 
deposit rate during 1989 yielded real interest rates at an extremely high level (Figure 
7). The real interest rate for three-month deposits was 113 per cent over one year, from 
March 1989 till March 1990 (Kolodko et al 1992: 129). 
Several measures in favour of a market environment were also adopted. Most prices 
were liberalized, formally abolishing the distinction between 'official prices' and 'free 
market prices' .12 The exchange rate was sharply devalued and was unified to a single 
official exchange rate at the level of the parallel market, implying a fivefold increase in 
the price of foreign exchange (from 900 to 4500 Dong for one US dollar). The state 
monopoly in the gold trade was abolished and market trading in gold was legalized. In 
the new environment, the SOEs have been given full autonomy in their pricing, 
production and investment decisions. According to Vietnamese economists, most 
enterprises have been assigned only one target, namely 'contribution to the state 
budget' (Jeffries 1993: 214). In rural areas, the collective system was largely 
dismantled and agriculture returned to family farming on the basis of long-term leases . 
After years of discrimination against the private sector, the government reversed 
course and began to encourage this sector. Also the first steps towards liberalizing 
foreign trade and attracting direct foreign investment were taken. 
12The only exceptions were the prices of electricity, oil, cement. steel, and transportation, but even these 
prices were adjusted and thus better reflected operating costs. 
41 
It is remarkable that Vietnam showed strong growth in 1989 (and through the 
adjustment processes as mentioned in Chapter 1). Reforms in 1989 brought an initial 
surge in output growth of the agricultural sector ( 6.9%) and services ( 17 .6% ), which 
offset the loss in industrial output (4%) and as a result GDP increased .8% (World 
Bank 1994a: 4). But the success of the reforms was particularly impressive in the area 
of combating inflation. As can be seen in Figure 7, the monthly inflation rate declined 
from 28 % in March of 1988 to slightly negative rates in the summer of 1989. For the 
whole year, inflation was 34.7% compared to several hundred per cent during the 
period 1986-88 (see also Figure 5, Section 2.2.1) 
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Note: TD interest rate= Time deposit interest rate (Time deposits are mainly in three or six months), 
DD interest rate= Demand deposit interest rate; before March 1989, there was only one interest rate for 
houdehold savings deposits. 
Source: Dang Due Dam (1995a, Table 1.27, p.155), GS0(1994, Table 72, p. 98) and World 
Bank(l992:2). Updated data have been provided by the CIEM. 
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Although there are no monthly or quarterly data for the budget and money supply for 
1989, there is no doubt that the fiscal and credit policies had been firmly tightened at 
least in the first three to four months after the reform was announced in Ivfarch, and 
this was the decisive factor for reducing the inflation rate. What could be observed are 
the adverse effects on the SOE sector of the policy changes (Wood 1989). N1any SOEs 
were not able to pass the higher costs on to customers, and the sharp reduction in 
profits (and hence cash flow) led to a shortage of working capital. This \Vas because 
there were no longer budgetary grants for working capital and the level of interest rates 
for loans was high. Few enterprises felt that profitability would be great enough to 
cover the cost of borrowing at these rates. The anecdotal evidence showed that the 
SOEs (especially those in difficulty) were doing everything to reduce physical stocks 
and were also selling off for cash all 'inessential' items of equipment . In many 
enterprises, there were reduced working hours or temporary dismissal of pan of the 
labour force, and in some, work had to cease altogether. This was reflected in the fall 
in industrial production in 1989. 
Also, the considerable change in household savings deposits due to the attractiveness 
of the interest rates had some effects on money supply. Household savings balance 
almost tripled from March till June 1989 (Kolodko et al 1992: 125) and increased 
from 1.5 to 5.3% of GDP over the year (see Table 5, Section 2.2.1). Given the tight 
monetary policy at that time, it seems that these proceeds were partly sterilized_ thar is, 
not spent or given as credit. 
In order to alleviate the difficulties of the SOE sector, in the second half of 1989 the 
monetary restraint was relaxed somewhat. In line with the substantial drop in inte::-est 
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rates on bank deposits after June 1989 (from 12 and 9% in March to 7 and 5<yo for time 
.. 
deposits and demand deposits, respectively, see Figure 7), the interest rates on loans 
were deliberately reduced below deposit rates with a maximum rate of 3.9% per month 
(GSO 1994:98). For long-term loans the rate was only 0.8% per month. Regarding the 
budget, the current expenditure associated with the payments for laid-off workers and 
reductions in 'army size', and also for capital expenditure, were excessive. In 19 8 9 the 
budget deficit was 7.6% of GDP, more than 90 per cent of which was financed by the 
State Bank. As a result of the relaxation of monetary policy and the budget deficit, 
domestic credits increased 175% for the year 1989 (Table 7, Section 2.2.2). In August, 
inflation re-emerged and monthly inflation was running at 2.5-3.0 per cent during the 
last three months of 1989 (and most of the first half of 1990) (Figure 7) . 
Although the inflation phenomenon cannot be understood without referring to the 
public deficits, the latter is not completely sufficient to explain the situation in 1989 as a 
whole and in the following years. In 1989, the budget deficit and the rate of change in 
domestic credits were very high, and also there was a sharp devaluation of the Dong 
against US dollars while inflation decreased sharply. 13 Also , the degree of positive 
association between the changes in domestic credits and inflation rates during the 
period 1989-95 is very weak, quite different from the period before the 1989-reform 
(see Figures 4 and 5, Section 2.2.1). Indeed, the correlation coefficients between the 
rates of change in domestic credits and in retail prices are 0.884 for the period 1978-88 
and 0.047 for the period 1989-95. 
13Kolodko et al (1 992) raised some questions concerning this phenomenon. 
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Apart from the other factors that could help reduce inflation, such as the increase in 
competition and in total output, one possible explanation of the somewhat paradoxical 
phenomenon in the inflationary movement is the large change in the asset portfolio 
choices made by the population. The phenomenon of Vietnam in 1989 seems to be 
similar to the closing months of hyper-inflationary episodes in the study _by Sargent 
( 1982), who foun_d that the end of hyper-inflation is often characterized by falling 
inflation rates despite the fact that the money supply continues to gro~ at~ rapid pace. 
Sargent notes that this only occurs as,- individuals exchange gold, foreign exchange or -
other assets for domestic money. He argues that once individuals come to believe the 
govenment' s fiscal reform and commitment to stabilize the economy, the central bank 
could be sure that the increase in money supply is all demanded by the public and so 
will be non-inflationary. 
The year of 1989 is one example-with substantial evidence of the portfolio shift out of 
dollars and gold into domestic currency. The demand for .US dollars and gold suddenly 
declined. The nominal exchange rate remained relatively stable after March i'989 until 
mid-1990 when consecutive devaluations occurred. Before the reform, the gold price 
was almost twice as high as the world price at free market exchange rates. It \Vas 
stabilized at a level lower than the world price throughout most of 1989 (Kolodko et al 
1992: 133). Household deposit saving behaviour was substantially altered in 1989 as 
the stability test for the equation of demand for real household deposits suggested, and 
the substantial change in household deposits into the banking system is further 
evidence of this point. 
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Thus, the government's success in stabilizing the economy in the year of 1989 as a 
whole was a combination of fiscal and monetary restraint as well as the asset portfolio 
choices of the people in favour of Dong in response to the market-oriented reforms that 
were set in train. The confidence of the people in the fundamental changes to policies 
enabled the government to ease credit conditions without re-igniting inflation. 
Summary 
This chapter examines the theory of the financial system in CPEs, in which central 
control over money supply is at best indirect and incomplete. With the accommodating 
and passive role of the monolithic state banking system ('monobank') and the 'soft 
budget constraint' facing the SOE sector, the economy tends to suffer from increasing 
'repressed' inflation because of the public deficits (the 'flow' problem), in addition to 
the 'monetary overhang' (the 'stock' problem). It is argued that, as a result of 
microeconomic reforms undertaken in the early 1980s resulting in significant parallel 
markets in Vietnam, there was no serious 'stock' problem during the 1980s before the 
1989-reform. However, there was a very serious 'flow' problem due to the 
monetization of the budget deficit and the deficits of SOEs. 
Despite the efforts to stabilize the economy, the 1985-reform failed. This is because 
the government applied strong measures in the form of confiscatory monetary reform 
to deal with an insignificant 'stock' problem, while the 'flow' problem remained 
untouched and became even more serious. The focus on the 'flow' problem made a 
decisive contribution to the sharp reduction in inflation, at least in the first half of 
1989. As prices were liberalized, there was no doubt that control over the public 
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deficits associated with the change in domestic credits and hence money supply would 
continue to play an important role in the process of stabilizing the economy. But this 
'flow' problem is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for explaining the 
inflationary movement. The evidence in 1989 showed that the asset portfolio choice by 
the population is a factor which cannot be ignored in understanding 1.nflationary 
movement. The interaction between macroeconomic policy initiatives and this type of 
structural change since 1989 is the subject of research in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
Monetary Control and Inflationary Movement 
in the Aftermath of the 1989-reform 
3.1. Financial structure and monetary control 
3.1.1. Financial structure and reform 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.1 ), prior to 1990, the \ t ietnamese banking 
system remained consistent with the model in a centrally-plm.ned economy: the 
primary task of the State Bank of Vietnam (SBVN) was to provide all banking 
services in accordance with the national plan. In mid-1988, v·ietnarn took the initial 
steps towards establishing a two-tier banking system by transferring the commercial 
banking functions of the SBVN to the new state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). 
In practice, however, the two-tier system did not function as intended since the SBVN 
remained very much part of the state bureaucracy. 
Only in 1990 did the new laws on banking (the 'Decree on the State Bank of Vietnam' 
and the 'Decree on Banks, Credit Co-operative and Finance Companies') authorize 
the SBVN to assume traditional central bank functions suc:1 a.s the conduct of 
monetary policy and the supervision of the financial system. T o a large extent, 
commercial banks took over from the SBVN the functions of de?osi t and lending vis-
a-vis households and enterprises. Sectoral restrictions on sr,ec iaiized banking 
activities and barriers to entry for ne\v domestic and foreign bru~~s -\,:ere abolished. At 
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present, 1n addition to the four SOCBs 14, there are in operation a number of 
shareholding banks, credit cooperatives/funds, joint-venture banks and foreign banks 
(see diagram). 
State Bank of Vietnam (SBVN) 
. 
4 state-owned 78 other Over 600 credit 2 finance co's & 
commercial commercial cooperatives and few insurance 
banks banks people's credit funds co's 
(of which: 52 joint stock bfnks, 22 foreign bank branches, 4 joint-venture banks) 
Source: Leung (1997) 
Since 1990, the ref arm measures have granted a greater degree of autonomy and 
independence to all levels of the banking system. The banks have begun to modernize 
their internal systems and have gradually improved services, for example, the payment 
systems within and between major cities. In 1995, larger companies and thousands of 
private customers had cheque-accounts , and credit cards appeared on the market. The 
Vietnamese banks have also taken th~ first step towards integrating into the 
international payment system by joining the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication and the Master Card and Visa Card payment systems. 
Vietnam began issuing T-bonds and T-bills in 1992 in order to cover the budge;t 
deficits. Following the first auction of domestic treasury bills in June 1995, a limj ted 
market in securities has developed bet\veen banks. The first treasury bond issue c h the 
international market was launched in 1996. The government is developj ng a securities 
market, which it hopes will be in place by 1997-98. 
14 Four SOCBs are_the Ba~k for Foreign Trad~ of Vietnam (Vie~combank), the Bank for Invf ~tm~nt and 
Development of Vietnam (BIDV), the Industnal and Commercial Bank (Incombank), and t lie Vietnam 
Bank for Agriculture (Agribank). 
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However. there are at present only a few private companies owned by shareholders . 
By the end of the first-quarter of 1995, there were 20,102 registrated private 
enterprises, but only 1.8% of these are shareholding companies. Most of the private 
enterprises (more than 72%,) are one-owner businesses (Le Dang Doanh 1995). 
Although the number of the SOEs were reduced substantially, from more than 12,000 
in early 1990 to about 6,500 by the end of 1995, so far only three SOEs have 
completed 'equitization'
15
. Also , as the World Bank (1994a: xviii) pomted out, it has 
been the experience in several developing countries that the development of open 
market operations as an instrument of monetary control can take five to six years, as 
developing the needed secondary market for government paper is a slow process. 
Therefore, development of an efficient securities market will take some time. Hence, 
in the foreseeable future, the financial system will be overwhelmingly dominated by 
the banking sector. There are, however, several challenges facing the banklng system. 
In spite of the growing number of domestic and foreign banklng institutions, there is 
little competition in the financial sector. This is not only because of gevemment 
restrictions, but also because the combination of reserve requirements, turnover taxes, 
and profit taxes makes financial intermediation unprofitable (World Bank 1994b). The 
longer-term solution for real competition, however. depends on understanding the role 
of the SOCBs in the new economic environment. At present, it is stressed in Vietnam 
that the SOCBs should play a 'leading role ' in the banking sector. As can be seen 
from Table 8, the sector remains dominated by the SOCBs. which account for about 
l
5The government expects to tum about 2% of the SOEs into shareholding companies rn 1996 and 
1997 (Economic Development Review No 22, June 1996). 
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90% of the total assets of all commercial banks. Also, the SOCBs are still biased 
against the non-state sector. While the non-state sector accounts for about two thirds 
of GDP, its share in total credit was only 36% by the end-1995 (Economic 
Development Review No 22, June 1996). 
Table 8: Structure of the Financial system 
Components 
SBVN 
SOCBs 
Others 
Assets of commercial 
banks (% of GDP) 
Assets 
31/12/89 
Dong (trill) 
5.27 
7.26 
0.22 
26.6 
Assets 
31/12/93 
Dong (trill) 
32.0 
35.1 
3.7 
28.4 
Assets Number 
31/12/95 of branches 
Dong (trill) ( 1995) 
43.3 
5.1 
21.0 
53 
800 
Note: Other institutions: for 1989: shareholding banks, urban and rural credit cooperatives; for 1993: 
shareholding banks, joint-venture banks and foreign banks branches; for 1995: as for 1993 plus credit 
cooperatives. Among the SOCBs, the Agribank has 56 provincial and 500 d_istrict branches. 
Source: To Dinh Thai (1996), World Bank (1994a: 9 and 1991: 18) and the estimation by the author. 
More importantly, in many aspects, the SBVN and SOCBs continue to operate in a 
monobank mode, despite their greater autonomy. In reality, the autonomy of the 
SBVN remains constrained by the government and the SBVN has continued supplying 
loans, making payments or transferring money on behalf of institutions outside the 
financial sector. The SOCBs remain large, public institutions, dependent on the SBVN 
for subsidized funds. In the case of non-perfoming loans, the interest due is covered 
by ne\v loans and by direct SBVN transfers via the SOCBs to the SOEs. In fact, this 
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treatment involves subsidies to the SOEs and may give an inaccurate view of the 
tightness of fiscal policy (Lipworth and Spitaller 1993) 16• Also, the SOCBs still 
operate in segregated parts of the economy, despite the fact that they are authorized to 
act as full service ' universal' banks. For example, over 90% of Agribank loans are to 
the agricultural sector; the Vietcombank has continued dominating the market for 
foreign exchange transactions (World Bank 1993 and Roman 1995). 
At present, Vietnam is a 'underbanked' country. The level of the total assets of all 
commercial banks in 1993 was well below that of other countries in Asia (World 
Bank 1994a: ii) and declined considerably in terms of GDP (Table 8). Most of the 
other banks, apart from the SOCBs, have very few branches- just 1-2 each. There is 
also the problem of access to the banking system. It is estimated that the banking 
system serves only 7% of the population. The survey 'Assessment of firm responses 
to the ne\v economic environment' conducted at the end of 1994 by Vietnam's State 
Planning Committee and Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, showed that 
a majority of enterprises saw limited access to finance as their most serious 
impediment. 
To measure the degree of financial intermediation, one can look at an indicator of 
financial depth. The ratio of M2 to GDP increased significantly from 19 .4% in 1988 
to 26.4% and 27 .2 % in 1989 and 1990 respectively, but declined somewhat during 
1991-93. In 1994-1995, the ratio stood at a level of about 30% (see Table 9 in Section 
16 The banking system has around 5-6 trillion Dong of nonperforming assets (of which 95% are held by 
the SOCBs and 65% are owned by the SOEs) or well over 25% of oustanding loans and twice the 
capital and reserve of the banks. The recorded amount is probably an underestimate of the level of 
nonperfoming assets, since it does not include estimates of substandard or doubtful assets (\Vorld Bank 
l 994a:vii). In 1995, Vietnam invited Coopers & Lybrand to audit the Agribank- the weakest of the four; 
the audits of other SOCBs were to follow (Reuter News Service, July 1995). 
5) 
11, 
3.2.2 below). According to fhe World Bank (1989:27), average M2/GDP ratios for 
three groups of developing countries - high, medium, and low growing economies -
were around 43, 31 and 23 % respectively for the years 1965-87. Thus, while the 
Vietnamese economy has grown fast, financial intermediation in Vietnam is still less 
advanced than in the medium-growth developing countries. Also, cash in .circulation 
to Ml (M2) is between 60 and 79% (30 and 43%) for the period 1989-95. These 
figures are very high in comparison with ASEAN countries and are much higher than 
in most transitional countries (World Bank 1994a: 12). This means that Vietnam is 
still very much a cash economy. 
The lack of public confidence in the formal financial system is a serious problem. 
Despite high real interest rates for time deposits, large financial savings still remain 
outside the banking system in the form of foreign currency, gold, and precious metal. 
The value of US dollars circulating in Vietnam is estimated at about 2-5 billion (see, 
for example, Ngo Huy Due 1996 or Dodsworth et al. (1996)). A number of reasons 
can be listed . One is the historical legacy of a monobank system that is not geared to 
serve individuals. Another is the collapse of several credit cooperatives in 1990-91. 
' 
Still other reasons are claimed to be related to the deficient payment system and cash 
management that result in unacceptable delays in effecting financial transactions or 
making cash withdrawals (Roman 1995). The recent widening of the current account 
deficit may have caused anxie_ty about the adequacy of official foreign exchange 
reserves and of macroeconomic management more generally. All these factors would 
have also contributed to a lack of public confidence. 
53 
I· I
A 
111! 
'l 
I• 
1·· 
A consequence of the weaknesses of the banking system is the development of a 
significant informal financial sector that consists chiefly of two types of activities. The 
first is transactions in parallel currency markets that mainly meet demand for foreign 
exchange for legal and illegal imports and portfolio di'versification. · The portfolio 
motive seems to be particularly strong in Vietnam as the hyper-inflationary experience 
in the mid-l 980s and the relatively high inflationary episode in 1990-91 still affect the 
credibility of the banking system. The second type of informal financial activity is 
(short-term) loans given for various investment and consumption purposes by money-
lenders, friends or relatives. 
Although the size of the informal financial sector is very hard to measure, there is no 
doubt that this sector plays a very important role in financial intermediation in 
Vietnam. It is an established fact that US dollars are widely used and kept by the 
population. A survey of hundreds of small to medium-sized private enterprises in 
1995 shows that about 78% of these enterprises borrowed from the informal sector 
(To Dinh Thai 1996). In rural areas, more than 70% of households have taken loans 
from the informal sector, which, in tum, has captured about 70% of the total loan 
market (World Bank 1994a: 72). 
From the point of view of conducting monetary policy, the examination of the existing 
financial environment has some important implications. First, given the large SOE 
sector17 and the importance of the relationship between this sector and the 
government, and the still limited independence of the state-owned banks. there exists 
17 Although the number of SOEs has been reduced substantially, they are still managing 88.4% of the 
country's total capital and their output share rose during 1989-94 from 25% and 66% to nearly 30% of 
GDP and 72% of industrial production, respectively (Economic Development Review No22, June 1996 
and Dodsworth et al 1996, Tables 3.1,p.12 and A.7,p.-1-5). 
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the potential for monetary expansion without rigorous control. It is essential that the 
'quasi-fiscal' deficit be part of the accounting of the consolidated government. (Quasi-
fiscal deficits can arise from loans by the state-owned banks at subsidized rates and 
losses on foreign exchange operation in the form of guarantees). Also, the government 
may be faced with the so-called 'asymmetry problem' in the implementation of 
monetary policy. That means that once the stock of money is already expanded, it is 
not easy for the government to contract the money supply (Yung Chul Park 1973). 
This is because the tightening up of credit could have a contractionary impact on the 
public sector. And this may not be desirable from the govenment's point of view. 
Second, the inflationary movement may not only be sensitive to the change in money 
supply, but also affected by the financial portfolio choice of the public in terms of the 
shifts between domestic and foreign currencies. The portfolio choice. in turn, depends 
very much on the expectation and credibility of the government policies. A 
preliminary consideration in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.3) shows that this \Vas the case in 
1989. The World Bank ( 1994b) also suggested that one factor in explaining low 
inflation despite an increase of 59% in domestic credit in 1993 \Vas that a substantial 
part of the rapid increase in credit to the private sector was offset by unrecorded 
contraction of activities in the informal sector. Since the 'informal' financial activities 
can significantly undermine monetary control, one important way to relieve the 
possible negative impact of the informal sector on monetary control is to create easier 
access for the private sector to the banking system (especially to the SOCBs in the 
case of Vietnam). 
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Third, because of the lack of development in the financial sector, in Vietnam as in 
many developing countries, most of the traditional monetary instruments are subject to 
certain technical limitations. This problem will be outlined in Section 3.1.2 below. 
3.1.2. lVIonetary control and the instruments of monetary policy 
In the past, within the framework of a centrally-planned economy or modified-planned 
economy, the SBVN became the interface between the state budgetary process and 
SOEs, ensuring the flow of financial resources in accordance with the national plan. 
The SBVN had, in fact, no control over the money supply, and the economy \Vas 
prone to inflationary pressures, kept in check only through price control and rationing 
(Chapter 1 ). 
The reform of the financial sector has changed the role and the functions of the 
SBVN. In principle, the SBVN has the authority to control monetary growth to meet 
targets for inflation and real economic growth, and has been responsible for the 
supervision and regulation of the financial system. The method of monetary control 
has improved in recent years. The SBVN has been using a monetary programming 
framework, that is, determining a monetary target consistent with projections of net 
foreign assets, credit to the government, and credit to the economy (World Bank 
1993). Also, by introducing a nascent government bill market, Vietnam has taken 
initital steps to develop open market operations as an effective indirect tool of 
monetary management. Some other more market-based measures such as the auction 
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of refinancing lines as well as the use of contracts allowing the sale and repurchase of 
some commercial papers at an agreed price, are also under consideration. 
It should be stressed, however, that the monetary targets have been established by the 
Council for Monetary Policy and Banking, which is headed by the Minister of Finance 
and includes other ministers as members , in addition to the SBVN governor. As a 
result, the board of directors of the SBVN has been performing more the role of an 
advisory committee than that of a decision-making board. Also, at present, the 
banking inspection body is directly responsible to both the governor of the SBVN and 
the government's General Department of Inspection. 
At present, the lack of development in the financial structure is also a senous 
institutional factor that limits the effectiveness of most monetary instruments 
available to the monetary authority. This can be seen from an examination of the 
money supply determination and the instruments and measures used by the SBVN to 
control the stock of money. 
By using the following definitional equations: 
M=CU+D, H=CU+BR , br=BRID, and cd=CU/D 
where Mis stock of money, CU is currency in circulation, 
D is deposits in commercial banks , 
His monetary base or high-powered money, and BR is bank reserves, 
we can easily derive the supply function for money 
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cd + l J M = --- H=kH 
cd + br (4) 
where k = (cd+ 1)/(cd+br) is the money multiplier. 
Since cd (the currency-deposit ratio) reflects the behaviour of the public, br (the 
reserve-deposit ratio) reflects the behaviour of the commercial banks (and other 
financial institutions), and H reflects the behaviour of the central bank, the money 
supply is determined by the interaction of all these agents. 
In Vietnam, as in many other developing countries, the cd ratio depends on income, 
the deposit interest rates, the expected exchange rate , the interest rate in the informal 
financial sector, the degree of monetization, and the development of the formal 
financial system. Four main factors determine the br ratio: the uncertainty of net 
deposit inflow; the cost of borrowing from the central bank when a commercial bank 
runs short of reserves; the loan interest forgone by holding reserves; and the required 
reserve ratio. The br ratio would depend very much on the reserve requirement ( and 
credit ceilings) established by the central bank, since commercial banks are likely to 
expand their loans to the maximum level permitted by their reserve assets. 
High-powered money His defined as the monetary liabilities of the central bank. The 
components of Hare (net) central bank credit to the government, central bank credit to 
the commercial banks and central bank net holdings of foreign assets. Foreign 
exchange reserves are influenced primarily by the fluctuations in capital flows. Hence 
the monetary authorities would have little direct control over this source, given the 
commitment to a pegged exchange rate regime. The control over the other two 
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sources, to a large extent, depends on the degree of independence of the central bank. 
In Vietnam, although the law sees the SBVN as a distinct body, the close link of the 
SBVN to the government and the SOCBs that dominate the banJcing system, reduces 
the ability of the SBVN to control the monetary base. 
In general, most determinants of the money supply are essentially endogenous to 
government interventions. The central bank can still control the stock of money only if 
it implements effectively various monetary instruments and measures. At present, the 
SBVN exercises monetary control through three policy instruments: interest rates on 
both deposits and loans, central bank refinancing, reserve requirements, and other 
measures such as informal or formal advice regarding bank lending policies and credit 
ceilings, in the aggregate and on a bank-by-bank basis (World Bank 1994a). 
Up to now, interest rates on deposits and loans have been controled directly by the 
SBVN through regulations. In fact, the SBVN determines and announces publicly the 
minimum deposit rate and the maximum loan rate to be used by credit institutions. In 
practice, banks maintain all interest rates at the prescribed levels. The interest rate 
policy, however, has radically changed since 1989 \Vith the linking of interest rates to 
the inflation index. The rates on time deposits and loans, except during 1990-91, have 
become positive in real terms, and banks have been able to eliminate the previous 
negative spread beween their deposit and lending rates. 
Deposit interest rates (3-and 6-month) have begun to play a ro le in the mobilization of 
short-term financial resources and in the increase in demand for domestic currency. 
One should mention that vitually all savings deposits in Vietnan1 are short -term. In 
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1992, the prescribed sector-specific lending rates were abandoned and instead, the 
lending rates were differentiated only according to the loans for fixed or working 
capital. However, the lending rates reflect very weakly credit risk premia and terms of 
maturity since the interest rate on fixed-capital is lower than that on working capital. 
These factors have been discouraging longer term lending by the banking se_ctor. 
Together with interest rate policy, (aggregate) credit ceilings are regarded as part of 
direct monetary controls 18. These ceilings are broken down into ceilings for individual 
banks. This implies that each bank faces the same restriction in terms of the maximum 
credit growth rate allowed. Thus, while some banks may hit the ceiling, others may 
not be restricted by it. In Vietnam, bank-by-bank credit ceilings have been used since 
1994 and were first imposed only on the four SOCBs. However, currently 22 
additional banks (mostly urban joint-stock banks) are covered by the ceilings; foreign 
and joint venture banks remain entirely exempt from ceilings. 
The main advantage of direct controls is their effectiveness in controlling intermediate 
targets such as credit growth or interest rates. Also, direct instruments are considered 
less complicated for the central bank to implement than indirect instruments. 
Nevertheless, direct instruments have a number of inter-related drawbacks. As with all 
non-market-based meth_ods, direct controls risk misallocation of resources and hamper 
competition and, therefore, development of the banking system. Furthermore, they 
18 There exit several types of credit ceilings: selective credit controls, gross ceilings, and credit ceilings 
that take into account the inflationary impact of credit creation. Note that. the distinction between direct 
and indirect monetary instruments is, however, not always clearly defined. These two concepts have a 
number of definitions. one of which is that direct instruments take the form of regulations , while 
indirect instruments work through markets. That is why, for example, although reserve requirements are 
generally considered as an indirect instrument, they carry characteristics associated with direct 
instruments in the form of regulation (see Hilbers 1993 ). 
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may lead to excess liquidity in the banking system, when demand for capital is high 
(Hilbers 1993). This is particularly so when high deposit interest rates come together 
with tight credit ceilings. A credit 'glut' was experienced in Vietnam at the end of 
1994-early 1995 and in the first half of 1996 (Vu Ngoc Nhung 1995 and Vietnam 
Investment Review No 249, 22-28 July 1996). 
In order to develop an efficient financial system, therefore, the use of indirect 
monetary instruments should be encouraged. But up to now, both the central bank 
refinancing and reserve requirements that are often regarded as indirect instruments, 
have been implemented inefficiently. 
With regard to refinancing policy, the SBVN provides two facilities: short-term and 
longer-term lending to banks. The rates charged for short-term lending are lower than 
the (maximum) lending rates prescribed for the banks ' own lending to their 
customers. This encourages banks to use the SBVN as a source of funds for onlending 
to their customers. The second facility (longer-term refinancing to banks) is now also 
supposedly available to all commercial banks, but in practice, it mainly benefits the 
SOCBs. Moreover, the longer-term refinancing rates are in the range of 85 to 95% of 
the interest rates charged by banks to their customers. Thus, both facilities represent 
cheap access to SBVN credit and hence contain inflationary potential. It seems that, at 
present, the SBVN is finding it difficult to encourage banks to lend long-term; 
therefore it is subsidizing this type of loan through ·cheap' refinancing rates. The 
threat to macroeconomic stability should be the main reason for finding solutions 
other than central bank subsidies. 
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Under the SB VN statute, m1n1mum reserve ratios may fluctuate between 1 Oo/o and 
35% of a bank's total deposits, including foreign deposits. The effective reserve 
requirements for all banks, however, ranged from 6% to 9% at the end of 1993 and 
were even lower in 1991 and 1992. Also, the penalty on shortfalls has been rarely 
enforced. In 1994, the SB VN prescribed separate reserve requirements for demand 
and time deposits, including also banks' holdings of T-bills. A justification for the 
differentiated reserve requirement is the experience of some developing countries, 
which require commercial banks to hold a minimum of certain prescribed liquid as_sets 
in order to prevent the use of alternative ways of acquiring reserves (for example, by 
liquidating banks' holdings of government securities). But the effectiveness of the 
new system of reserve requirements has been in question. The World Bank ( 1994a) 
even saw this as 'a regressive step' , given the capability of the banks to collude with 
customers to change the categories of deposits, the limitations of staff expertise in 
defining the procedures of banking transactions and the fact that T-bill holdings only 
change the composition and not the volume of credit, and hence the new step will 
weaken its monetary policy impact. 
As the high-powered money, H, in Equation (4) has a (net) foreign asset component, 
the control of the money stock depends also on foreign exchange management. In a 
small open economy with a fixed exchange rate and capital mobility, the monetary 
authorities have very weak control over the high-powered money. After exchange rate 
unification in 1989, Vietnam was classified as a country with a managed-floating 
exchange rate regime 19 • This could give more scope for an independent monetary 
19In 1991, the SBVN established two forei2:n exchan2:e trading centres, dealing with US do llars. in Ho 
Chi Minh City and Hanoi. The participan~ include ;ommercial banks. the companies with authorized 
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policy. For various reasons (eg., control of inflation, reduction of the effects of capital 
inflow on competitiveness), the SBVN would intervene in the foreign exchange 
market as in recent years. But care needs to be taken for two reasons. First, official 
reserves are still low. At the end of 1995, these reserves \Vere about US $900 million, 
or just equal to about 12% of total import in 1995. Second, the market for government 
securities is not well-developed to allow for sterilization on a large scale. The 
intervention, thus, may undermine the monetary growth target. 
To sum up, the implementation of credit ceilings, at present, is an easier tool for the 
SB VN to restrain credit growth. As the economy becomes more open, together with 
other monetary instruments, exchange rate management can aiso play an important 
role in the control over the money supply. Together with the continuing process of 
financial reform, there is obviously room for improvment of monetary instruments and 
measures. 
3.2. A statistical consideration of inflationary movement 
3.2.1. The causes of inflation 
The question of the causes of inflation has been at the centre of the 
monetarist/structuralist debate since the 1960s and 1970s (Kirkpatrick and Nixon 
197 6, Crockett 1981 ). The monetarist view sees the causes of inflation ( and baiance 
of payments) difficulties in the excess of aggregate demand associated mostly with 
monetary expansion, over aggregate supply. This vie\v often interprets inflation as a 
access to international markets and institutions which hold licences fo r receiving payments in foreign 
exchange (Brahm 1992). 
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purely 'monetary phenomenon', ie inflation cannot continue for long without 
monetary expansion. Inflation stabilization, therefore, can be approached only by 
restraining aggregate demand. The 'monetarist' solutions - the removal of fiscal 
deficits, the restraint of credit, and the elimination of market distortions (especially the 
establishment of an 'equilibrium' rate of exchange)- have formed the basis of Ilv1F-
sponsored stabilization programs. However, as Barro( 1982) pointed out, it should be 
realized that the 'monetary phenomenon' refers not only to movements in the quantity 
of money but also to factors that influence the public's willingness to hold money. 
Although structuralists do not deny the 'monetary' nature of inflation in the long-run, 
they contend that demand restraint could be reflected in the short run mainly in a drop 
in domestic output due to structural rigidities and bottlenecks in the pattern of 
production and demand. Policy, thus, should focus on removing supply bottlenecks 
and other structural rigidities, so that output capacity can be raised, and therefore, 
excess demand reduced. 
The debate over the inflation problem indicates the complexity of the problem. As 
Crockett ( 1981) pointed out: 
'Inflation is a complex interactive process in which the level of aggregate demand 
and the economic structure (including the structure of expectation) within which 
that demand operates, both play important roles. Over the long run, inflation can 
persist only if the monetary authorities continually permit nominal demand to rise 
faster than real supply ... But when the structure of the economy is such that certain 
economic agents have substantial market power, or when inflationary expectations 
have become firmly entrenched, pressures on prices can persist for a long time even 
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when conventionally used indicators show no overall excess demand. The existence 
of strong inflationary expectations increases, at least in the short run, the degree of 
monetary restraint required to achieve a given moderation of those pressures. And 
in the longer run, structural factors, as even monetarists would agree, determine the 
intensity of factor use that is consistent with price stability'. 
The interaction of the factors causing inflation can be seen from two simple formulas 
for inflation rate which can be derived either from the equilibrium condition in the 
money market or from the formula of money supply and the definitional equation for 
monetary velocity. Both these formulas will be shown since they form the basis for 
analyzing the inflation problem and for building most theoretical and econometric 
models of inflation. 
In the first case, the supply of real money balances (MJPt equals the demand for these 
balances (M/P)d. 
(: r (: r (5) 
Taking the natural logarithm and differentiating with respect to time will give us 
n: = gM -D,log(: r (6) 
where n is the inflation rate, gM is the growth rate of nominal money supply, Dr is 
the differentiation operator with respect to time, showing the rate of change in real 
demand for (domestic) money. 
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To obtain another formula for the inflation rate, we suppose that cg is flow of (net) 
central bank credit to cover a 'monetized' part of the government budget deficit and 
cb is central bank credit to commercial banks. (In a broader sense, cg can be 
understood as credit to the public sector; then ch is credit going to the private sector). 
Here cg and cb are aII measured as a percentage of GDP. In the case without central 
bank intervention in the foreign exchange market, cg+cb reflects entirely the change 
in high-powered money, H. For simplicity, we assume also that the money multiplier k 
in Equation (4) is stable . In other words, the change in total money supply M is 
determined only by the change in H. Therefore, by denoting P as the general price 
level and y as real output, we can obtain 
M H 
kPy - Py =cg+ ch (7) 
where a dot over a variable (for example, M), indicates the rate of change (dM/dt). 
But monetary velocity Vis defined as V = Py/M, so by taking the natural logarithm 
and differentiating with respect to time , we can obtain 
. . . 
M P y V V 
-=-+---=rr+n--
M P y V V 
where 'Tr is the inflation rate and n is the growth rate of real output. 
Using (7) and (8) will give us 
V 
'Tr =kV(cg+ch ) - n +y 
(8) 
(9) 
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As monetary velocity can be considered a linear and increasing function of the 
inflation rate (Mundell 1971 ), V= a + f3n , where a represents the noninflationary 
level of velocity and ~ ( > 0 ) is the responsiveness of velocity to the inflation rate, it 
is possible to derive the formula of the determination of the inflation' rate in a steady 
state (V = 'It = 0): 
n 
ka(cg+cb)-n 
l - k/3 (cg+ cb) 
(10) 
Since the budget deficit g can be financed in three ways: \vith high-powered money 
through central bank credit to the government cg, domestic bonds b, or foreign debtf, 
where g, b and fare also measured as a percentage of GDP, we can rewrite Equation 
( 10) as: 
n 
ka(g-b- f +cb)-n 
l-kf3(g-b-f+cb) 
( 1 O') 
Both Formulas (6) and (10) show that inflation is the result of several factors. Because 
of the increase in money supply and its underlying causes as the monetization of fiscal 
deficit and central bank credit to commercial banks, there is inflation. Evidence from a 
number of inflationary experiences (including the case of Vietnam) shows that they 
have common internal causes, notably large budget (public) deficits which run to an 
expansion of money and credit. Moreover, the dynamics of inflation are broadly the 
same (Bn1no et al 1991 and Dornbusch 1992). At the same time, the ability to cover 
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the budget deficit by domestic or foreign debt can directly contribute to a reduction in 
inflation (Formula (10'))20 . 
But given the change in money supply, inflation rates can differ widely, depending o,n 
the supply side, real demand for domestic money, which in tum depends on the 
financial structure, and expectations. Both Formulas ( 6) and ( 10) indicate the benefit 
from a reduction in the inflation rate due to strong economic growth ( In (6), there will 
be higher demand for real balances). In other words, there is room for the provision of 
additional money without introducing the risk of inflation. As f3 in Formulas ( 10) and 
( 1 0') represents the responsivness of velocity of money holdings to the inflation rate 
(and therefore, usually reflects the rate of change in the flight from domestic 
currency), the public credibility of an anti-inflation program is very important from 
the policy point of view. For example, in an environment where there is accelerating 
dollarization (/3 is increasing, so is n), the scope for an inflation tax is very limited. A 
more detailed examination of the possible factors explaining demand for money, 
which thus effect inflation (Formula (6)), is undertaken below. 
According to the Keynesian approach, real money demand depends positively on the 
level of real income or real wealth and depends inversely on the (bond) interest rate 
which measures the opportunity cost of holding money. According to Friedman 
(1956), money, like any other asset, yields a flow of services to the person who holds 
it. That is why money is directly substitutable with both financial assets and real assets 
20 To see these effects, one can take partial derivatives of the inflation rate to corresponding variables. 
For example, Jrr/cJcg = ( k( a+ka/3-/3n))/(l-k/3( cg+cb )J2 > 0 since f3n is very small in comparison to a. 
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(such as physical capital and real durables). 21 The measure of the opportunity cost of 
holding money should be based on the income to be earned from possessing these 
other assets. Moreover, the principle of the diminishing marginal rate of substitution 
between money and other assets ensures that, if the, return on any of these other assets 
nses, the demand for real balances will fall. Thus, the problem of defining an 
appropriate money demand function, together with the choice of a real income 
variable, is to pick out the relevant variables to measure the opportunity cost of 
holding money. 
In developing countries, particularly in those with the experience of high inflation and 
an under-developed capital market, both physical assets (like durable goods) and 
foreign currency (for example, US dollars) are usually the principal assets that can be 
substituted for domestic currency. For durable goods, the rate of return is the expected 
rate of inflation. The rate of return on foreign currency in terms of domestic currency 
is often measured as the ( expected) rate of depreciation (see, for example, 
Calvo( 1992) and Choudhry( 1995)). Implicitly, this assumes that the public can only 
keep foreign currency in hand rather than keeping it as an interest-earning foreign 
exchange account in a bank. 
Some countries with a high degree of currency substitution, however, have allowed 
the banking system to hold US dollar deposits for residents (Rodriguez 1993). 
Moreover, these countries usually also have an active interest rate policy so as to make 
domestic currency more attractive. In this case, the domestic economy may function as 
21 The dividing line between the Keynesian and Friedmand (monetarist) model of the demand function 
for real balances is drawn in terms of the extent to which money is directly substitutable for other 
assets. 
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if it operated under high capital mobility. The residents can deposit dollars and/or, if 
the transaction costs are negligible because of rather free exchange between domestic 
currency and dollars, can change dollars into domestic currency to deposit in the local 
banking system. Thus, the deposit interest rate on dollars ( ifc ) or· the deposit interest 
rate on domestic currency minus the expected depreciation rate ( id - Ef ) could be 
used as a measure of the opportunity cost of holding dollars in hand, depending on 
which is higher22. Note that an increase in id - Ef means a rise in demand for domestic 
currency. 
The above consideration implicitly assumes that there is only a one-way effect from 
the right-hand-side variables in (6) and ( 10) on inflation. In fact, the problem of 
inflation determination is much more complicated since these variables can be 
affected by inflation and can have an interrelationship. The empirical studies support 
the proposition that high inflation has a negative impact on output growth (Barro 
1995, Dornbusch and Reynoso 1989, and Fischer 1993). The public expectation of the 
variables determining the opportunity cost of holding money, such as interest rates, 
expected inflation rate and exchange rate, is strongly affected by current inflation 
rates. In tum, the coefficient f3 in ( 10) depends obviously on this expectation. Also, 
the anti-inflationary effects of the rise in foreign and/or domestic borrowing may be 
partly reinforced /offset by a change in /3. An increase in inflation will also result in a 
22This is implied from the so-called parity condition: Ec/E 1 (1 +id)= 1 +ire , where Eo and E1 are exchange 
rates at initial and end periods of depositing money, or Ee = (id -ire)/(1 +ire) ::::: id - ire , or ire = id - Ee. Note 
that people's financial portfolios depend also on the loan interest rates in the informal sector, which are 
usually higher than official deposit interest rates. But the risks are also much higher. Moreover. the 
choice of an appropriate informal interest rate is not simple because of the lack of data and the 
segmentation of the informal market. In the case of Vietnam, anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
portfolio choice by the publ ic is mostly affected by the official deposit interest rates. 
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fall in real budget revenue because of collection lags ( the Olivera-Tanzi effect), 
thereby possibly widening the budget deficit (Chaudhry 1990). Moreover, the central 
emphasis on money creation as an exogenous variable in the inflation process has not 
gone unchallenged (Dornbusch 1987). The 'Balance of Payments School' held the 
view that balance of payments difficulties, associated with repatriation payments, gave 
rise to exchange rate depreciation, which in tum led to inflation and monetization. 
A rigorous investigation of the inflation problem, therefore, requires support from the 
more sophisticated techniques (eg. a broader dynamic model and/or an econometric 
investigation). However, the Formulas (6) and (10), that reflect quite well the main 
ideas of the causes of inflation, provide a good guide for a preliminary assessment of 
the inflationary experience in Vietnam or any developing/transitional economies. 
3.2.2. The Vietnamese experience: A statistical consideration 
It is clear from Table 9 that the much higher inflation rate during 1989-91 1n 
comparison to that during 1992-95 was associated with the higher growth rate of 
money supply (in terms of currency in circulation, lv!l, or M2). This pattern seems to 
be consistent with the monetarist explanation of inflation. Thus, better monetary 
control and fiscal management could have been the important factors in inflation 
control during the period of 1992-95. 
In recent years, as mentioned in Section 3 .1.2, the SBVN has used different monetary 
instruments, such as interest rates, central bank refinancing, reserve requirement and 
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credit ceilings, to control money supply. In particular, credit quotas have been quite an 
effective instrument in avoiding excessive credit gro\vth. 
Table 9: Some Financial Indicators (1989-95) (%-change, otherwise indicated) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Budget balance (% GDP) -7.6 -5.9 -1.5 -1.7 -4.7 -3.6 -4.2 
Money supply Ml 53.9 79.0 58.6 46.3 31.6 20.8 23.0 
- Currency 129.6 58.8 71.8 69.7 35.5 26.4 20.0 
Money supply M2 188.8 53.1 78.8 33.7 27.2 51.2 33.1 
- Domestic credit 175.0 36.4 44.1 19.9 58.6 40.2 32.6 
'Inflation (by CPI) 34.7 67.5 67.6 17.5 5.2 14.4 12.7 
Seigniorage (%· of GDP) .. 5.6 3.2 6.0 2.5 4.0 3.7 
Monthly average nominal interest rates on Dong: 
I -demand deposit 6.15 2.75 2.45 1.63 0.83 0.70 0.70 
- time deposit 8.06 4.41 3.75 2.86 1.70 1.70 1.70 
Nominal depreciation rate 59.09 93.98 -15.89 0.00 1.71 -0.41 
Real exch. rate (89=100) 100 97.0 126.7 88.2 86.2 77.5 69.8 
Financial depth (M2/GDP, % ) 26.4 27.2 26.4 24.6 25.3 29.6 30.1 
Currency/Ml (%) 65.7 58.3 63.2 73.3 75.5 79.0 77.l 
Currency /M2 ( % ) 31.7 32.9 31.6 40.1 42.8 35.7 32.2 
Note: -The estimation is based on the data measured from December to December 
- Ml = Currency in circulation + demand deposits; M2 = :tvfl + time deposit + foreign currency 
deposits. In Vietnam, M2 is often referred to as total liquidity. 
- Seigniorage is measured as the change in high-powered money 
- The estimation for the real exchange rate is based on the formula Re=(EP*)IP where £=nominal 
exchange rate, p*=US price level, and P= domestic price level. Declining values indicate appreciation. 
Data of US inflation are taken from IMF(l 995, Table A9, p 133). Because of the lack of data, we cannot 
estimate the real trade-weighted index as real effective exchange rate. The estimation based on the 
bilateral exchange rate of Dong against US dollar may result in an exaggerated view of the Dong's 
appreciation. 
Source: -The estimation and data are mainly based on data from the SPC (1994) and the World Bank 
(1993, Table 4.1, p.242 and 1994a: Table 2.1, p.4 and Table 3.2, p.10). The revised data of 1994 and 
1995 are provided by the SBVN and the CIEM. (References to data in Dang Due Dam (1995a), GSO 
(1994) and Le Dang Doanh (1995) also are made). 
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Regarding the state budget, revenue has increased sharply since 1992 due to better tax 
collection and the revenue from increasing oil production (see, for example, Table 6 
in Riedel and Comer 1996 and Table A13 in Dodsworth et al 1996). The improved 
domestic revenues, together with tHe available aid resources, allowed the government 
not only to implement the salary reform in the public sector in 1993, but also 
concentrate much more on the public investment program which was earlier curtailed 
in 1991. More importantly, the way of financing budget deficits has changed. 
Although there are quite different figures from different sources, it is believed that the 
use of the SBVN as a source for monetizing the budget deficit has become much less 
significant23 . This situation is in contrast to the past when the SB VN' s credit, together 
with foreign assistance, were mainly used to cover the budget deficits. 
However, the budget alone does not fully describe the overall public finance. The 
quasi-fiscal deficit (the consolidated balance sheet of the go\'ernment which also 
includes assets and liabilities of the SOEs and the state-owned financial institutions 
(including the SBVN)) should also be taken into account. In fact, the government has 
continued to use public financial institutions other than the SBVN, such as the SOCBs 
and the Social Security Fund, as the sources for the budget payments. It is also 
reported that many government bodies (the Treasury and the General Department of 
Investment, for example) have accepted deposits or supplied loans outside the control 
of the SBVN (Economic Development Review No 22, June 1996). The existing 
23 For example, according to data from the SPC (1994) and Dang Due D::im ( 1995b ), since 1991 
Vietnam has ended the use of the SB VN' s credit to cover the budget de fi cit. But the preliminary 
estimation given in the World Bank (1994b, Table 5. 1) shows that in 1993. fo r example, the financing 
of the budget deficit through the SBVN still existed, although this source of fin ance was small and even 
negative in 1991 and 1992, respectively . 
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refinancing facilities that mainly benefit the SOCBs, may represent another channel 
for increasing the quasi-deficits. Recently, moreover, there has been a tendency to 
return to support the SOEs with price subsidies, preferred interest rates, depreciation 
and tax reductions as in the case of 1990-91 when the reforms were somewhat 
reversed. 
Table 9 shows that throughout the first half of the 1990s, the government continued to 
exploit the SBVN' s capacity to create 'easy money' through seigniorage. The annual 
values of the seigniorage are quite significant as percentages of GDP. Also, in recent 
years the growth rate of money supply has been still rather high. Put together, these 
figures alone can hardly explain the low inflation rate since 1992. 
One fact, which was mentioned in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.3) is that the inflation rates 
appear to be no longer sensitive to changes in domestic credit as in the past, \Vhen the 
banking system played only an accommodating and passive role. But the correlation 
coefficients calculated from Table 9 bet\veen the change in the currency in circulation, 
M 1, and M2 and inflation rates during the period of 1990-95 are 0.666, 0.880 and 
0.823 respectively. The high degree of association between the change in M2 and 
inflation rates may indicate that the international reserves management has played a 
new role in affecting inflation through the building up (1990-95 except 1993) or the 
running down (1993) of the net foreign assets. With regard to the effect on the 
exchange rate, however, the net interventions of the SBVN have been modest. Since 
1992, the nominal exchange rate has remained fairly stable, although during 1990-91 
it closely followed the price level, depreciating as inflation rose (Figure 8). One main 
reason for the real appreciation of the domestic currency (the Dong) has been a surge 
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in capital inflows stemming from the growth in exports, foreign investment and aid, 
and private remittances. This happened even though the SBVN intervened in the 
foreign exchange market in 1992, 1994 and 1995 by purchasing US dollars. 
Given the active interest rate policy implemented by the government, the relatively 
stable nominal exchange rate since 1992 has reinforced the portfolio choice in favour 
of the Dong, which in tum has contributed to slowing down inflation. Also, since 
1990 Vietnamese citizens possessing foreign exchange have had the right to deposit it 
in a foreign exchange account and receive interest at the SBVN rate. 
Figure 8: Nominal Exchange Rate and Price Level, 1989-95 ( Index, 1989=100) 
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Source: The estimation is based on data in Table 9 
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In 1989, the high interest rate policy did its job in defending the domestic currency 
and fighting inflation. The very high nominal and real interest rates (Tables 9 and 10) 
strongly increased demand for domestic money and hence succeeded in offsetting the 
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impact of a high rate of monetary expansion on inflation. This policy was, of course, 
very costly and could not be sustained. 
Table 10: The Rates of Return on Dong in Real Terms 
and in Terms of US Dollars (1989-95) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Annual real rate of return on Dong Cid - n): 
- demand deposit 70.0 -29.0 -33.9 3.9 5.2 -5.7 
- time deposit 118.8 0.3 -12.1 22.8 17.2 8.0 
Annual rate of return on Dong in terms of US$ ( measured as id- Et 
- demand deposit 121.1 -20.6 -60.3 37.3 10.4 7.0 
- time deposit 169.9 8.8 -38.4 56.2 22.4 20.7 
Note: a-£ is current depreciation rate. 
1995 
-4.0 
9.7 
9.1 
22.8 
- The depreciation rate in the parallel market in 1989 is -16.4% and the annual nominal interest rates 
are calculated as ((l+ ictm/100) 12-l)*IOO, where idm are monthly average nominal interest rates on Dong 
taken from Table 9). 
Source: The estimation is based on data in Table 9. 
The result of the temporary reversal of the reforms in 1990-91 with the attempt to 
'rescue' the SOEs by relaxing the monetary restraint_ and the interest rate policy \Vas 
that there was no further portfolio adjustment in favour of the Dong. A close 
association between inflation and money growth was observed. Also, the prices of 
foreign exchange and gold increased well ahead of the rate of inflation (World Bank 
1992). A household survey undertaken by McCarty ( 1994) shows that in 1991, the 
holding of dollars (gold), rice, and other goods was registered as the most important 
components of a saving portfolio. The highly negative value of the difference between 
the deposit interest rate and the depreciation rate during 1990-91 (Table 10) indicates 
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that a better option for households was to deposit dollars in banks to get some interest 
or even to keep dollars in hand. High money growth together with a substantial 
decrease in real demand for the domestic currency, are seen to be important factors 
explaining the relatively high inflation rates in 1990 and 1991 (see Formula 6, Section 
3.2.1). 
But since 1992, with the new commitmentto keeping inflation under control, the real 
time deposit interest rate has again become positive and the difference between the 
deposit interest rate and the depreciation rate has been much greater than the deposit 
interest rate on dollars (about 8% per year). During 1992-95, there existed real 
incentives for people to shift their financial portfolios out of US dollars and into 
domestic currency deposits. For example, in 1995 the time and saving deposits 
increased by 72.5% compared to the foreign exchange deposits (23.4%) and T-
bond/f-bill deposits (34.7% )24. Also, people now no longer consider rice and durable 
goods important components in their portfolio choice. 
Last but not least, apart from the inflation tax, the source of revenue from issuing 
money also stems from the increase in demand for real money balances as a result of 
an increase 1n income, especially in a growing economy. In Vietnam, even in the 
1980s when the economy was a MPE, the demand for money function had high 
income elasticity, \vhich reflects the rapid process of monetization under the 
increasing coordination of economic activities through the free market due to 'fence 
breaking" and certain microeconomic reforms (Chapter 1, Section 2.2.1 ). This process 
24The figures are provided by the SBVN. Also, according to Nguyen Thi Hien (1995). the Vietnamese 
people still prefe r 3 or 6 month-deposits rather than longer-run T-bills even with higher interest rates. 
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appears to have continued as market-oriented reform took place since 1989. As a 
result, Vietnam may gain from the rise in demand for real balances associated with 
strong overall economic growth: there is room for increasing the money supply 
without introducing the risk of higher inflation. 
However, this kind of benefit should be interpreted with caution. In Vietnam, the 
pressure on and the variation in the inflation rate which is measured in terms of the 
CPI, are associated, to some extent, with changes in agricultural output. Also, given 
the still close relationship between the SOE sector and the banking system, and the 
fact that most monetary expansion is absorbed by the industrial and service sectors, 
the benefits from the growth in these sectors alone may not be enough to offset the 
risks of higher money supply. 
Summary 
Despite the progress in the reform of the financial sector in the first half of the 1990s, 
Vietnam remains an 'underbanked' country. The financial environment is 
characterized by the dominant role of the SOCBs whose lending policies are biased 
against the non-state sector, the limited markets for domestic securities, the existence 
of a significant informal financial sector, and the lack of the necessary public 
confidence in the banking system. Public finance still plays a very important role in 
money supply and contains the elements that may lead to the expansion of money 
supply without rigorous control. This is, of course, understandable since the financial 
sector has been reformed from a passive, monolithic banking system in an economy 
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with dominant state ownership, and the government still likes to see the ' leading role ' 
of the state sector in the economy. Also , the underdevelopment of the financial sector 
has constrained the efficient use of the market-based monetary instruments. One major 
problem facing Vietnam no\v is the dilemma between the imperative of controlling 
effectively money supply through rigid direct measures and the urgency of promoting a 
financial system with efficient financial resource allocation. 
A pre11m1nary assessment in this chapter suggests three main factors that have 
contributed to the slowing down of inflation since 1989 in Vietnam. The first factor is 
the fiscal restraint and harder budget constraint of the SO Es which form the foundation 
of a sounder monetary policy. The second is the financial portfolio choice with the shift 
out of US dollars and towards the Dong. And the third is related to the process of 
monetization associated \vith strong economic growth from a relatively lo\v level of 
per capita income. 
The characteristics of the financial system and the (suggestive) factors behind the 
inflationary movement should be taken into account in developing any appropriate 
(dynamic) model of inflation for Vietnam. Also , the varying significance of these 
factors on the inflation rate deserves to be investigated more rigorously. 
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Chapter 4 ·· 
A Theoretical Model of Seigniorage, 
Inflation and Expectation for Vietnam 
4. 1. The theoretical models of inflation: An overview of the literature 
In the past two-and-a-half decades, many countries have gone through high inflation 
episodes, largely as a result of internal crises reflecting macroeconomic 
mismanagement and a failed response to external shocks. Economic stabilization, 
which is defined as the attempts to correct excessive or unsustainable balance of 
payments deficits, to reduce the rate of inflation, or (usually) both25 , has become a 
central policy issue for many developing countries, the economies in transition as well 
as for international agencies. The problem of stabilization has also been the subject of 
a large number of studies that covered not only the general issues of stabilization but 
also many case studies (see, for example, Balcerowicz and Gelb ( 1995), Blanchard et 
al (1991), Bruno (1993), Bruno et al (1991 and 1988), Cline and Weintraub (1981), 
Dornbusch (1986 and 1992), Dornb4sch and Fischer (1993), Dornbusch et al ( 1995), 
Killick (1984), Kolodko et al (1992), Parkin and Zis (1976\ Schipke and Taylor 
(1994), World Bank (1996)). 
25 Here we focus on the inflation problem. 
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Two approaches, the orthodox and the heterodox appro"ach, have been usually adopted 
for stabilizing the economy and, in many cases, with the Ilv1F behind them. The 
orthodox program (for example, the cases of major stabilization in Bolivia (1985), 
Chile (1975), and Vietnam (1989)) focuses on the removal of the source of 
fundamental disequilibrium and usually combines traditional anti-inflationary measures 
such as fiscal and monetary restraint and appropriate adjustments for the exchange 
rate. The heterodox program (for example, the cases of Argentina in l 985~ Brazil in 
1986, Israel in 1985, Mexico in 1988, and Poland in 1990) uses the nominal _anchors by 
controlling or fixing some kind of prices (wage, exchange rate~ .. . ) as the means to 
stabilize the economy2
6
. The justification for the use of nominal anchor(s). \Vhich may 
lead to distortion in resource allocation. is that the correction of the public deficits may 
not be enough to stop inflation because of inertia, sluggish expectatio~ or lack of 
credibility. It is also believed that the longer-run benefits from a sharp disinflation, if it 
persists, may outweigh the temporary distortive effects of controls . 
The application of two approaches, however, has seen a mixed result: both their 
pro grams have experienced successes and failures ( see Bruno et al 19 91). The 
experience of inflation stabilization, together with consideration of the causes of 
inflation in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.1), has _shown the complexity of inflation problem. 
To a large extent, the choice of a stabilization program and its outcomes depend on the 
specific country characteristics, such as the role of the public sector. the financial 
structure, the degree of indexations of the economy, and the history of inflation. In a 
study of German inflation, Dornbusch (1987) concluded that ' stabilization appears a 
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much more diffuse,- multifaceted issue than a simple monetary model would predict' 
and that 'only a broader model of the hyperinflation economy that models real 
exchange rates, portfolio balance, and credibility' can hope to address this issue. 
In fact, many theoretical models have been built to deal with the problem of inflation 
( and balance of payments) stabilization in developing countries and the economies in 
transition. They attempt not only to explain the sources of, and the policy impacts on, 
inflation, but also to give some useful policy advice. They can be divided into three 
broad groups: I-Generalized macroeconomic models; 2- Smaller macroeconomic 
models with emphasis on the specific structure of the financial sector; 3- Smaller 
macroeconomic models with multiple inflation equilibria. 
The first group captures the widely accepted specifications for the key behavioural 
equations of the subsectors such as the private sector, the public (government) sector, 
the foreign sector, and the financial system, that are interrelated in a consistent 
macroeconomic accounting frame\.vork (Haque et al l 990, Khan and Knight 1981, 
Khan and Montiel 1989, Khan et al 1990, and Yung Chui Park 1973). A typical 
example is the model developed by Khan et al ( 1990) ( or the model by Khan and 
Montiel (1989)). This model, in fact, combines both the IlvfF approach, which links 
the financial sector with the balance of payments, and the World Bank approach, the 
core of which is a variant of the Harrod-Domar growth model of an open economy, to 
allow for the treatment of economic gro\vth, balance of payments improvement and 
price stability as the explicit policy objectives. Overall, the results of the comparative-
static analyses are quite consistent with the standard vie\v. For example, a credit 
contraction usually associated with a reduction in the fiscal (public) deficits, will 
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reduce domestic prices and (real) output, and improve the balance of payments; a 
devaluation will increase prices and improve the balance of payments, but the output 
impact may be contractionary
27
. However, the important point is that, \.Vith two policy 
instruments- overall (public) credit ceilings and the exchange rate devaluation- the 
authorities can attain the targeted values for both the balance of payments and the rate 
of inflation. 
Despite this capability in predicting outcomes for the principal macroeconomic 
variables, the generalized models contain certain limitations. These models are often 
one-period models, and therefore, they cannot trace well the transition of the economy 
from one equilibrium to another. Even a quite simple generalized model cannot be 
used readily for empirical study because of the lack of necessary data. The 
econometric estimations usually are based on panel data, and hence, the 'goodfit' 
model can be only regarded as the appropriate framework for a 'representative' 
developing country (see, for example, Haque et al 1990, and Khan and Knight 1981). 
This is not to deny the common economic relationships across countries, but the 
diversity of developing (and transitional) economies in terms of real sector and 
-
financial system development, argues for a more flexible approach in the design of 
stabilization programs. The following two groups of models attempt to deal with these 
limitations and to provide more insight into the inflation problem in these economies. 
The second group emphasizes the specific features much more, especially the 
financial characteristics of the developing/transitional economies. The models 
27This result is quite model specific. In the more general case, there is a deai of ambiguity about 
whether devaluation would raise or lower output on impact (Lizondo and i1ontiel i9S9). 
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developed by Bruno (1979), and Taylor (1981) provide support for the structuralist 
critique that the conventional package of orthodox stabilization policies may be 
stagflationary, ie. credit contraction may result in higher inflation and lower output 
expansion. The crucial feature of these models is that interest costs enter directly into 
production costs and final prices because of interest expenses for working capital. 
Thus, the financial deregulation may be not desirable for inflation control and growth. 
The link with the financial system, however, is used in some other theoretical models 
to support the role of financial liberalization in a 'repressed ' economy. Kapur (1976) 
presented a model that shows that an increase in interest rates on money (whic~ 
cannot be beyond the point where the real loan rate equals the rate of profit on 
working capital) has very favourable short-run effects on real output and so , reduces 
inflationary pressure given aggregate demand. The reasons behind these outcomes are 
that higher deposit rates lead to an increase in bank deposits, and hence the net flow of 
real bank credit to finance investment. 
The results may, however, be quite different if the role played by the informal sector is 
important in the interaction between the financial and real sectors (Buffie 19 84 and 
Van Wijnbergen 1983). In such models, depending on the extent curb loans could 
substitute for deposits, an increase in deposit interest rates does not necessarily 
increase the total supply of loanable funds or lead to a shift out of an 'unproductive ' 
asset like gold or commodity stock. Thus, raising deposit rates can be contractionary 
and may lead to more rather than less inflation in the short run. Some recent 
theoretical considerations have also adopted the skeptical approach to high interest 
rate policy. though since the 1980s. this policy has been a popular method of 
3--+ 
defending the domestic currency and fighting inflation in many high-inflation 
countries. The constraints on the effectiveness of this policy would be particularly 
acute when the credibility of an anti-inflation program is not established, and when 
the financial burden of nonviable enterprises is large and/or the public sector fi~ances 
cannot be subordinated to a restrictive credit policy (Bennett and Schadler 1992, 
Calvo 1992, and Calvo and Coricelli 1992). Calvo and Vegh (1995) have also shown 
that in an small open economy under flexible prices, although a temporary increase in 
the deposit rate leads to an initial fall in the price level, inflation increases 
exponentially afterwards. Paying higher interest on money, thus, will only exacerbate 
the stop-and-go inflation cycles. 
Two aspects of the exchange rate are often included in the theoretical models of 
inflation stabilization: the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor and the role of 
the parallel currency market. The study by Fischer ( 1986) shows that in a small open 
economy with perfect capital mobility and wage contracts set for either one or two 
periods, exchange-rate-led stabilization is, in general, less costly than that led by a 
money-growth target in terms of the sacrifice ratio- the ratio of total loss of output to 
the fall in the inflation rate. It is worth noting some practical advantages of an 
exchange rate anchor. First, international prices would exert an immediate tight 
discipline on domestic price increases through competition because, 1n an open 
economy, tradeable goods form a substantial part of the goods basket. Second, the 
fixed exchange rate would shift expectation to a ne\V regime of price stability. But the 
defects of the (rather long) fixed exchange rate-policy are that it can lead to real 
appreciation and the resulting overvaluation can become very costly due to capital 
85 
flight and increased import spending (Dornbusch 1986). It is, therefore, argued that 
once credibility has been achieved, the exchange rate as a key anchor in the early 
stages of rapid stabilization should give \Vay to a more flexible regime (Bruno 1991 ). 
Mexico at the end of 1994 is a good example of this point: the economy succumbed to 
the crisis because of the rigid exchange rate policy (Dornbusch et al 199 5). 
A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of parallel currency markets in 
developing countries ·and an examination of the policy issues such as the effectiveness 
of exchange control, devaluation and parallel market premia and unification, are given 
in Agenor (1992). In the macroeconomic model, with the sizeable parallel market for 
foreign exchange developed by Agenor ( 1990), the inflationary impact of expansionary 
(fiscal and credit) policies is larger, and the output effect is smaller, than would be the 
' 
case in an economy without foreign exchange rationing. The reason is that these 
policies are associated with a more depreciated parallel exchange rate. The inflation 
outcome of exchange rate unification is analyzed in the studies by Kharas and Pinto 
(1989), Lizondo (1987), and Pinto (1991). This policy could generate much higher 
inflation. Moreover, as Kharas and Pinto (1989) have pointed out, the economy then 
may converge to a high-inflation, saddle-point stable equilibrium given a fiscal deficit. 
Note that most studies of the parallel currency market have used the portfolio-balance 
approach to exchange rates -as a basic strand of the analysis. This approach is also 
applied in Calvo and Frenkel ( 1991) for analysing the effects of price liberalization in 
the early phase of economic transformation and in Goldberg and Karim.av ( 1992) for 
studying the erroneous interpretation of black-market exchange rates as indicative of 
post-reform equilibrium rates in a transitional economy. 
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The interesting point in Kharas and Pinto ( 1989) that there may exist many inflation 
equilibria, is not new. Several other studies that are here regarded as the third 
theoretical model group, have focused on this point (Bruno and Fischer 1990, Evans 
and Yarrow 1981, Kiguel 1989, Liviatan 1983, Ruggerone 1996, Sargent and Wallace 
1981 and 1987, Savastano 1992) . The idea is quite simple. Since a 'monetized' 
budget (public) deficit can be financed with inflation tax or 'seigniorage revenue', the 
same amount of real deficit can be sustained in low or high-inflation equilibrium 
depending on whether inflation is low or high and the tax base is high or low. 
('Seigniorage revenue' denotes the real value of money printed by the government; 
'inflation tax' usually denotes the loss in real value of money held by the population. 
In a steady state, where real money balances (m=MIP) are constant, they are the same. 
Indeed, this is directly implied from the formula M h . m = -- - m 1r , w ere n 1s p 
inflation rate) 
Moreover, the relationship between inflation and the budget deficit is, in general, not 
linear, as can be seen in Formula (10) (Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1). In addition, the real 
'monetized'' budget deficit can be expected to be an increasing and concave function 
of the inflation rate. Indeed, without the loss of generality, we assume the monetized 
budget deficit, measured as a percentage of real output and denoted by d, is the only 
source of change in money supply. Then Formula (10) can be rewritten as 
d 
n + n 
k ( a + /3 n ) • This implies 
Jd 
an 
ex - f3n 
k(a + f3n) 2 and 
J2d 
Jn 2 
-2 f3 (ex - /311) 
k(a + f3n ) 3 ( 11) 
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Since f3n, in general, is small in comparison to a , so Jd/Jn > 0 and ;J-d I Jr? < 0 
(Recall that a represents noninflationary level of velocity, f3 is the responsiveness of 
velocity to the inflation rate, k is the money multiplier, and n is gro\vth rate). 
Therefore, under certain circumstances that could depend on the private sector's 
behaviour in relation to money holding and its dynamic expectations , there would be a 
Laffer curve of inflation tax revenue and a maximum deficit that can be financed by 
printing money. Going beyond that point implies hyperinflation. Note that the third 
group of theoretical models has been applied for analyzing a number of countries that 
experienced· high inflation: Argentina (Kiguel and Neumeyer 1995), Brazil (Cardoso 
1991), Israel (Bruno 1989), Russia (Sachs 1995), Ukraine (Havrylyshyn et al 1994), 
Ukraine and Latvia (Ruggerone 1996), Yugoslavia (Bole and Gaspari 1991). 
One direction for studying the stabilization problem in Vietnam is to build a rather 
complex macroeconometric model (eg. Nguyen Van Qui 1994), which can be used for 
examining the effects of policy change on prices, among other macroeconomic 
variables. However, as stressed by Bruno ( 1989), in economies characterized by short 
time-series and rapid 'regime' changes (like the Vietnamese economy), such a model 
can have only limited use for policy work. It is much more useful to apply small 
compact models with an emphasis on their underlying theoretical grounding. The 
approaches used in the second and/or third groups of modelling may identify ways for 
developing appropriate models of inflation for Vietnam. 
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In this chapter, we follow the last approach in developing a dynamic model of inflatio~ ·· 
which combines three strands of analysis: the 'traditional' ·vie\v of government inflation 
finance; the role of private sector behaviour with financial portfolio choice: and 
dynamic expectations of inflation. Such a model is, therefore'.' more likely to capture 
the most noticeable characteristics of the financial system and economic behaviour in 
Vietnam considered in Chapter 3. This kind of model can be used also for examining 
the conditions for stability of inflation and the effects of pDlicy changes and economic 
growth on the inflation rate. Furthermore, it allows us to understand the way in which 
the economy can go to hyperinflation and change positions between a stable high 
inflation ('high inflation trap') and a low inflation equilibrium. .. .\ll these considerations 
are very relevant for Vietnam, which is a country exposed to hyper-inflation in the 
l 980s, but now seems to be on a relatively low inflation path. 
4.2. A model of seigniorage, inflation and expectation for Vietnam 
4.2.1. The Model 
The model developed here follows the line of analyses in most studies m the third 
group of models of inflation, particularly in the study by Bruno and Fischer (1990). 
Our model, however, emphasizes interest rates on money and the changes in the 
exchange rate (depreciation rate) as the main factors detenninmg the opportunity cost 
of money holdings. The role of real income in the demand function for money is also 
specified in a more general form than in most studies \vhich usually assume unitary 
89 
~ 
I
,, 
lji 
f' 
income elasticity in the real demand for money. Moreover, in the analysis of the 
model, we apply the idea of the coordination between monetary and fiscal policies put 
forward by Sargent and Wallas ( 1981 ). It is argued that which policy is dominant 
matters for the problem of inflation control. An extension of the model with variable 
output is also considered. 
The model consists of three equations: 
. 
M 
d = (12) 
Py 
M p = f ( Y) exp(-y (c e - id)) (13) 
£. e = A ( n - £ e ) (14) 
where all variables are denoted as before: M, P, y, and d are nominal money supply, 
price leveL, real income ( or output), and fiscal deficit (public defici t) measured as a 
percentage of real income and entirely financed by borrowing from the central bank (d 
> 0); E'! is expected depreciation rate , id is deposit interest rate, which is exogenously 
determined by the government, and ,r is inflation rate. Both y and A are positive 
parameters; f(y) is an increasing function, f'(y )> 0. We assume that real income y, the 
rate of change in y and the income elasticity of demand for real money are regarded as 
exogenous variables in this model
28
. 
28 One limitation of this ki nd of model of inflation is that there is no effect of money on growth. Note 
that, in order to avoid the effect of output, most studies assume unitary income elasticity and take the 
simplest fo rm f(y )=y. 
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Equation ( 12) shows the relationship between the 'monetized' fiscal deficit and 
money supply. In contrast to Equation (7) where the central bank gives credit to both 
the government and the private sector (Chapter3, Section 3.2.1), 'monetized' fiscal 
deficit dis the only source of change ih high-powered money. For simplicity, we also 
assume the money multiplier k to be constant. Since the involvement of constant k in 
Equation ( 12) does not affect the results, so we can further assume that k = 1. 
With Equation (13), the money market is in equiEbrium and the right hand side 
determines the demand for real balances. Most studies apply Cagan's hyperinflation 
semilogarithmic model (Cagan 1956), in which real money holdings are determined 
only by inflationary expectations. In much less extreme inflationary conditions , real 
income should be an important determinant of money demand and, in a growing 
economy like Vietnam since 1989, the income elasticity of real money is possibly 
higher than unity (Recall that the income elastici ty of demand for real money in the 
1980s is estimated to be higher than two, see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 or Appendix, 
Part A.2). Also, the difference between the expected depreciation rate and deposit 
interest rate is considered the opportunity cost in Equation (13) rather than simply the 
expected inflation rate. 
The expectations (Equation (14)) are supposed to be adaptive in the sense that the rate 
of change in the expected depreciation rate will be adjusted upward as the 'gap' 
between current inflation rate and current expected rate of depreciation increases. A 
main disadvantage of the adaptive expectations assumption is that private agents only 
limit themselves to a very narrovv set of information to form expectations. However, 
as Bruno and Fischer ( 1990) mentioned, this assumption makes the most sense where 
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the statistical systems are poorly developed or there does not exist much credibility 
concerning the government's policies. Also, according to Equation ( 14 ), the expected 
exchange rate is allowed to diverge from purchasing power parity (PPP) in the short 
run 2
9
. This seems to be consistent with the behaviour of the exchange rate movement 
in Vietnam since 1992, where the nominal exchange rate has remained fairly stable 
while price level has- continued to rise, albeit at a moderate level. Moreover, the 
'rational expectation' which here is defined as Ee = TC or that the PPP always holds, 
represents the limiting case when A --:t c.:J in Equation (14). 
Equations (12) and (13) in combination will give us 
MM =B f(y) exp(-y(c'-id)) 
d = M Py . , Y ( 15) 
M 
where 0 is growth rate of money, B = M and 0 > 0. 
For ease in recognizing the direction of the relationships between the variables, we 
also express Equation ( 15) in natural logarithm 
yce = loge - logd + log(f (y) I y) +yid (15') 
Taking the natural logarithm and differentiating (13) with respect to time~ we obtain 
29Note that the PPP condition is that ( F: P*)IP= 1 where£' is expected exchange rate. P * is foreign price 
level and Pis domestic price level. With the assumption of constancy of P* , it is easily to derive Ee = 
TC. 
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M P f'(y)y ·e rJ/(y) 
M- P= f(y) -y£ = cJy 
. e e • - ye = - n - 7J m y n 
y . _Y 
f (y) y-yEe (16) 
( 17) 
where T]my is the income elasticity of money demand ( T]my = ( cJm/c)y )(ylm) = 
(f'(y)exp( ... )y)l(f(y)exp(. .. )) = ( c)Jl;)y)(y/f) from (13) with ,n = MIP) and n is growth rate 
of real output. 
In the steady state, i,e =0, so Ee= n (from Equation (14)) and Equation (17) 
implies 
£e ==TC ==8-T]myn ( 18) 
In Equation (15) (or Equation (15')), e and d can be regarded as endogenous variables 
or shift parameters depending on which policy - fiscal policy or monetill)' policy - is 
dominant. Equation ( 18) differs somewhat from Formulas (6) and ( 10) (Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.1), but they share the same internal root of (the steady state) inflation, 
/ 
notably the monetary expansion because of (quasi-) fiscal deficits, and the benefit 
from strong economic growth in the reduction of inflation. The interactions between 
curves (15 or15') and (18) on the planes (Ee, 8) or (~, d), depending on \vhich 
dominant policy is examined, will show the steady state equilibria of expected 
depreciation rate and inflation rate (Remember that, in fact, they are equal to each 
other). The stability of any steady state equilibrium then will be determined by 
Equation (14). By using (17) to eliminate nin ( 14), we get 
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E e == A YE e + A( 0 - 11 my n - Ee) 
• Ee== (l- AY)-1 A(B - Ee -11myn) 
( 19) 
(20) 
Stability conditions for equilibria, thus, depend on the sign of 1-Ayand the position of 
the interaction point(s) between two curves (15 or 15') and (18). Now we will turn to 
the two cases when fiscal policy or monetary policy is dominant. 
4.2.2. The case of fiscal policy dominating monetary policy 
This case is close to the situation in most developing countries and economies 1n 
transition. In this case, the fiscal authority sets its budget and determines the amount 
of revenue that must be raised through bond sales, together with the amount borrowed 
abroad, and seigniorage. Then the central bank will be forced to create money to 
finance the 'monetized' part of the fiscal deficit, and hence, in our model money 
supply becomes entirely endogenous. 
On the plane (Ee, 0), the £e in (15') is an increasing concave function of 0 since J£e/J0 
= 1/( y0) > O and ;J-£e!Je2 = -1/( yf/) < 0 (dd-curve in Figure 9). The steady state 
relationship ( 18) is the 45°- line with the intercept on the 00-axis equal to T]myn. 
There are, at most, two points A and B representing steady state inflation equilibria. 
Since along the dd-curve, dis fixed, these equilibria reflect a kind of Laffer curve: the 
same amount of seigniorage may be obtained at either a low or high inflation rate, or 
in other words, at a low or high growth rate of money supply. 
94 
Figure 9: Inflation, Expected Exchange Rate and Money Gro,vth 
( Steady state equilibrium and the effects of changes in d and id) 
ce 5°-line 
c ...... &: dd' 
e 
In the steady state, the seigniorage revenue is given by 
f ( y) . )) d = e--exp(-y(e -7Jmyn-ld 
y 
(21) 
• dd = f(y) exp(-y(B -T1myn-id))(l-y8) ae Y (22) 
Thus, Jd/Je = 0 when e = 1/y. The concavity of the dd-curve ensures that there exits 
maximum seigniorage value (dmax), corresponding to e at max =lly and inflation rate Teat 
max = 1/y- TJmyn. On Figure 9, dmax will be achieved when dd-curve is tangent to the 
45°-line at A"=B". Also, the elasticity of demand for money with respect to Ee at the 
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maximizing point is -1 + YTlmyn (In fact, it is easy to obtain from Equation (_13) that 
cJlog(MIP)lcJEe = -y . But this elasticity is equal to cJlog(MIP)lcJlogc: 
(cJlog(MIP)/cJc:)c:= -YE,e and at the calculated point £: = 'Trar max). All these similar 
results for the revenue-maximizing inflation rate are well known in Friedman ( 1971). 
Thus, there are two, one , or none steady state inflation equilibrium depending on 
whether d < dmax, d = dmax, or d > d,nax. 
The stability conditions for steady state inflation equilibria, if they exist, can be 
examined now. The examination is based on the direction of £!-motion implied from 
Equation (20) and the fact that, in the case of fiscal policy dominating monetary 
policy, the economy is always moving on the dd-curve since the government budget 
constraint should be obeyed. Together with the stability conditions, the transition of 
the actual inflation rate can also be traced. 
For A y < 1 (slo1-v expectation adjustment) , in Equation (20) c· e ) 0 if £: < e - Tlrnyn ( or 
Ee is belo\V the 45°-line), and c· e (0 if£:> e - Tlmyn (or Ee is above the 45°-curve). 
Thus , below the 45° - curve, Ee increases, and above the 45° -curve, Ee decreases, as 
indicated by the arrows on Figure 9. For A y> l (fast expectation adjustment), the 
arrows indicating the directions of ~-motion will be reversed. Figure 9 represents the 
case with dual equilibria and slow expectation adjustment: low equilibrium A is stable 
and high equilibrium B is unstable. The economy will converge to A from any point 
on the dd-curve to the left of B, but it will go to hyperinflation from the right of B. In 
the latter situation, the depreciation expectation never catches up to actual inflation. 
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This is i}!1plied from Equation (14): 7r = £ e + A Ee and the fact that from the right of B 
Ff is only increasing, so ;r > Ee always. When the economy is to the left of A, Ff will be 
closer to n, although still less than Jr, and by the end will catch up to n at A. If E! is 
moving to A from the position between A and B, then ~ > 7r and by the e:id they are 
also in equality. 
However, when the expectation is adjusted fast enough ( one example is when the 
expectation is close to the 'rational' expectation), the economy may fall into the 'high 
inflation trap': point B becomes stable (and A unstable). (Of course, the motion of the 
expected depreciation rate in relation to the actual inflation rate along the dd-curve is 
not difficult to see in the same way as just mentioned above). Theoretically, the 
seigniorage revenue can achieve the maximum value in a steady state, but the only one 
equilibrium in this case obviously is never stable. Moreover, both the cases of the 
existence of one or no steady state equilibrium ( d is too high) may correspond to 
explosive inflation30 . 
Now we can look at the comparative analysis. One complication is that the effect of 
output level always exists because of output growth. We will consider only the case of 
a growing economy (n > 0) and hence the output level y always increases. Then from 
Equation ( 15) we can obtain 
e 
dy exp(y(E e - id)) 
f (y) 
(23) 
3°rn fact, according to our model. the too large 'monetized' fiscal deficit could result in hyperinflation 
only when the expectation adjustment is slow. Kiguel (1989) has developed a model which shows that 
this is also the case for the wtional (or perfect foresight) expectation. 
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Je Jy = d exp( r (Ee - id) )lr f ( y) - yf ' ( y) 7 
f 2(y) J 
Je 
cJy 
K (l - T/ my ) where K = d exp(y(c' -iJ )) 
f ( y) 
(24) 
(25) 
. 
In a grovving economy, it can be assumed that Tlmy > l, so cJ8/oy < 0. This means that, 
given ff , an increase in y leads to a decrease in 0 . In other vvords, the dd-curve will 
shift to the left. The sustained increase in output, thus, would reinforce or offset 
somewhat the effects of the changes in other exogenous variables in our model. 
Keeping in mind this fact, we now focus on the effects of changes in fiscal deficit d, in 
interest rate on money id, and in growth rate of output n. 
Suppose firstly that the economy is initially in a stable lovv steady state inflation 
equilibrium, point A. An decrease in d then \vill only shift the dd-curve to dd' (Figure 
Je 
9) (since for Equation ( 15) J d ) 0 and Equation ( 18) does not depend on d). The 
decrease in d implies an instantaneous shrink in the growth rate of money from A to 
C . The expected depreciation rate, and so the actual inflation rate, will decline along 
the dd'-curve until the economy reaches a ne\v lower equilibrium, point A'. A rise in 
id has the same qualitative effect on the steady state inflation as a decrease in d ( From 
( 15) G£e !3id = l>0, so the dd-curve vvill be shifted up ). This is because real demand 
for (domestic) money will be increased. Therefore, the central bank can print money 
less rapidly to finance a given fiscal deficit as the inflation tax base is now larger. An 
increase in n shows in Figure 1 0 as a rightvvard shift of the -4-5 --1 ine since for Equation 
Je 
( 18) -;-- = Tl mr )0. At the same time. the output expands much more. Indeed, suppose 
on -
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y = y 0 exp(nt) with t as the time variable, then r}y!Jrz = ty
0
exp(nt) > 0. As a result, the 
steady state inflation goes down further from A to A"' (Figure 10). 
Figure 10: The Effects of Changes in Output Level and Growth Rate 
Ee 
O 8 
We can calculate the change in steady state inflation corresponding to a one 
percentage point change in the growth rate. We have 
TC - e - n - dyexp(y(n -ic1)) 
- T] mv - f ( ) - T] m"n - y -
(26) 
an ydyexp(y(n -ic1 )) an . rJy f(y)- yf ' (y) 
--;;;; = f (y) --;;;; + d exp(y (n - ld )) an ( f 2 (y) ) - T/ my (27) 
But, again, dyexp(r{n-id))/f(y) = 8 and )f'(y)/f(y) = T]my, so that 
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Jrc 
Jn 
1 Jy ( 1 - iJ my J ] 
(1 - 0y ) -1 dn f ( Y) - 7) my (28) 
If growth rate of money is not too large (in the sense that 1 - ey > 0), then cJITlcJn < -I 
and hence, a one percentage point increase in n would lead to a greater than one 
percentage point decrease in the inflation rate31 . In the long run, however, it can be 
expected that economic growth would be around the average trend and income 
elasticity would be close to unity. In this case, the benefit of output growth to the 
reduction in inflation would be limited. 
In the case when the economy falls into a high (stable) inflation trap, the effects of all 
the changes just considered seem to be paradoxical. As shown in Figure 9, for 
example, a decrease in the fiscal deficit will lead to a higher inflation rate (B to B '). 
One can see that as the economy is on the 'wrong' side of the Laffer curve, an increase 
in inflation is needed to generate the lower revenue for the decreasing deficit. i-\n 
intuitive explanation may be based on portfolio choice. The instantaneous monetary 
squeeze due to the fiscal cut implies an increase in the value of the domestic currency 
( The same thing is true for an increase in id or in output). Since the expectation is 
quickly adjusted, the new signal for the value of the domestic currency leads to an 
equal shift in the depreciation rate, and so also in the inflation rate, in order to keep 
the existing portfolio balance between domestic and foreign currency. Calvo ( 1992) 
31 With T7m_v= 1, we get lhe fo rmuia in Bruno and Fischer ( 1990). However, their conclusion thar one 
point percentage increase in n implies a greater than one percentage point increase in if, does not al \\'avs 
hold. This is true only for a not too large 8. 
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got nearly the same result when he found that under perfect foresight (Ef = £), an 
increase in interest rates for deposits will result in higher steady state inflation. 
Note that, in the r.:ase of very high inflation, the benefits of real income growth as a 
source of seigniorage revenue are quite small. As can be seen from the formula for 
'Trarmax above, the high revenue-maximizing inflation rate is not sensitive to the 
correction term 1Jmyn. For example, with y = 0.5, the peak of the seigniorage Laffer 
curve would be 200 percent if n = 0 and 180 percent if even 1Jmy= 2 and n = 10 (see 
also Friedman 197 1 and Dornbusch and Fischer 1993). 
4.2.3. The case of monetary policy dominating fiscal policy 
This case me1ns that the central bank independently sets monetary policy, for 
example, by fixing the growth rate for base money. The central bank also determines 
the nominal amount of credit given to the fiscal authority. The fiscal authority is 
forced to finance the remainder of the deficit by bond sales and/or foreign borrowings. 
In our model, this scenario can be analyzed on the plane (Ef, d). £e in Equation ( 15') is 
a decreasing and convex function of d since oEf /od = -1/( yd) < 0 and o2 Ee /od2 = 
1/( yd2 ) > O (the 00-curve in Figure 11 ). The shape of the 00-curve shows that for a 
given growch rate of money, a higher 'monetized' fiscal deficit can be financed only 
with a lower exchange rate expectation. It is easy to see that the 00-curve always cuts 
the Od-axis and is asymptotic to the 0Ee -axis (lim£e • 00 when d • 0). Note also that, 
l O 1 
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similarly as in the case of the dominant fiscal policy, the 'power' of the monetary 
authority now forces the economy to move on the BB-curve. Equation (18) presents 
simply the line parallel to the Od-axis (the 0°-line). Thus , there always exists an unique 
steady state inflation equilibrium equal to e - TJ my n . This feature of the model is in 
favour of the well-known argument for central bank independence: the central bank 
can permanently control inflation since it is free to choose any path for money growth. 
Moreover, by sustaining a low growth rate of money supply, the economy will avoid 
falling into the equilibrium trap with high stable inflation. 
Figure 11: Inflation, Expected Depreciation Rate, and Fiscal Deficit 
Ee 
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The ( only) equilibrium E -the intersection between two curves- 1s stable when 
expectation adjustment is slow (Ay < 1) (indicated in Figure 11) or unstable when 
expectation adjustment is fast (Ay> 1 ). If E is unstable equilibrium and the position of 
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the economy is above the equilibrium point, the expected depreciation rate wi ll go to 
infinity. In this case, the economy also runs into hyperinflation and once again_ the 
depreciation expectation never catches up to actual inflation. 
Now suppose that Eis a stable equilibrium. The comparative effects of the changes in 
output level and growth, in interest rate, and growth rate of money supply, can be 
analyzed. It is clear that the changes in y or id only shift the BB-curve and hence have 
no effect on inflation equilibrium. However, the revenue in terms of output through 
seigniorage will be changed. For example, the expansion of output (given n>O ) or an 
increase in id shifts the BB-curve up, since from (15') 
dE e 
Jy 
and 
_l y (f'(y) y ~f(y)]=-I(TJm -'" -I]>o 
y f(y) y - y y 
dE e 
did 
1)0 
(29) 
(30) 
As a result, d will increase but the rate of inflation in equilibrium will be intact. 
The change in the growth rate of real output has effects on both curves. Indeed~ from 
(15') and (18) we can obtain, respectively 
dE e 
Jn 
and 
y_j}J_( Yf ' (y) ~ f (y)] = _1 j}J_(TJ m Y - l] > Q 
yf ( y) Jn y - y Jn y 
dE e 
dn = -71 my (0 
(31 ) 
(32 '\ 
·o~ : ., 
Thus, as shown in Figure 11, the 88-curve and 0°-line will shift up and down 
respectively as n increases and the lower, new inflation equilibrium \Vill be E". The 
economy benefits not only in terms of lowering inflation but also in terms of revenue 
through seigniorage. But the benefit of a reduction in inflation would be quite small if 
the inflation rate was high. Since the position of the equilibrium depends only on the 
shift of the 0°-line, so according to (32), a one percentage point increase in n will lead 
to only an TJmy -percentage point decrease in the inflation rate. 
It is not difficult to see that the change in the growth rate of money also shifts both 
curves. Again, from (15') and ( 18) we have cJcerae = ll(y8) > 0 and cJ£elcJ8 = l > 0 , 
respectively. So, an increase in 0 will shift up both curves. As a result of the new 
position of the 0° -line, the economy will move to a higher inflation equilibrium ( E 
moves to E"' in Figure 11 ). But in regard to seigniorage, nothing can be said with 
certainty. Given the new level of 0, cl may be increased or decreased depending on the 
relative positions of the shifts of the two curves. 
In both cases, whether fiscal policy or monetary policy plays a dominating role, the 
essential point of the model is the stability conditions for inflation equlibrium. The 
question is how this condition would be changed if the model is extended to the case 
in which the real output growth can vary. In an open economy, the change in the 
expected real exchange rate may be an important factor in changing export and hence 
output. Taking this fact into account, suppose the supply function has the following 
form 
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·· y = Y0 exp(nt)( E:* J (33) 
where t is time variable, ~ is the expected nominal exchange rate, P and P * are 
domestic and foreign price levels respectively, and s is a positive parameter. With the 
assumption of the constancy of foreign price level, we can see that 
L=n+c;(Ee-n) 
y (34) 
Thus, growth rate of real output varies around the value of n, which now indicates this 
rate at the steady state (Ee = n). By using the same procedure for obtaining Equation 
( 17), we can obtain 
-rte = e-n-11,nv[ n-c;(n-£e)] ( 17') 
Then, using (14) to eliminate Jr in (17') will give us the formula which is similar to 
(20) 
£ e = (1 - ;t y - TJ mv c; )-1 1( 0 - £ e - TJ my n) (20') 
Although, there may be output expansion due to real exchange rate depreciation, this 
kind of benefit will have a destabilizing effect. Indeed, it enhances the likelihood that 
equilibria A in Figure 9 and E in Figure 11 are more difficult to become stable since 
the stability condition no\v requires that 1- (A y + T]mys) > 0. This result is opposite to 
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the case of a model for a closed economy, in which the expected inflation serves as a 
measure for the opportunity cost of holding money. As shown by Bruno and Fischer 
( 1990), the fact that output supply is positively affected by an 
unanticipated inflation, has a stabilizing effect on inflation equilibrium32. 
Summary 
. . 
increase 1n 
There is substantial literature on the problem of inflation stabilization in developing 
countries and more recently, in transitional economies. A common belief is that 
money creation, usually associated with fiscal (public) deficits, is the root of the 
inflation problem, particularly in the case of high inflation. At the same time, the 
inflation problem in these economies cannot be understood without taking into 
account the characteristics related to the supply side and in particular, the issues 
related to financial structure, such as the limited role of markets for domestic 
securities , the legally determined interest rates on bank deposits and loans, and the 
coexistence of the formal and informal financial sectors. In particular, a number of 
theoretical models that capture the behaviour in such an underdeveloped financial 
environment, have been built to explain the inflationary movement and the possible 
policy effects on inflation. 
In this chapter, a dynamic model of inflation for Vietnam was developed. The model 
reflects the features that seem to have had the most important impact on inflation in 
Vietnam: the public finance through seigniorage, the demand for domestic money in 
32 In Bruno and Fischer ( 1990), the supply function has a Lucas-type form: Y = Yoe"r( p;pc l . 
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the context of the existence of a significant parallel foreign exchange market and a 
growing economy, and the dynamic behaviour of expected changes in exchange rates. 
Within the framework of this model, there are some alternative explanations of hyper-
inflationary/ high inflationary episodes. Regardless of whether fiscal o~ monetary 
policy is dominant, inflation may run into hyperinflation as an unstable phenomenon. 
This could happen because, in the case of a dominant fiscal policy, the real monetized 
fiscal deficit is too high (higher than the maximizing inflation revenue), or the 
economy is too far on the 'wrong' side of the Laffer curve instead of at the stable low 
equilibrium. In the case of a dominant monetary policy, hyper-inflation can result if 
the expectation adjustment is fast. In the case of a dominant fiscal policy, another 
interesting explanation is that the economy might be stuck at a high stable 
equilibrium. A crucial point here is that reducing the fiscal deficits is not the sole 
solution; only a substantial change in the financial portfolio choice (which depends on 
the credibility of government policies and structural reform) could 'push' the economy 
out of this 'high inflation trap'. 
The model shows that it is possible to have the economy standing at a low stable 
inflation equilibrium in the case of a dominant fiscal policy with a slow expectation 
adjustment. The benefit of the expansion of output level and high economic growth in 
the reduction of inflation may be quite considerable, once the process of monetization 
of the economy is continuing. Moreover, government can now manipulate the fiscal 
policy and/or interest rates to keep the inflation rate at a low level. 
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From a policy perspective, a dominant monetary policy seems to be a better 
alternative, not only because it can effectively keep both inflation rates and 
fluctuations under control (Note that inflation now is affected by fewer variables), but 
also because it can prevent the economy from falling into a high stable inflation 
equilibrium in the first place. 
An extension of the model shows that if a rise in the expected depreciation rate 
relative to inflation leads to a higher output growth, the stability condition for inflation 
equilibrium is more difficult to achieve. 
As the main features of this model conform well to the characteristics of the 
Vietnamese economy in the 1980s as described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2), the model 
can be used also to analyze the situation when the economy moved from very high 
inflation in the mid-l 980s to a moderate and low inflation path since the market-
oriented reform in 1989. More importantly, an econometric investigation of this 
theoretical model can help determine whether the relatively low inflation rate at 
present in Vietnam can be sustained into the future33 . 
33 Surprisingly, in the studies using this kind of model. no attempt was made fo r testing the condition 
for stability of inflation. 
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Chapter 5 
The Econometric Evidence: The Determinants of 
Inflation and the Condition for Stability of Inflation 
5. 1. The underlying determinants of inflation in the first half of the 1990s 
The issue of which factors have a significant effect on inflation, deserves to be 
investigated more rigorously. The econometric results obtained in several studies of 
the recent inflationary experiences of developing countries imply that the causes of 
inflation vary across countries, and that there is no basis for generalization (See 
Dhakal and Kandil (1993) , Ghatak and Deadman (1989), Hamann (1993), Lim (1987), 
Moser (1995), Parikh (1990), and Yang (1990)). More interestingly, in some countries 
experiencing moderate/low inflation, money supply has been found not to contain 
valuable advanced information on the change in prices over a certain span of data. 
For Vietnam, an econometric analysis of the determinants of inflation since the 
market-oriented reform in 1989 is found only in the study by Dodsworth et al (1996), 
which estimated a polynomial lag model to examine the influence of money supply 
(M2) on inflation. It also used an error-correction model (ECM) to consider the effect 
of rice price on inflation. The main findings in this study are that an increase in 
growth of M2 leads to higher inflation, with contemporaneous money growth having 
no impact and money growth with a one- to two-month lag having the maximum 
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impact, and that the changes in the price of rice have a positive and significant impact 
on inflation in the short run. 
In this chapter, we use a distributed-lag model in order to investigate the determinants 
of inflation rate in Vietnam in the aftermath of the 1989-reform. But our investigation 
is enriched by the choice of variables. Firstly, the role of the (possible) factors 
explaining the demand for (domestic) money is explicitly exhibited in the regression. 
In Dodsworth et al (1996), a rising trend of real money demand is reflected only in a 
negative constant term. Secondly, we examine the relationship not only between 
inflation and broad money (lv12), but also between inflation and currency in circulation 
( CU), and narrow money (lvf 1). This is important since Vietnam is still very much a 
'cash economy'. Moreover, rigorous techniques for identifying the appropriate lag 
lengths of each determinant are applied rather than relying on somewhat arbitrary 
choice. 
5.1.1. The empirical model, data description and approach to estimation 
In view of the theoretical background and the statistical analysis given in Chapter 3 
(Formula (6) in Sections 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2), a distributed-lag model will be 
employed for the estimation. 
~ n" ~ n_e 
n:I = ao + L,aiMgM,_; + I,aiygYr-i + L,a;{j/iJr-i + I,ai,r'n:/'._; (35) 
i=O i=O i=O i=O 
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where 1'C and gM, as before, are the inflation rate and the growth rate of nominal 
money supply respectively, gy is the growth rate of real output, (JJ is minus the rate of 
return on Dong in terms of US dollars (see Table 10, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2); ie. m 
1s measured as the difference between the depreciation rate and the time deposit 
interest rate (c - id), and -,f is expected inflation. Here, growth rate of a variable, say, 
Xis measured as gX=(X-X(-l))IX(-1)34• Note that the empirical model incorporates 
both current and past variables of the (possible) determinants of the inflation rate. 
Also, as the theory predicts the (steady state) effects, the cumulative coefficients of 
each determinant have the following signs35 : 
LaiM > 0, 1:aiy < 0, Lai(i] > 0, Lai,re > o (36) 
The model will be estimated for three monetary aggregates: currency in circulation 
CU, M 1 defined as CU plus demand deposits , and M2 as M 1 plus time deposits plus 
foreign currency deposits. Inflation is measured by the rate of change of the CPL Due 
to the lack of a better measure of real income, the real industrial output is used as a 
proxy for gy. An adaptive expectation sch~me is used to approximate the expected 
inflation rate. Accordingly, n,e is approximated by 'TCt_/6. 
34This measure is slightly different from the measure of growth rate of X as ~logX. Note aiso that the 
use of lJJ = c - id instead of(, - c as used in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.2) is just for convenience (see also 
the formula of demand for money in the theoretical model developed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.1 ). The 
only difference in using id - c is that its coefficient in the regressions will have the opposite sign. 
35 This is implied from the equality of all lags of each determinant in steady state. 
36 This comes from the formula of adaptive expectation: rt, -rf ,_ 1 = 'r(1r,_1 - lf1-1 ) with r = 1. Thus, in 
our regressions, expected inflation rate is proxied by one-month lag , but expected depreciation rate is 
proxied by current value. 
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The data on inflation calculated from CPI, exchange rate, and time deposit interest 
rate have been provided by the CIEM. The data on nominal money supply have been 
provided by the SBVN. The data on real industrial output have been obtained from the 
GSO. All data are monthly time series which cover the period from 1990: 12 to . 
1994: 1237 . It is worth noting that the monthly data are, in general, consiste7:1t \vith the 
statistical consideration based mostly on the annual data and given in Chapter 3 
(Section 3.2.2). In the monthly series, there is also a high positive association between 
re and gM (gCU, gMJ, and gM2). The monthly values of£ and uJ, averaging at 1.2% 
and -1.4% respectively, reflect the attractiveness of the Dong, and this fact could have 
an important role in lo\vering inflation. In fact, the average value of re was only 2.1 %, 
\vhereas the average value of gCU, gMJ, and gM2 was about 3.5%, 3.2%, and 2.5% 
per month respectively. The only inconsistency between the monthly and the annual 
data lies in real industrial output. The average monthly value of gy appeared to be too 
high, standing at 1.6% in comparison with the average annual value of about 12 % for 
the period 1991-94 (see Table 1, Chapter 1, Section 1.1). Since the monthly series 
show the same trend of strong growth as the annual series during the period of 
estimation, the bias problem in the regression estimation due to the overestimated 
monthly gy may not be serious. However, the interpretation of the estimation results, 
especially in relation to the determinant gy, should be done with caution. 
Following the methodology used in Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and in Hamann 
( 1993), the estimation will focus on the predictive content of the determinants. That 
is, independently of the results of the Granger-causality tests, if lagged values of the 
37 In fact, we have got a longer period for the data of inflation, exch~nge rate. and interest rate. but the 
estimation is limited by the availability of the original time series of money supply and industrial 
o utput. 
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determinants help predict movements in prices, then these variables contain valuable 
information that can be used to guide policy decisions. For the estimation of Model 
(35), in order to assess the information provided by each determinant, but not already 
by the others, it is necessary to test the joint significance of the coefficients of gM, gy, 
uJ, rf. However, if the Granger-causality exists from inflation to the explanatory 
determinants, with the implication that the determinants are not exogenous to the 
change in prices, the evidence on the information content of the determinants would 
be weakened. To get more confidence in the further assessment of the results of the 
single-equation estimates, the formal causality test is also implemented (see 
Appendix, Part D). 
Since the estimation also investigates the long-term effects of the determinants on 
inflation, the problem of 'spurious' regression may arise when performing regressions 
vvith the non-stationary series. But the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
tests show that all series n, gM (gCU, gMJ, gM2), gy, and [iJ are integrated of order 
zero, ie. stationary (see Appendix, Part B). 
Another problem for a distributed-lag estimation is to identify the appropriate lag 
lengths. The lags, together with the determinants of Model (35), are chosen in 
accordance with a sequential procedure suggested by Hsiao (1981) (see Appendix, 
Part C). Since this procedure is based on Akaike' s minimum final prediction error 
(FPE), the procedure seems to be consistent with the main focus of the estimation, 
namely, the predictive content of the determinants. The implementation of this 
procedure leads to the following model specifications to be estimated: 
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Table 11: The Specifications of Model (35) for the Cases of CU, Ml, and N/2 
case of CU case of Ml case of M2 
··-····· .................................................... _ ............... ____ .. _ ........................................ . 
(JJ ( nm = 6) m ( nu1 = 6) uJ ( nu1 = 6) 
gCU ( IlM = I ) 
7f ( n~ = 5) 
gy ( Dy= 2 ) 
gMJ (nM=2) gM2 ( IlM = 3) 
gy ( ny = 3 ) gy ( ny = 2 ) 
Note: The list of detenninants for each case shows the sequence of the choice 
according to Hsiao's procedur~. 
In all cases, the first choice is determinant uJ with the same number of lags. Also, 
whatever the monetary aggregate used, the growth rates of money supply and real 
industrial output contribute to the explanation of the variation in inflation rate. 
However, the expected inflation, proxied by rc_ 1, does not play this role in the cases of 
Ml andM2. 
5.1.2. The estimation results and interpretation 
Tables 12, I 3, and 14 present the results of the OLS estimations for the specifications 
given in Table 11. Although there is the problem of functional form for the cases of 
M 1 and lvf2 as Ramsey's Reset test for them is not passed, the most important tests, 
the tests for serial correlation and normality of the error term, for this kind of model 
are quite satisfactory. The Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for the three cases shows no 
serial correlation up to 12 lags of the residuals. The statistic of the J arque-Bera test for 
normality is also highly insignificant, ie. the null-hypothesis of normality of residuals 
cannot be rejected. All regressions also pass the tests for structural stability under the 
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Cusum-sq test and the White test for heteroscedasticity based on the regression of 
squared residuals on squared fitted values. Also, the explanatory powers of all 
specifications are quite satisfactory. Moreover, the exogeneity of the determinants is 
not a problem within the time frame of setting lags of the determinants (see causality 
test in Appendix, Part D). In general, these estimations can be used .for further 
analysis. 
The three regressions share some common features. The lags of uJ and gM are jointly 
significant at the 1 % and 5% levels respectively (see the F-test for the joint 
significance of the lags). Thus, these determinants are very useful predictors of the 
variation in the inflation rate. The sums of the coefficients of the lags of uJ and gM are 
highly significant and have positive signs. This indicates that they both have a long-
lasting impact on inflation with the signs that are predicted by theory. For example, a 
one percentage point increase in G5 (in the difference between the depreciation rate and 
time deposit interest rate) or growth rate of CU, other things being equal, ultimately 
leads to about a 0.45 or 0.23 percentage point increase in the inflation rate. At the 
same time, the evidence on the information content of gy is weaker, with the F-
statistic for the joint significance of the lags significant only at 10% for the case of Ml 
only. Moreover, the sum of the coefficients of the lags of gy is not significant at the 
10% level and has the wrong sign, positive38 . Thus, it can be said that the impact of gy 
on inflation, if it exits, is only of short duration. 
38 The same result is obt:1ined for the case of Singapore and Korea during the period of about 1970-90.' 
H owever, no explanation is given for this phenomenon (see Dhakal and Kandil 1993). 
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Table 12: Estimation Result: the·-Case of Using CU 
Sample period: 1990:12-1994:12, 43 observations (1991:6 - 1994:12) are used 
Constant term: 0.0072 ( 1.726)* 
Lag uJ ( E - id) gCU 'JT:_J ( Tf) gy 
0 0.1630 0.1313 -0.0312 . 
(2.744)** (2.474)** (-0.863) 
1 -0.1148 0.0962 0.0432 -0.0133 
(-1.613) ( 1.639) (0.259) (-0.320) 
2 -0.0518 0.1079 0.0542 
(-0.757) (0.7546) (l.495) 
3 0.0924 0.0675 
( 1.520) (0.489) 
4 0.1710 0.2396 
(2.613)** (2.058)** 
5 0.1063 -0.2324 
(1.603) (-2.388)** 
6 0.0812 0.1503 
( 1.238) (1.978)* 
................. -....................................................... .. .......... -.................... .......... ...... .................. .... ............. -............................................................... --···-···· 
Sum of the lag coefficients (I) 0.4472 
-Wald test for I=0, x2cl) 16.438*** 
-Wald test for IaiM = 1 
F-statistic for the joint F(7,24)= 
significance of the lags 4.410*** 
-
Other statistics R 2 =0.715 
0.2275 
9.783*** 
112.787*** 
F(2,24)= 
5.162** 
SE=0.0090 
0.3760 
6.059** 
F(6,24)= 
2.238* 
0.0097 
0.010 
F(3,24)= 
2.047 
Max Log = 153 .878 
............................................................................................................................................................ -........................................................................ -....................................................................... _ ..................................................................... ----······················ 
Autocorrelation (LM test, x2c12)): 15.981 Functional Form (RESET test,x2cl)): 2.655 
Normality (Jarque-Bera test, x2(2)): 0.536 Heteroscedasticity (White test,X
2
(1)): 0.824 
Cusum-Sq test: Pass 
Note: *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels respectively. The figures in 
parentheses are t-ratios; SE is standard error of the regression; Max.Log is maximum of log- likelihood 
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Table 13: Estimation Result: the Case of Using Ml 
Sample period: 1990:12-1994:12, 43 observations (1991:6 - 1994:12) are used 
Constant term: 0.0109 (2.786)**-
Lag (iJ ( E - id) gMJ gy 
0 0.1220 0.0419 -0.0173 
(1.871)* (0.769) (-0.475) 
1 -0.0618 0.0979 0.0333 
(-0.794) (l.942)* (0.812) 
2 -0.0784 0.1050 0.1079 
(-1.098) (l.865)* (2.721)** 
3 0.0236 0.0494 
(0.323) ( 1.608) 
4 0.1990 
(3.036)*** 
5 0.1574 
(2.397)** 
6 0.1570 
(2.562)** 
........................... ······· ...................... ····-····. ·····-··············· .............. -· ...................................... --............................................. . 
0.1732 
2.599 
Sum of the lag coefficients (I) 
-Wald test for I=O, x\1) 
-Wald test for LCXiM = 1 
0.5187 
37.789*** 
F-statistic for the joint F(7,28)= 
significance of the lags 
Other statistics 
10.153*** 
R 2 =0.668 
0.2448 
11.846*** 
112.772*** 
F(3,28)= 
4.115** 
F(4,28)= 
2.328* 
SE=0.0098 MaxLog=147.300 
Autocorrelation (LM, x2cl2)): 12.790 Functional Form (RESET, x
2
(1)): 13.123*** 
Normality (Jarque-Bera, x 2(2)): 0.067 Heteroscedasticity (White, x2cl)): 0.179 
Cusum- Sq test: Pass 
Note: *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels respectively. The figures in 
parentheses are t-ratios; SE is standard error of the regression; MaxLog is maximum of log-likelihood 
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Table 14: Estimation Result: the Case of Using M2 
Sample period: 1990:12-1994:12, 43 observations (1991:6 -1994:12) are used 
Constant term: 0.0114 (2.575)** 
Lacr t, uJ ( E - id) gM2 
0 0.1006 0.0872 
(1.364) (1.084) 
1 -0.1250 0.0379 
(-1.699)* (0.503) 
2 -0.0353 0.1259 
(-0.491) (l.631) 
3 0.0307 0.0862 
(0.419) ( 1.297) 
4 0.1966 
(2.613)** 
) 0.0985 
(1.444) 
6 0.1715 
(2.264)** 
·········· .................................................................................................................................. -................................................................ . 
Sum of the lag coefficients (I) 0.4377 
-Wald test for I=0, x2(1) 19.334*** 
-Wald test for IcxiM = 1 
F-statistic for the joint F(7 ,28)= 
0.3371 
10.043*** 
38.835*** 
F(4,28)= 
2.834** 
gy 
-0.0263 
(-0.7007) 
0.0073 
(0.168) 
0.0687 
(l.826)* 
0.0497 
0.24S 
F(3~28)= 
2.071 significance of the lags 
Other statistics 
7.571 *** 
R2 =0.631 SE=0.0 103 MaxLog= 145 .026 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................. ........................................................................... .................... ---····-·· ..................................................................... . 
Autocorrelation (LM, x2(12)): .. 11.038 Functional Form (RESET, x2(1)): -1-.137** 
Normality (Jarque-Bera, x2c2)): 0.269 Heteroscedasticity (White,x\l)): 0.281 
Cusum- Sq test: Pass 
Note: *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels respectively. The figures in 
parentheses are t-ratios; SE is standard error of the regression; MaxLog is maximum of i,.1g-likelihood 
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Also, in all three cases, the inflation rate is not proportional to the growth rate of 
money supply. The Wald test shows that the sum of the coefficients of the lags of gM 
is not equal to one ( in fact, much lower than one and even lower than the long-term 
effect of (JJ ). Once again, this confirms the very important role of the financial 
portfolio choice by the public in favour of domestic currency in slowing down 
inflation over the estimation period, 1991-94. 
At the level of individual lags, the currency growth, gCU, has an immediate and 
statistically significant impact on · increases in inflation, whilst the impact of the 
growth of narrow money, gMI, has a lag of one to two months. For the case of 
changes in broad money, gM2, the lagged -impact is up to two months and to a less 
significant degree (at 12% level). Thus, when the cost of holding money (W ) is 
included explicitly in the regression, the impact of g}r12 on inflation is weaker than the 
result in the study by Dodsworth et al (1996). In general, the lag length of impact of 
money supply is short, . and hence, a restrictive monetary policy, particularly in terms 
of CU and MI, would quickly bring down inflation. 
The inflation rate is also sensitive to short lags of uJ; especially in the case of CU, but 
the maximum impact of uJ appears in the interval of four to six months. This suggests 
that the attempts to make the Dong attractive through interest rate/exchange rate 
policies should be sustained in order to be effective in reducing inflation. 
With regard to gy, the current impact is negative, as expected, but not significantly 
different from zero . At the same time, the later significant (much less significant for 
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the case of CU) lags are positive ones. This could mean that the change in the real 
.. 
industrial output may not be quite appropriate as a proxy for real income. Ho\vever, on 
the face of it, the result suggests an interesting explanation. Although an immediate 
increase in the supply of industrial goods might have had a small (but not significant) 
impact on the inflation reduction, this contribution could not offset the effect of an 
increase in the supply of credit, which is an underlying determinant of industrial 
output expansion. This result is particularly important in Vietnam, where the 
industrial sector is dominated by the SOEs, and the SOEs still have a close 
relationship with the state-owned banks which dominate the banking system . 
Only the regression with the use of CU contains the expected inflation, 1f , as a 
determinant of the inflation rate. It is clear from Table 12 that 1f is also a useful 
predictor of the inflation rate. Also, this determinant has a long-lasting positive impact 
on the inflation rate, as expected. The fact that people may hold durable goods instead 
of Dong, seems to be not a very convincing explanation for the whole period under 
consideration (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2). As 1f is proxied by 1r_1 , the more 
probable explanation could be the so-called problem of 'inflation inertia' 39 . AI though 
the degree of inflation inertia fell after stabilization, people still expect inflation to 
continue once it gets under way again. 
The next important step is to determine which of the three monetary aggregates ( CU, 
M 1, M2), together with their specifications of Model (35), contains the most valuable 
information on the inflationary movement. The assessment is usually based on two 
39 In a dynamic sense, the long-lasting multipliers of {iJ and gCU are now equal to 0.4472/(1-0.3760)= 0.7167 and 0.2275/( 1-0.3760) = 0.3646 respectively. 
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kinds of measures: the ·goodness-of-fit' indicators of the regr_essions (the adjusted-R2, 
the maximum-log of the likelihood function, and the standard error of regression) 
and/or the measure of the ability of the regression to forecast well (the root-mean-
square forecast error, RMSFE). According to the 'goodness-of-fit' indicators, as 
shown in Tables 12, 13, and 14, the best result for the inflation equation.is obtained 
when CU is used as the relevant monetary aggregate. But Table 15, in which the 
RMSFEs are computed over two ex-post forecasting periods, sho\vs that the 
specification with the use of Ml outperforms the other two specifications. The 
assessment in both cases is consistent with the fact that Vietnan1 is still very much a 
cash economy and an underbanked country. 
Table 15: Ex-post Forecasting RMSFEs 
Specification of r.11odel (35) 
-CU 
-Ml 
-M2 
Forecasting period 
1994:3 - 1994: 12 1994:6 - 1994: 12 
0.00696 0.00552 
0.00682 0.00449 
0.00908 0 .00521 
5.2 The condition for stability of inflation 
The condition for stability of inflation is understood in the sense of the theoretical 
model developed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2). A steady state inflation equilibrium is 
stable if 1-1 y > 0 or 1-(A y + T]my0 > 0 (when the output significantly depends on the 
expected real exchange rate), where y reflects the impact of the opponunity cost of 
holding domestic money (measured as £e-id ) on the demand for money; Tlmy is the 
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income elasticity of money demand (Equation ( 13)); A is the adjustment coefficient in 
the equation of dynamic expectation (Equation (14)); and s indicates the impact of 
the change in the expected real exchange rate on output growth (Equation (34)). The 
estimated values of these parameters will be determined from the regressions similar 
to Equations (13), (14), and (34) in Chapter 4 (We ignore writing the error terms in 
the regressions for simplicity): 
log mr = canst+ 11 my log Yr - yuJ r 
~ £ r = cons t + A ( n r-i - £ r- i) 
gy 1 =canst+ 8 (£ - n ), + 8 1gy,_ 1 + 8 2 gyr_ 2 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
Most symbols of the variables are already described in Section 5.1. Remember only 
that operator log means natural logarithm and 1n (cu, ml, m2) is real money; ie. the 
nominal money M (CU, M 1, M2) deflated by the CPI. In fact , the equation of demand 
for money here is derived from the formula 1n=Ay11exp(- yuJ), where A is constant. The 
choice of two lags of the growth rate of output in (39) will be explained later, but as 
this is a dynamic equation, s=&'( I-8r8i). The estimation of these regressions will be 
undertaken using the same time series described in Section 5.1. And again, the 
expected depreciation rate is proxied by the current rate. 
It is worth noting some important points in checking the condi tion for stability of 
inflation imposed on the estimated parameters. First, because the observed inflation 
rate is only transitional, by checking the stability condition, we can answer the 
question whether the actual infl ation tends to be stable. Second, the regression 
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estimations should be acceptable in terms of several econometric tests; in particular 
the structural stability of the parameters is essential. 
Although our focus is on the stability condition of inflation, the regression 
estimations will also give us more confidence in assessing the credibility of 
government policies and the process of economic reform as a whole. 
5.2.1. Demand for money in Vietnam in the first half of the 1990s. 
The estimation of the Model (35) of inflation suggests that the real output y, the 
opportunity cost of holding money OJ, and possibly Tf could be important determinants 
of money demand. However, this does not mean that the demand for money is well 
behaved over the sample period from 1990: 12 to 1994: 12. Equation (37) represents 
the long run relationship in demand for real balances. Cointegration techniques 
(Appendix, Part A. l) are therefore used. 
As shown in Appendix (Part B), the unit root tests are satisfied for further 
cointegration tests: all nonstationary variables logcu, Iogml, log1n2 and logy are 
integrated of order 1, ie I( 1 ); the opportunity costs uJ and expected inflation rate -Tf = 
1r_1 are stationary, ie. I(O). Thus, we can examine the long run relationship between 
real money demand and other variables by running cointegration regression. Since the 
inclusion of -,f and/or the time trend do not improve the results and the focus is on uJ 
as suggested by the preliminary analysis in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2), we only 
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summarize the cointegration test in Table 16 for the OLS regressions of the log of real 
money on logy and w-. 
logcu 
logml 
logm2 
logcu 
logml 
logm2 
logcu 
logml 
logm2 
Table 16: Money Demand: Cointegration Regressions 
Constant 
1.562 
2.756 
7.170 
9.219 
9.244 
9.?97 
logv rJJ=&-ld R: D-W errorEI(0)? 
--------
Sample period: 1990: 12 - 1994: 12 
l.?60 
1.136 
0.621 
------------
0.736 
0.627 
0.713 
0.777 0.509 
0.788 0.503 
0.803 0.762 
Sample period: 1990: 12 - 1992:9 
0.181 
0.220 
0.320 
-0.107 
-0.063 
0.556 
0.292 0.691 
0.245 0.636 
0.318 0.906 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sample period: 1992: 10 - 1994: 12 
1.326 1.291 -2.972 0.789 1.279 yes 
(9.948)*** (-1.729)* 
3.219 1.073 -2.596 0.820 1.424 yes 
(10.988)*** (-2.006)* 
8.380 0.459 -1.172 0.800 1.406 no 
.Vote: - See the ADF tests for residuals from cointegration regressions in Appendix (Part B). The error 
term for the case oflogml over 1992: 10-1994: 12 is stationary only at the 10% significance level. Since 
ADF tests are sensitive to the time length, they are also conducted for logcu, logml, logm2, and mover 
1992:10-1994:12 and the results (not shown here) are thatlogcu, logml, andlogm2EI(l) and wEI(0). 
- The only standard t-statistics for the cases of existence of cointegration are shown for the purpose of 
calculating confidence intervals. D-W is the Durbin-Warson statistic. 
The low Durbin-Watson statistics for three regressions over the whole sample from 
1990:12 to 1994:12 signal noncointegration. This is confirmed by the ADF tests for 
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stationarity on the series of residuals. Thus, the long-run demand for real balances does 
not exist. A question, then, arises: has the demand for money behaved \veil enough 
since 1992? This point of time is chosen because of two main factors. First. the market-
oriented reforms since then have gone ahead after the temporary reversal of reforms in 
1990-91. Second~ the financial environment has become more stable. The choice of a 
particular month is based on the empirical regressions, which show the best broken 
point is October of 1992. 
As presented in Table 16, the cointegration regressions for the cases of logcu and 
logml over the period from 1992: 10 to 1994: 12 look quite reasonable. They have the 
right signs in the explanatory variables and a higher than one income elasticity as 
expected. The ADF tests on the regression residuals confirm the existence of the long 
run demand for real balances. Moreover, the elasticities of demand for money with 
respect to ru are quite high. Since 8logm/8logru = (81ogm/8 w):(clogw-/om) = 
(3logm/3ru)*ru= (coefficient of ru)*ru where mis real money balances, for a w of 1 % 
(ie the difference between the depreciation rate and the time deposit interest rate is 
1 %), the elasticities of demand for cu and ml with respect to w are -0.030 and -0.026. 
This confirms the large shift towards the Dong since 1992 as we have seen in Chapter 3 
(Section 3.2.2). However, the long run demand for real Ml is still weakly established 
since the null hypothesis of unit root for the residuals from the cointegration regression 
is rejected only at the 10% significance level. And again, Table 16 shovvs that there is 
no cointegration for the case of logm2 over 1992: 10 - 1994: 12, and all the regressions 
over 1990: 12 - 1992:9 are 'spurious· . 
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In the cointegration regressions, the standard t-statistics and the test for stn.1ctural 
changes may create problems because the standard errors may be misleading. To get 
more confidence in the use of the estimated parameters from the acceptable 
cointegration regressions, we will estimate the ECMs representing the short-run 
dynamics of the demand for cu and ml . This can be done since there ex.ists the long 
run demand for cu and ml over 1992: 10 - 1994: 12. The expectation is that the correct 
sign of the coefficient of the error-correction term should be significant and the short-
run dynamics should pass the test for structural stability. The following ECM is chosen 
for the estimation: 
Iogmr = const.+/3 1~Iogyr + /3 2 ~ Ci5r + /3 3!:iuJr-i + /3 4 resmr-i + vr (40) 
where res1n represent residuals from the corresponding cointegration regression. 
Table 17 contains the results of the OLS estimations. Only the sign of the coefficients 
of resm(-1) requires some explanation. Since the variable resm is measured as the 
difference between actual values and fitted values, the negative coefficients mean that 
if real money stock is above that consistent \Vith the desired long-run holding, real 
money demand should be decreased. In terms of the signs and significance of the 
coefficients, the explanatory power, the diagnostic tests, and test for structural stability, 
the ECM is quite good for representing the short-run dynamics of demand for cu. The 
case of logml presents a problem in the test for normality of residuals because the test 
statistic is significant However, the level of significance is only at 10%. 
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Table 17: The Estimation of the EC Ms for Demand for Money 
(Sample period: 1992: 10 - 1994: 12) 
logm = logcu logml 
Constant 0.019 0.014 
(5.148)*** (2.852)*** 
~logy 0.266 0.397 
-
(3.876)*** (4.375)*** 
~[jj -2.639 -1.821 
(-5.167)*** (-2.870)*** 
~[jj(-1) -1.105 -0.884 
(-3.933)*** (-2.408)** 
resm(-1) -0.241 -0.420 
······································································-·······-········· (-3 .. 570)***··········-··········(-3.795)*** .......... . 
R-bar-squared 0.729 0.563 
Overall F-test F( 4,21 )= 
S.E. of regression 
............................. _ 
Diagnostic tests: 
Serial correlation x2c 12) 
Functional form 
? 
x-cl) 
Normality 
") 
x-(2) 
Heteroscedasticity x 2( 1) 
Cusum-sq test 
17.829*** 
0.018 
8.493 
0.290 
3.752 
0.164 
pass 
9.047*** 
0.024 
14.281 
1.033 
4.731 * 
0.005 
pass 
Note: The figures in parentheses are t-ratios. All diagnostic tests are as before (see, 
for example, Tables 12,13 or 14) 
As the long run equation of demand for real currency in circulation since the end of 
1992 is acceptable, the estimated parameter y can be considered to be equal to 2.972 
(see Table 16). When the money is taken as narrow money, y = 2.596. However, the 
case of narrow money is only presented for the purpose of comparison because the 
existence of cointegration is very weak. The question of inflation stability now 
depends on the results from the estimation of Equations (38) and (39). 
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5.2.2. A check on the condition for inflation stability 
Equation (38) is firstly run by the OLS method for the whole sample period and the 
results are presented in Table 18. The estimated coefficient of (n-£)_ 1 has the right sign, 
positive, and is highly significant. The interpretation in terms of econometric tests, 
however, is misleading because the hypothesis of normality of the error term is 
strongly rejected. Moreover, the Cusum-sq test shows that the 95 per cent confidence 
interval is broken over the wide range, from the end of 1991 to the end of 1993. This 
means that there is a very high probability of systematic shifts in the estimated 
parameters. However, attempts to introduce dummies on the basis of the period of 
institutional changes have not altered the results. 
As in the case of money demand, we ask whether there exits a time span where the 
estimation of Equation (38) is stable. It is found that this time span has existed since 
1993:10. As also shown in Table 18, the estimation of Equation (38) over 1993:10 -
1994: 12 passes the test for structural stability, and, given a very small number of 
observations, the regression is quite acceptable in terms of other tests, the sign and 
significance of the explanatory variable (though only at the 10% level). In fact, the 
structural instability mostly occurred in the period before 1993: 10 (see also the 
estimation for the period from 1990: 12 to 1993:9). The estimations support the 
significant and positive association between the change in the depreciation rate and the 
deviation of inflation from the depreciation rate. That is , A is positive and significant. 
Also, 1 declined over time, from 0.361 to 0.108. Since 1 reflects the people's rate of 
response to the changes in inflation, a decrease in the value of A would be expected as 
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inflq.tion is decreased. However, we can use the estimated coefficient only fo r the 
period since October 1993 with A= 0.108. 
Table 18: Dynamics of (Expected) Depreciation Rate and the Estimation 
De12..endent variable: ~E 
Sample period 90: 12 - 94: 12 90: 12 - 93:9 93: 10 - 94: 12 
Constant -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 
(-0.873) (-0.698) (-1.317) 
(Jr-E)(-1) 0.352 0,.... r, _jo1 0.108 
(3.032)*** (2.529)** (1.892)* 
................ -..... 
R-bar-squared 0.146 0.141 0.156 
Overall F-test 
S.E. of regression 
F(l,47)=9.196*** F(l,32)=6.397** 
0.030 0.036 
F(l,13)=3.581 * 
0.003 
...................................................................... .................... .. ....... .. _ ................................ .................. -................ ................ ··-···· ............................................................................... --....... . 
Diagnostic tests: 
Serial Correlation x2cI2) = 17.265 X \ 12) = 12. 441 -, x-o) = 1.620 
Functional Form x2c 1) 0.046 0.048 1.093 
Normality 
-, 
x~C2) 27.339*** 4.088 1.573 
Heteroscedasticity x2c 1) 0.124 0.681 0.038 
.................... ····-··-········ --·-· .................................................. -·· ......................... -............ ..... ....... ··-· ............................ -....... ............ . 
Cusum-sq test not pass not pass pass 
Note: The figures _in parentheses are t-ratios. All diagnostic tests are as before. 
Now i..ve estimate the last equation, Equation (39), for the whole sample period. Since 
the current output depends on its previous situation, naturally the lags of dependent 
variable gy should be used as predetermined variables in the (OLS) regression. 
Initially, all lags from gy_ 1 to gy_6 are put into the regression. But only the coefficients 
of the first two lags are significant and the F-test of j oint zero restriction on the 
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coefficients of lags from gy_3 to gy_6 is highly insignificant (F :_ -.:._-3~ , == 0.651 )40 . As a 
result, Equation (3 9) is chosen and its (OLS) estimation is preseJ.~d in Table 19. 
Table 19: Effect of the Change in Real Exchange Rate on Output Growth gy 
(Sample period: 1990:12-1994:12; 46 observations (91:3- :?-k 12) are used) 
Constant 
0.037 
( 4.439)*** 
E-'lr 
Dependent variable: gv 
gv(-1) 
0.494 
(2.146)** 
-0.592 
(-4.945)*** 
m~-~- J ) 
-0.226 
(- 1.9:6)* 
···············-······················-·· .......................................... .... ............................................... _______ .,__________________________________ ······-··················· 
R-bar-squared = 0.340 ; Overall F-test: F(3,42) = 8.743*** S .l::.. = 0.051 
...................................................................................................................... -........................... __ __________ ............................................. . 
Serial correlation x2c12) = 8.834 Functional form :("(1) = 0.797 
Normality 
? x-c2) = 1.111 Heteroscedasticity _x2(1) = 0.332 
Wu-Hausman test F(l,41) = 0.354 Cusum-sq test: ?2..Ss 
Note: The figures in parentheses are t-ratios. The \Vu-Hausman test :n-, JtYe-5 ~ugmenting the 
regression with the residuals from the regression of each of the re _:""eSS-J rs suspected of 
endogeneity (In our case, variable £-Jr) upon the set of available instrume:·, E::re we use (E-Tr). 1 
and gy. 1) and then testing the joint significance of these added residuals :y ~ing r.he F-test (In 
our case, we can just look at the t-statistic because there is only one =-='.:'"e:~scr suspected of 
endogeneity). Other diagnostic tests are as before. 
The Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity of the regressors is also i:c:1.:ied. together with 
other 'standard' diagnostic tests. Because output may have an ~:~-e-..:t on depreciation 
rate, there is potential for E-n to be endogenous and hence, the ;:5::i• ::ites \vould not be 
consistent (In Section 5.1.1, we only undertook the test for cai:.s2.li:y oet\veen gy and 
inflation rate). But the Wu-Hausman test shows that variable E-:-: ::m be regarded as 
40 There are 4 restrictions and the regression which has 7 explanatory variabl~- -..L~s 4-2 observations 
from 1991:7 to 1994:12. therefore the F-statistic should be compared to the:-:-:;:.::~ ,.-2..lue \\·ith 4 and 34 
( 42-7-1) degrees of freedom . 
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exogenous. The estimation results are highly acceptable (The negative coefficients of 
the lags of gy indicate the cycles of (industrial) output growth). Parameter s in 
Equation (34) (Chapter 4, Section 4.2) now can be estimated s = 
0:494/(1 +0.592+0.226)=0.272, and this value can be taken to represent the whole 
sample period. 
Table 20 shows that the condition for inflation stability is satisfied (1-Ay> 0 or 1-(Ay+ 
T]my0 > 0). But, of course, this result is valid only for the period since October 1993; 
before then the value of the parameter A is not acceptable. Moreover, the observed 
inflation rate has been at relatively low levels and the nominal exchange rate has 
continued to be rather stable even in 1995 and 1996. This rules out the possibility that 
the economy could be on the 'wrong side' of the inflation-seigniorage Laffer curve
41 
and hence, the actual inflation in recent years has tended to be stable. 
Table 20: Checking the Conditions for Stability of Inflation 
Case .1' 11.mv 1 { 1 - ).,y 1-( AY±:7Jmv-Sl 
cu 2.972 1.291 0.108 0.272 0.679 0.328 
I 
Ml 2.596 1.073 0.108 0.272 0.719 0.428 
How confident can we be that inflation in Vietnam has been stable since October 
1993? To get some idea about this, we calculated the 90 per cent confidence intervals 
of the estimated parameters -y (the case of using CU in demand for money) and 1: they 
41 In the framework of the model developed in Chapter 4, even when the condition for inflation stabiliry 
is met, inflation may run into hyperinflation if the economy is far enough on the 'wrong ' side of the 
Laffer curve. 
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are (-5.913, -0.030) and (0.007, 0.209) respectively-+ 2. If these parameters are highly 
independent, the 'worst scenario' may happen: y is too close to 5.913 and ;t to 0.209, 
and then YA:::::: 1.236. Obviously, whatever the values of other parameters, the condition 
for inflation stability is not satisfied then. Thus, this condition is only satisfied 'on 
average', but not firmly established yet. 
The overall estimation procedure is consistent with what happened during the 
transitional period in the first half of the 1990s. There were substantial institutional 
changes, but the path of the economic reforms was not smooth, sometimes 
characterized by stop-and-go policy. The examples are the temporary reverse of the 
reforms during 1990-91 and the fact that the reform process of the SOE sector and the 
banking system has been slow in comparison with overall economic development. All 
this occurred in the context of a population suffering for several years in the mid-1980s 
from the negative consequences of macroeconomic mismanagement. As a result, there 
should be systematic shifts in money demand, credibility and expectation. For the 
whole period, therefore, it is to be expected that long run relationships between real 
money, real output, and opportunity costs cannot be obtained, and that the parameter 
reflecting the adjustment in adaptive expectation is subject to frequent changes. 
We found that there has existed only long run demand for real currency in circulation 
(and for real narrow money, although with the much weaker econometric evidence) 
since the end of 1992. A stable regression for the dynamics of the expected exchange 
42The confidence interval can be obtained as (x - tcsx , x + t,sx ) where x is the estimated regression 
parameter, sx is the estimates of its standard error, and tc is the t-distribution critical value 
corresponding to the regression degree of freedom and the probability of the true parameter falling into 
the confidence interval. 
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rate has existed only since the end of 1993. This may reflect the fact that the 
'credibility gap' among the people with regard to government policies has recently 
been narrowed. The process towards financial stability has started, but has not been 
firmly established. The degree of confidence in a stable financial environment is not 
high. Even in the case of real currency in circulation, the evidence in favour of the 
existence of coint~gration cannot be considered strong because of the limitation of the 
test power due to the very short time series. 
Summary 
This chapter has investigated two questions: what are the major determinants of the 
inflation rate in Vietnam since the market-oriented reforms ? Has the inflation in 
recent years tended to be stable? 
The investigation of the first question relied on a simple monetarist model (Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.1) which explains the inflationary movement as a result of the changes in 
money supply and the factors determining the demand for real balances. The 
monetarist model fits monthly data from December 1990 to December 1994 
reasonably well. Both money growth and the rate of return on Dong in terms of US 
dollars circulating in the economy (Recall that it is measured as id - £ = -m) contain 
valuable information on the behaviour of inflation, and both have a si£nificant and :::, 
expected long-term impact on the inflation rate. The econometric analysis , thus, 
reconfirms the intuition behind the descriptive statistics in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.2) , 
that the key r?le in affecting the inflation rate is that played by money growth and 
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especially, the factors reflecting the attractiveness of the Dong43 . Moreover, the 
inflation rate is sensitive to short lags of both money growth and ITJ, but in the latter 
case, its maximum impact appears in the interval of four to six months. The 
investigation also indicates that the significant positive impact of the expansion of 
(industrial) output on inflation is only of short duration. 
The answer to the question of inflation stability is based on the estimations of several 
pararpeters characterizing the demand for (domestic) money, the expectation of 
depreciation, and output growth, that established, together with the public finance-
seigniorage relationship, the theoretical model in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2). We found 
that the condition for inflation stability has been met since the end of 1993, and hence, 
the rather low inflation in recent years has tended to be stable. However, the process 
toward financial stability has not been firmly established. Moreover, our investigation 
reflects the rapid institutional changes and the \Veak credibility of the pace of the 
financial and SOE reforms during the first half of the 1990s. Thus , the inflation 
dynamics since the 1989-reform should be analyzed largely on a case-by-case basis. 
The investigation of both questions suggest that, at present, currency in circulation CU 
or, perhaps, narrow money Ml, is the 'best' choice for an intermediate target. This is 
because these monetary aggregates contain the most useful predictive information on 
inflationary movement. Furthermore, there is recent evidence in favour of the 
structural stability and the actuaLlong run relationship of the real demand for these 
monetary aggregates. 
43 Thus, in the sense of the impact of growth of money (M2) on inflation, our result is consistent with 
the study by Dodsworth et al (1996). However, in our estimations, which explicitly took the opportunity 
costs of holding money into account, the effect of money growth on inflation is much weaker 
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Chapter 6 
An Assessment of the Appropriate 
Anti-inflation Policy for Vietnam 
6. 1. Inflationary target 
The social and economic benefits gained by Vietnam in the first years after the 
market-oriented reform in 1989 have been significant. In order to sustain the 
achievements, particularly the improved resource allocation and high economic 
growth, efforts to stabilize the economy will continue to be very important. The 
outcome of these efforts, of course, largely depends on the ability to control money 
supply and the policy choice in regard to other macroeconomic variables such as fiscal 
(public) deficits, interest rates, and exchange rates. But the first thing the government 
should do in this respect, is to make a firm commitment to low inflationary growth. 
As inflation surged in 1990 and 1991, in December 1991, inflation control was again 
declared the priority policy objective to the year 1995. It is pleasing to see that since 
then, together with the success in slowing down inflation, Vietnam has been always 
regarding price stabilization as one of the priorities in macroeconomic management 
However, the commitment to the goal of low inflation sometimes seems to weaken. 
For example, after the failure to keep the inflation rate at a single-digit level in 1994 
and 1995, following a record lo\v of 5.2% in 1993, Vietnam assessed that with the 
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high economic growth, an annual inflation rate at a moderate double-digit level is 
acceptable economically. There was also the suggestion that the government needs to 
keep the inflation rate not higher than double that of the GDP growth rate (Le Dang 
Doanh 199 5). 
There are some reasons behind the weakening of commitment to the goal of low 
inflation (say, at about 10 per cent per year or lower). During the transitional period, 
the government is under constant pressure to increase public spending (salaries, 
expenditure on infrastructure and social services) and credit to the SOEs. It is also 
believed that inflation is inevitable in a growing developing economy like Vietnam, 
· and more importantly, that moderate inflation does not negatively affect economic 
growth. At the same time, there is the fear that moderate inflation can be reduced only 
at a substantial short-term cost44. 
At present, however, any relaxation of the commitment to keep inflation under control 
may hurt the stabilization efforts in several aspects. Firstly, this may result in 
macroeconomic mismanagement. Once 'the worst' is seemingly over, public deficits 
may again increase out of control and hence, lead to an unnecessary easing of fiscal 
and monetary policy. Secondly, any relaxation of the commitment to anti-inflation 
may alter the structural parameters of the money demand functions, and the dynamic 
expectations of the depreciation rate, the stability and the predictability of which, as 
seen in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2), have just started forming. As a result, inflation could 
again become unstable within a very short peeriod. Thirdly, relaxing the anti-inflation 
44In Dornbusch and Fischer (1993), annual inflation in the range of 15 to 30 percent is defined as 
moderate inflation. 
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commitment, together with widening the trade deficit, encourages speculation over the 
value of the Dong, which in turn could lead to a higher expected depreciation and 
hence, higher inflation due to a portfolio shift against the Dong (see also Chapter 5)45 . 
Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) present some cases where economies can .grow for a 
rather long time with moderate inflation after having reduced the inflation rate from a 
high level. But the risk of crises is also high, particularly for an open economy 
(Mexico is a typical example) since a moderate inflation rate cannot sustain a stable 
nominal exchange rate over time. J)n the other hand, depreciation may create a 
'vicious circle': depreciation may lead to higher inflation, and this requires a more 
depreciated domestic currency. Korea during 1980-81 illustrates the case where 
disinflation from a moderate to a single digit range was accompanied by a significant 
cost to output. But it is also true that Indonesian efforts to bring inflation down to 
single digit levels, firstly from high inflation in 1968, and then from moderate 
inflation during 1974-76, involved apparently low output cost. Success usually is 
achieved in combining mostly orthodox monetary and fiscal- policies with some 
exchange rate commitment, and taking advantage of favourable supply shocks (for 
example, the 'oil boom') (Dornbusch and Fischer 1993). 
It is well established that high inflation involves substantial costs to the economy. In 
times of high inflation, relative prices are highly variable; the volatility of inflation 
itself is high; information on prices and the ensuing uncertainty become highly 
-+5The trade deficit in 1996 was expected to be US$4.0 billion, the highest ever and up sharply from 
US$2.3 billion in 1995. In November of 1996, Vietnam had to move to dampen speculation over a 
devaiuation of the Dong by stating that a devaluation of the Dong was not being planned and the 
authorities wanted to manage the Dong, ensuring reasonably stable rates against other currencies 
(Reuters News Service, November 1996). 
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problematic; and the credit selection process is destroyed. High inflation, therefore, is 
the major source of resource misallocation and also brings about a major 
redistribution of wealth. Output growth is negatively associated \vith high inflation 
and high inflation is not consistent with sustained growth (Barro 1995 and Fischer 
1993). 
Meanwhile, the study of a sample of 127 countries over the period 1961-92 by Bruno 
and Easterly ( 1995) shows that if the countries with high inflation crises are excluded, 
there is no evidence of any consistent relationship between growth and inflation at any 
frequency46 . But this does not mean that low-to-moderate inflation is not very costly 
as it was believed for a long time (For example, the classical measurement by Bailey 
( 1956) led to the cost being identified with 'boot leather', thus being small). New 
studies have provided evidence that even relatively low and anticipated inflation 
might impose substantial costs, particularly welfare costs (Parkin 1994: xiv). 
Moreover, the economic achievements of the East Asian countries demonstrate 
vividly the contribution of macroeconomic stability with low inflation to growth. By 
and large, East Asia managed to keep inflation at single - digit levels (Leipziger and 
Thomas 1993). 
Whether the time period is short- or long-run, the commitment to lowering inflation 
rates is desirable. In the first years after 1989, better resource reallocation due to the 
market-oriented reform was seen to be the most important factor contributing to 
economic growth. Now is the time for a more stable macroeconomic environment to 
46They define high inflation crises as periods when inflation is above 40 percent annu:illy. 
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play its role. Of course, making a commitment is only the beginning. The inflationary 
target can be achieved only when the state priority is indeed reflected in real policies. 
"I 
6.2. The SBVN, monetary instruments, and monetary target 
The ability to control the money stock, in which the SBVN plays a central role, 1s 
another crucial element in combating inflation. In this regard, as described in Chapter 
3 (Section 3.1), the SBVN is still subject to two main limitations. First, although the 
1990-la\v on banking authorized the SBVN to assume traditional central bank 
functions, the SBVN still operates under the government's guidance in policy matters . . 
Second, the lack of development in the financial sector creates difficulties in the use 
of the monetary instruments to control effectively money stock without negatively 
affecting the efficient allocation of financial resources. In an open econom,y, as the 
exchange rate becomes more flexible , the monetary authorities will have more scope 
for controlling domestic monetary development. Another problem for the conduct of 
monetary policy, thus, is to decide which monetary aggregate should be targeted. 
Making the SBVN a much more independent agency in reality, with the responsibility 
for maintaining price stability is an important step in strengthening the government's 
credibility. Central bank independence is advocated as a very desirable remedy against 
inflation47 . One well-known argument is that this independence would reduce the risk 
47 Central bank independence is usually based on 'political' independence and 'economic' 
independence. For example, according to the Grilli measure , political independence is determined by: 
1. the procedures for appointing board members; 2. the relationship between the governing board of the 
central bank and the government; 3. formal responsibilities for monetary policy; economic 
independence is determined by the influence of the government in deciding how much to borrow from 
the central bank and the nature of the monetary instruments under control of the central bank (De Haan 
and Sturm 1992). The study by Cukierman et al ( 1992) shows that among developing countries, 
however, legal independence is not very important and not a statistically significant determinant of 
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of the government exploiting the central bank capacity to create 'easy money' through 
seigniorage to finance the public deficit. This is especially common in developing 
countries and economies in transition. Also, as predicted by our theoretical model 
(Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2) where monetary policy dominates fiscal policy, an 
independent central bank is much more powerful in controlling and. stabilizing 
inflation at low levels, particularly when the expectation adjustment is slow, or in 
other words, when the condition for inflation stability is met. Moreover, in a recent 
empirical study of more advanced countries, De Haan and Sturm (1992) came to the 
conclusion that an independent central bank yields lower inflation rates without 
making economic sacrifices such as lower output. For developing countries, Roubini _ 
and Sala-i-Martin ( 1992) also found that in the presence of financial repression, 
inflationary revenue is one potential element affecting growth negatively. 
The ideal model , which ensures the independence of a central bank in its mandate to 
pursue price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy, usually centers on 
two main guidelines: first, all credit to the government is discretionary; second, only 
. indirect credit is allowed (see Table 21 ). It also suggests that parliamentary control 
over central bank credit to the government should be discouraged (Cottarelli 1993 ). 
In Vietnam, as in ma~y developing countries, the banking system is still thin, 
inefficient, and inflexible, and the government paper market is not sufficiently well 
organized; therefore some limited access to direct central bank credit may be 
unavoidable. At present, however, giving greater real autonomy to the SBVN in the 
price stability. In these countries, the rate of mrnover of the central bank governors is a better proxy for 
central bank independence. 
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conduct of monetary policy is very desirable. To a large extent, this depends on how 
the authorities would tighten the criteria for government financing, and revise the 
Decree on the SBVN, particularly Article 29 which states that " the State Bank is to 
assist the· State Budget Office in reaching an agreed total amount of credit the State 
Bank plans to supply to the Government for the next fiscal year ... " and that "the State 
Bank will negotiate with the Finance Ministry upon amount, length and interest rates 
of any advance or loss to the Treasury". Otherwise, up to now, the board of directors 
of the SBVN has been performing more the role of an advisory committee. Also, 
given the still close relationship existing between the state-owned banks and the 
SOEs, it is necessary that the reform of the SOE sector and the banking system 
should be pursued si1nultaneously. 
Table 21: Ideal Model of Constraints on Central Bank Credit to the Government 
Instrument Degree of Allowed Quantitati- Interest Rate 
Control Maturitl'.'. ve Ceiling 
Overdraft on current account Prohibited NA NA NA 
Fixed-term loans and advances Prohibited NA NA NA 
Purchase of securities Discretionary NA NA NA 
(primary market) or Prohibited 
Purchase of securities Discretionary U neons trained None Unconstrained 
(secondary market) 
Repurchase agreements (repos) Discretionary U neons trained None U neons trained 
Gov't deposits at central bank Discretionary Unconstrained Yesa Limitedb 
Note: a)Expressed as a percentage of government revenue in the preceding year; b) Linked to rate paid 
on government short-term paper. 
Source: Cottarelli (1993 , table 2, p.11) 
In regard to monetary instruments, in 1996, the SBVN implemented several measures 
to improve the monetary instruments regarding interest rate policy, refinancing 
facilities and reserve requirements (IMF 1996). For example, the interest rate on loans 
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for investment now is higher than that for working capital.is, and the minimum deposit 
rate for savings is not differentiated by sector, so that commercial banks can mobilize 
savings more effectively. Although the refinancing facilities still mainly benefit the 
SOCBs, the refinancing rate is a penal one to deter banks from freely using that 
facility for onlending. The 1994-modification in the reserve requirements ratio was 
reversed; this ratio was again unified at 10 percent, applicable to total deposits. But 
the more important issue is how Vietnam can effectively use monetary instruments 
without sacrifying the development of an efficient financial system. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3 (Section 3.1.2), direct controls such as limits on interest 
rates and credit ceilings are rather effective in controlling monetary growth and are 
easier for the central bank to manage, but could distort resource allocation and 
hamper the development of the banking sector. At the same time, certain conditions 
have to be met to fully liberalize interest rates and effectively develop open market 
operations. Caprio and Levine ( 1994) suggest that complete deregulation of interest 
rates should be considered when: macroeconomic conditions are robust enough; the 
financial position of banks and their borrowers is sound; financial markets are 
reasonably sophisticated; and financial markets are sufficiently competitive or 
contestable. In Vietnam, at present, these criteria are barely satisfied or not satisfied at 
... 
all. The same can be said for developing open market operations to be an effective 
indirect instrument of monetary policy. The conditions for this are as follows: auctions 
of government papers are market determined; investors are given a wide choice of 
48 In Mid-1996, following the low inflation, did the interest rate reduction enable the maximum rate on 
long-term loans (1.65% per month) to be higher than the short-term rate ( 1.6% per month) (Vietnam 
Investment Review No 249, 22-28 July 1996). The monthly (6-month) deposi t interest rate was also 
reduced from 1.7% in 1995 to 1.4% in the early 1996, and further to about 1 % in mid-1996. 
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maturities; the central bank's participation snould be in both primary and secondary 
markets CN orld Bank 1994a: 36). But a secondary market that ensures liquidity in 
government papers (eg. T-bills) takes time to evolve. Moreover, as Lane ( 1994) 
pointed out, until the banking system begins to \vork efficiently, it will be difficult for 
other financial intermediaries and a stock market to play a meaningful role in resource 
allocation and corporate control. And last but not least, the proper use of indirect 
instruments requires monetary programming skills as well as timely and accurate 
monetary statistics. 
In the foreseeable future, thus , direct mone tary instruments will still be important 
measures in controlling monetary growth. It is \vorth noting, however, that the view 
that all direct instruments are regarded as rigid a.dministrative rules , is quite extreme. 
In fact, market conformity of a monetary instrument to a large extent is the degree to 
which market forces are relied upon to ca...rr:· out the influence of the instrument 
(Hilbers 1993). There may be rigid indirect instruments as well as market-based direct 
controls (see Table 21). 
Therefore, this is the time for Vietnam to deYelop more ·market-based direct controls 
and gradually gain experience with the use of indirect monetary instruments
49
. This 
option seems to be the second best policy in helping to control money supply and 
gradually establishing an efficient financial system with full reliance on indirect 
instruments. 
49 In the early 1996, the credit cei lings were pcrmi;::.:d ro be traded amo ng the banks (IMF 1996). 
However, up to now no trading has taken place. 
i43 
IU• 
I 
Table 22: The Degree of Market Conformity of Monetary Instruments 
Low de!:!ree 
Direct instruments - interest rate regulations 
- selective credit controls 
- general credit ceilings 
High degree 
- net credit ceilings 
- tradeable credit ceilings 
- credit ceilings with the option 
to exceed the ceiling at a price 
......................................................... -............................... ---·-······ .... ----........... --................................. --.................................. ---..... . 
Indirect - reserve requirements - open market operations 
instruments (preferential) refinance - refinance auctions 
policies on a bank-by-bank - foreign currency swaps 
basis 
Source: Hilbers (1993). 
The choice of monetary aggregates to be targeted depends on which one is the best 
measure with which to consider the economic impact of change in monetary policy. 
The econometric evidence from Chapter 5 indicates that either currency in circulation 
CU or narrow money M 1 is the most valuable indicator of price pressure and the 
demand for them has recently been stable and predictable in terms of the relationship 
between the real money stock and other variables such as real output and opportunity 
cost reflected in the deviation of the deposit interest rate from the (expected) 
depreciation rate. Therefore, these monetary aggregates are the preferred targets. 
It is worth noting that while CU and M 1 seem to be easier to control, their usefulness 
would diminish with the development of new financial instruments and institutions. 
However, since there is still a lack of reasonable confidence in modelling the demand 
for real broad money, M2, Vietnam needs to have an eclectic approach in using M2 as 
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a monetary target. This has significant implications for the manipulation of domestic 
credits and the intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
6.3. Dynamics of inflation: Lessons and a policy option 
This section gives a brief assessment of the dynamics of inflation in Vietnam for the 
period from the mid-1980s , when the economy experienced very high inflation, to the 
present time, when rather low inflation has tended to prevail, largely in the light of the 
theoretical model developed in Chapter 4. Then an option for an appropriate anti-
inflation policy will be provided. Since up to now there has existed a 'strong' 
relationship between the budget, the state-owned banks and the SOEs, it is reasonable 
to examine the inflationary process referring to the case of a dominant fiscal policy in 
our model (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2). 
During 1986-88, the annual rate of inflation reached several hundred per cent despite 
efforts to stabilize the economy. The root cause was that the government failed to deal 
with the flow problem - the very high public deficits (the budget and the SOE 
deficits). The monolithic state banking system played only an accommodating role to 
finance the budget, and the SOE sector continued to face a 'soft budget constraint'. 
There was also no sign of credibility in the government's reforms (see Chapter 2, 
especially Section 2.2.2). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 'black' foreign 
exchange market at that time was nearly 'rational': it responded very quickly to any 
measure associated with monetary policy so that the depreciation rate was the leading 
indicator of actual inflation. Thus , there was a high possibility that the economy was 
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on the move to the trap of a high and stable inflation equilibrium. In this case, as can 
be seen in our model (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2), a mere cut in the monetized public 
deficit may not have worked in reducing inflation if there was no change in portfolio 
choice behaviour due to the lack of credibility. The experience of high inflation 
countries also shows that high inflation is often a prolonged and stable process, and 
that in this case only decisive efforts can cut inflation down to more or less moderate 
levels (Bruno 1991 ). 
The reform package in March 1989 was not just a stabilization program, which 
focused on the control over the flow problem, together with the measures inducing a 
strong portfol10 adjustment in favour of the Dong, such as the increase in interest 
rates, the unification of the exchange rate and the legalization of gold trading (Chapter 
2, Section 2.2.3). In fact, it signalled fundamental changes in the economic system, 
which in turn changed the people's credibility in the government's policies. As a 
result. the 1989-reform worked well: the monthly inflation declined even to slightly 
negative rates in the summer of 1989. The measures affecting the financial portfolio 
choice by the households continued to be effective even in the context of much higher 
public deficits. Demand for domestic currency continued to increase strongly and so 
did the inflation tax base. As a result, the high public deficit could be financed at 
rather low inflation. In 1989 as a whole, the budget deficit was 7 .6% of GDP and 
domestic credit increased by 175%, but inflation was only 34.7%. Thus, it can be 
belie\'ed that in 1989 the economy was on the move to a low and stable inflation 
equilibrium. 
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This situation, however, could not be prolonged as people recognized the reversal of 
the reforms in 1990-91. During that period, the situation in the SOE sector worsened 
because of the shocks from the loss of aid in 1990-91 and the collapse of exports with 
the former bloc of socialist countries in 1991. In order to 'rescue' the SOE sector, the 
government had to reaccelerate monetary growth. The interest rate policy 'ijas relaxed. 
Also, the growth rate of GDP declined. All these factors led inflation to higher levels, 
averaging 4.4% per month in 1990-9150 . The people's confidence in the economic 
reforms also reversed and in terms of our model, the expectation adjustment could 
have become faster. The price of gold and foreign exchange increased well ahead of 
the rate of inflation (World Bank 1992:7, see also Figure 8 in Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.2). Thus, the economy could have been in a 'danger zone', where high inflation 
equilibrium would again become stable because the adjustment parameters could 
change substantially. Note that the study by Bruno (1989) found that in the case of 
stabilization in Israel (and maybe in some other Latin American countries), the 
threshold level of monthly inflation was about 5%, above which the stabilization 
program could get into serious difficulty. 
Fortunately, since 1992, economic reforms have resumed at a rapid pace. A new 
commitment to keep inflation under control was indeed reflected in policies (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2). The government again gradually gained credibility in its 
policies. At the same time, the surge in the supply of foreign exchange because of 
foreign investment, growth in exports, and private remittance has also had a 
significant impact on slowing down the expected depreciation rate and increasing 
50 As the economy stuck to a low stable inflation equilibrium, the increase in the inflation rate can be 
explained by the factors that shifted the dd-curve and 45°-line in Figure 9 (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2) to 
the right and left respectively. 
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demand for the domestic currency. As a result, the SBVN could progressively lower 
the deposit interest rates (see Figure 7, Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3), without losing the 
attractiveness of the Dong. As shown in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2), the economy shifted 
to a relatively low and stable inflation equilibrium, although the condition for stability 
of this equilibrium has just been satisfied since the end of 1993 and. not firmly 
established. Now the message from our theoretical model and the econometric 
investigation for the option of an appropriate anti-inflation policy is clear: 
• To keep inflation under control , it is necessary to avoid the policy 'shocks' that 
could destroy the existing slow expectation adjustment, which is not well 
entranched. The shocks may happen, for example. ·because of a weak commitment 
to price stability through an increase in inflationary target, or a sudden large 
devaluation, or the slowing down of the pace of the fiscal and SOE reforms. 
• To sustain lower inflation rates, it seems best to provide the SBVN with greater 
autonomy in formulating and implementing monetary policies. Then the SB VN 
can choose the path for money growth corresponding to a particular inflationary 
target. Given the fact that the SBVN still plays a rather passive role in the 
interplay between fiscal and monetary policies, it is necessary in this case to keep 
the public deficit adjustments in line with the seigniorage revenue corresponding 
to a new lower inflationary target. Then, other policies such as interest rate and 
exchange rate policies, which do not allow the Dong to lose its attractiveness, can 
play a supporting role in this process. 
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At present, however, Vietnam is facing several challenges in implementing a more 
stringent fiscal policy. The first question is whether Vietnam can keep the primary 
budget deficit at an appropriate percentage of GDP even if it could be financed by 
domestic and foreign borrowings. Otherwise the total budget deficit will keep growing 
as the debt grows because of the deficit, and interest payments will rise because the 
debt is growing. Debt-financed persistent deficits may create a substantial burden in the 
future; then the government may be forced to finance the large deficit again through 
seigniorage. Moreover, domestic borrowings will crowd out private investment. This 
could be a serious problem if there were inefficiencies in budget expenditure. 
The next question is whether Vietnam can reveal clearly its 'quasi-fiscal' deficit. 
Because the budget deficit is only a part of the story~ all 'quasi-fiscal' activities such as 
bad debts of the SOCBs, interenterprise arrears, losses on foreign exchange operations, 
government guarantees for loans to some SOEs, should be part of the accounting. 
Without the inclusion of the 'quasi-fiscal' losses, the government cannot see the total 
public deficit that truly does matter for the issue of the control of monetary emission. 
In that sense, an audit of the state-owned banks (the SBVN and SOCBs) is worth 
encouragmg. 
The last but not least question in dealing with the public deficit is the process of the 
reform of the SOE sector. The result of the econometric estimations (Chapter 5, 
Section 5 .1.2) indicates a lack of any long-lasting effect of industrial output growth on 
inflation. This may reflect a better management of the SOE sector, whose growth in 
industrial output is not brought about solely by growth in bank credit as in the past. At 
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the same time, the existence of the short-duration effect from the industrial e~pansion 
suggests that a harder budget constraint policy should be sustained. At present, the 
sustainability of such a policy is threatened by several factors: the tendency to return 
to subsidizing the SOEs; the still rather high level of seigniorage51 ; the formation of 
SOE conglomerates, which will dominate the industrial sector, but hardly operate 
efficiently and competitively, as hoped by the Vietnamese government. 
As also shown by the econometric estimations in Chapter 5 (Section 5.1.2), the rate of 
return on the Dong in terms of US dollars, which is measured as the difference 
bet\veen deposit interest rate and (expected) depreciation rate, has a significant impact 
on the inflation rate. Mathematically, an increase in the deposit interest rate or the 
same percentage points decrease in the ( expected) depreciation rate, other things 
being equal, has the same impact in percentage terms on lowering the inflation rate. 
From the view point of policies aimed at promoting the Dong, however, the changes 
in these variables are subject to different constraints. 
It is often said that a high deposit interest rate policy has been an effective tool to aid 
the disinflation process in Vietnam. In fact, the Vietnamese experience shows that an 
active interest rate policy in defending domestic money works not necessarily because 
of high interest rate, but mostly because in combination with the tightened fiscal and 
monetary policies and the establishment of people's credibility in the government 
efforts to fight against inflation. High deposit interest rates also imply higher loan 
interest rates and hence, can be very costly for the economy and can not be sustained. 
51 Dornbusch and Fischer ( 1993) found that seigniorage revenue accounted for a significant share of 
government revenue in most of the moderate-inflation countries. It is likely that seigniorage is rarely an 
explicit reason for a government to pursue inflationary policies. 
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One should , thus , be aware of the limitations of the high interest rate policy, although 
the policy for positive interest rates in real terms is in the right direction. One question 
arises: How can the SBVN determine the appropriate interest rate level(s)? The 
answer to this question is not simple, but a number of indicators can be used. The 
indicators are: positive level in real terms; positive rate of return on the Dong in terms 
of US dollars circulating in the economy; rates of return on investment; relative price 
of capital and labour; and interest rates in the informal sector as the upper bound (see 
also Leite and Sudararajan 1990). 
On the other hand, it is difficult to sustain a stable nominal exchan ae rate in the b 
context of moderate inflation. Over time, this may have a very considerable negative 
impact on economic growth (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2). Moreover, as predicted by 
our theoretical model, the economy has been moving to a relatively low and stable 
inflation equilibrium from below because for a rather long time the (expected) 
depreciation rate has been lower than the inflation rate52. Thus , other things being 
equal, there is a tendency for both the inflation and depreciation rate to increase 
somewhat. Two important things are implied from this analysis. First, this confirms 
again the decisive role of the public deficit adjustments in the policy package in line 
with a lower inflation rate. Second, if there is some pressure in the market on 
depreciation, the SBVN should allow this to occur, intervening only to smooth out 
the depreciation movement, without the fear of falling into a 'vicious circle' in the 
relationship between the depreciation rate and the inflation rate. The very high rate of 
return on Dong in real terms and in terms of US dollars in recent years (Table 10, 
52See detail of the explanation in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.:2). Here we just mention that as equilibrium 
point A in Figure 9 is stable. there are only two possibilities: if E:> n. then the economy is moving to A 
alo ng the dd-curve from above; if ff< n, then the economy is moving to A from below. 
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Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2) also indicates that there is a little room for depreciating the 
exchange rate (/or reducing deposit interest rate) without causing a significant shift out 
of Dong to US dollars. But the SBVN needs to prevent the 'jump' in the rate of 
depreciation and to avoid a sudden large devaluation. Othenvise, these kinds of 
'shocks' can weaken and destroy the people's credibility in the govemm~nt's anti-
inflation policy. 
Summary 
This chapter attempts to provide a general framework for anti-inflation policy. It is 
desirable for Vietnam to pursue a target of low rather than moderate inflation rates. In 
order to achieve this target, in general. the policy package recommended is quite 
'traditional'. A firm commitment to ·sustain low inflation should be the starting point 
for policy formulation. The SBVN in a more deregulated financial environment needs 
autonomy and relative policy independence. In this direction. now is the time for the 
SBVN to develop and implement more market-based direct control over money supply 
and step-by-step gain experience with the use of indirect instruments. Also, at least in 
the near future, currency in circulation and narrow money rather than broader money 
are better monetary aggregates to be targeted. 
Since the SBVN can still be forced to provide direct credit to the government, dealing 
with public finance will play a decisive role in keeping and sustaining low inflation. In 
this regard, it is important not to allow the budget deficit to rise out of control, to 
specify all 'quasi-fiscal' losses. and to sustain a harder budget constraint policy to the 
SOE sector. Better management of public finance also creates a good precondition for 
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the successful implementation of other supporting policies, such as exchange rate 
policy and interest rate policy, in combating inflation. For example, a depreciation of 
the Dong and/or a choice of the ( deposit) interest rates then could be made more 
reasonably, without the fear of creating high costs to economic activities, while the 
Dong remains attractive. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the process of inflation stabilization in Vietnam, 
focusing on the 'price-salary-money reform' in 1985, the stabilization policy package 
in 1989, and the market-oriented reforms since then. 
The outcomes of Vietnam's efforts to stabilize the economy in 1985 and 1989 are 
mostly explained within the framework of a theory of the financial system in a CPE. 
Under a CPE or MPE, the monolithic state banking system acts as the interface 
between the state budgetary process and SOEs, ensuring the flo\v of financial 
resources in accordance with the national plan. With the passive role of the banking 
system and the 'soft budget constraint' facing the SOE sector and in an environment 
of controlled prices and rationing, the economy is prone to the increasing inflationary 
pressure that comes from two sources- the central bank credits extended to cover the 
government budget deficit and the deficits of the state-owned enterprise sector (the 
'flow' problem), and the excess money stock over the desired level (the so-called 
'monetary overhang' or the 'stock' problem). However, this thesis argues that, in the 
case of Vietnam, there was no significant 'monetary overhang' in the period before 
the 1989-reform. The main reason was the strengthening of the parallel economy and 
the increase in voluntary interaction bet\veen economic agents through the free market 
channels partly resulting from microeconomic reforms introduced in the early 1980s. 
This should, thus, have given encouragement to efforts to liberalize prices, and the 
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main task should have been to control credit expansion. Unfortunately, this was not 
the story of the 1985-reform. While the government applied unnecessary measures of 
confiscatory monetary reform to deal with the insignificant stock problem, the flow 
problem became even more serious. The much greater focus on the flow problem in 
the 1989-reform made a decisive contribution to reduce inflation sharply., at least in 
the first half of 1989. Also, the legalization of many economic activities in the parallel 
market, in addition to the decisive stabilization package, strengthened the credibility 
of the government policies. As a result, the financial portfolio choice by the 
population in favour of the domestic currency was enhanced. This was a very 
important factor in explaining the success of inflation stabilization in 1989 as a whole. 
As the problem of inflation stabilization became more diffuse, the thesis attempted to 
cover a wider range of factors that could be important for understanding the 
inflationary movement in Vietnam since the 1989-reform: from the financial reform 
and the ability to control money supply by the central bank, to the underlying 
determinants of inflation, the dynamics of inflation and the conditions for stability of 
inflation. 
The most remarkable progress in the reform of the financial sector in the first half of 
the 1990s was the establishment of the two-tier banking system and the abolition of 
the barriers to entry for new domestic and foreign banks. The SBVN also 
implemented a more active interest rate policy and used more effectively the credit 
ceiling measure to restrain money expansion. The financial environment remains, 
however, typical of an 'underbanked' country: the limited degree of independence in 
conducting monetary policy by the SBVN; the dominant role of the SOCBs biased 
155 
' 
against the non-state sector; the limited role of markets for domestic securities; the 
existence of a significant informal financial sector; and a lack of the necessary public 
confidence in the banking system. The consequences of this financial system are that 
_ public finance still plays a very important role in money supply and the money supply 
may be expanded without rigorous control. Also, the underdevelopment of the 
financial sector has constrained the efficient use of the market-based monetary 
instruments. 
The thesis also investigated the major determinants of the inflation rate in Vietnam 
since the market-oriented reforms in 1989. The investigation relied on the monetarist 
as \Vell as structuralist approaches to the causes of inflation. A simple model was 
specified, which explains inflation as a result of the changes in money supply and the 
factors -determining the demand for real balances. Both the intuition behind the 
descriptive statistics and the econometric analysis confirm the key role of money 
growth and especially, the factors reflecting the attractiveness of the Dong such as the 
( expected) depreciation rate and the deposit interest rate, in affecting the inflation 
rate. Thus, the root causes of the success in bringing inflation under control \Vere the 
fiscal restraint and harder budget constraint of the SOEs, which formed the foundation 
of a sounder monetary policy, and the large portfolio choice in favour of the Dong. At 
the same time, a harder budget constraint policy should be sustained. At present, the 
sustainability of such a policy is threatened by several factors: the tendency to return 
to subsidizing the SOEs; the still rather high level of seigniorage; the formation of 
SOE conglomerates, which dominate the industrial sector, but hardly operate 
efficiently and competitively, as hoped. Also, the econometric investigation suggests 
156 
! 
~ 
that currency in circulation CU and narrow money lvf 1 contain more useful predictive 
information of inflation than broader money M2. 
In order to examine the dynamics of inflation and the condition for stability of 
inflation, a simple dynamic model was developed. The model reflects the features 
having the most important impact on inflation in Vietnam: public finance through 
se1gn1orage, the demand for domestic money in the context of the existence of a 
significant parallel foreign exchange market and high economic growth, and the 
dynamic behaviour of the expected exchange rate. The main idea for building the 
model is the Laffer curve of inflation tax revenue: the same amount of seigniorage 
revenue can be attained at low or high inflation. As a result, the economy can run to 
hyperinflation, stick in the 'high inflation trap', or stay at a low stable inflation 
equilibrium, depending on its initial position, the size of the monetized public deficit, 
and the speed of expectation adjustment. The model also strengthens the argument in 
favour of central bank independence in fighting inflation. 
The model seems to explain quite well the dynamics of inflation in Vietnam since the 
mid-l 980s, particularly in terms of the changes in people's confidence in and 
expectation of government policies. Once again, it was established that a belief on the 
part of the Vietnamese people in fundamental policy changes and commitment to 
stabilize the economy in 1989 enabled the government to ease money supply without 
re-igniting inflation. But the government could not use this kind of credibility for long 
as people recognized the reversal of the reform in 1990-91. Since 1992, together \Vith 
a new commitment to keep inflation under control and better macroeconomic 
management in the continuing process of ref arm, the governme1;1t has gradually re-
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gained the people's confidence. In fact, the econometric investigation shows that the 
condition for inflation stability has been met since the end of 1993, and hence, 
relatively low inflation in recent years has tended to be stable. However, the process 
towards financial stability has been not firmly established. Funhermore, we also found 
that a long run relationship of the real demand for CU and M 1 has started to emerge. 
What anti-inflation policy package should be adopted by the Vietnamese government? 
First, the thesis argues that it is desirable to pursue a target of single-digit inflation 
rates. Second, the ~BVN should really become more independent in conducting 
monetary policy and the second best policy for the SBVN no\v is to implement more 
market-based direct control over money supply, while gradually gaining experience 
with the use of indirect monetary instruments. Also, at present. C[J and M 1 rather than 
M2 are better monetary aggregates to be targeted. Third, the policy package should 
keep up the existing condition for stability of inflation and moreover, correspond to a 
~ 
· tower inflation equilibrium. In that sense, a firm commitment to price stability and a 
more ngorous adjustment of public finance are essential clements in the policy 
package. This will also create an easier condition for pursuing more reasonable 
policies in regard to the exchange rate and the interest rate; that is policies to reduce 
the costs of economic activities, while keeping the attractiveness of the Dong. 
The year of 1996 could be a good example for illustrating this anti-inflation policy 
package. This was the second time that the inflation rate in Vietnam was reduced to a 
single-digit level ( 4.5% ), while the economy continued to grow as fast as in 1995 
(9.5%). What we can observe is a non-monetized budget deficit and rigorous 
constraint in credit expansion, particularly to the SOE sector. The S_BVN could reduce 
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considerably both deposit and loan interest rates (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2). At the 
same time, the nominal exchange rate (Dong vs US dollar) only slightly depreciated 
by about 0.5% despite widespread speculation over a devaluation of the Dong because 
of a substantial increase in the trade deficit. 
In general, Vietnam now has several good conditions for pursuing a low inflation 
target. Vietnam has recognized the importance of inflation stabilization and has learnt 
valuable lessons in dealing with the inflation problem. In the medium term, capital 
inflow seems to be continuing and this would have a positive contribution to the 
fiscal (public deficit) management and the portfolio choice in favour of the Dong. 
Another very favourable condition is the fact that at present, the economy is close to a 
low, stable inflation equilibrium. The theoretical model shows that, in this case, the 
economy can benefit from overall high economic growth and the strategy for 
keeping/lowering the inflation rate is quite clear since the effects of the policy changes 
are 'traditional'. 
At the same time, the most serious challenge to Vietnam is how far the reforms of the 
financial system and the SOE sector can go. To a large extent, the answer to the 
question of how long Vietnam can keep up the spectacular achievement in controlling 
inflation and promoting growth depends on the process of the simultaneous reforms of 
these sectors. On the one hand, Vietnam has accepted the necessity of a market 
economy and recognized that the economy cannot function efficiently without a 
healthy financial environment and decisive reform of the SOE sector. On the other 
hand, Vietnam seems still to prefer a economy, in which the state sector should play a 
I 
'leading role'. If the latter can be interpreted to mean the state setting the framework 
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in which markets .:an operate (rather than state ownership and contro i of the means of 
production), then L.~ere are good prospects for the continuation of financial sector and 
SOE sector reforms, and therefore, good prospects for low inflationary growth in 
Vietnam into the 21 st century. , 
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Appendix 
A. The estimation of demand for money 
A.1. General framework 
Over the past ten years the error-correction models (ECMs) have been widely used in 
estimation of the demand for money. The ECMs have seYeral advantages. These 
models not only capture the long-run relationship but also reflect the short-run · 
behaviour of money demand. The latter is important since theory provides little guide · 
to the short-run dynamics of money demand. The general EC?vis allow also for a much 
broader range of dynamic behaviour than the partial adjustment model (PAM), that is 
only the simplest case as will be seen below. Moreover, the ECMs help to avoid the 
spurious regression problems that can arise in estimating models with nonstationary 
variables. 
There are two common approaches in the use of the ECNfs. The first approach is 
associated with the 'purely statistical' concept of cointegration and practically 1s 
implemented by the following procedure (Engle and Granger 1987). First, it 1s 
important to verify the orders of integration for each of the variables under 
consideration with the help of the unit root tests, a standard test of which is the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Second, if the nonstationary variables are 
integrated of the same order (usually order one), then the long-run relationship 
between the concerned variables (their cointegration) can be confirmed by testing the 
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residuals from cointegration (OLS) regression for stationarity. In the case of the 
existence of cointegration, the short-run dynamics can be represented by the ECM, 
which involves regressing the first difference of the dependent variable in the 
cointegration regression onto lagged values of the first differences of all of the 
variables plus the lagged value of the error-correction term, ie the jus_t mentioned 
residuals (see also Equation A.2 below for comparison). 
The second regards ECMs as a structural representation of dynamic adjustment 
towards equilibrium based on decision rules. For example, the ECMs can be derived 
from a forward looking quadratic costs of adjustment optimization problem ( Nickell 
1985 and Vo 1993). Suppose that the natural logarithm of desired real money stock, 
logni*, is given by 
* Iogm
1 =a 0 +a 1 Iogyr +a 2 zr +ur (A.1) 
where logy is the natural logarithm of a scale variable, z is an opportunity cost variable 
(or vector), and u is error term. Then the money demand function derived from the 
adjustment problem can be written as 
n 
Afog711 =/Jo+ 2Jf3uAfC!sYr-i + /32i~-i + f3:1~CW!1-'t-i) + f3~ (CXi logyr-t +£Xi~-1 -lc&?'f-t)+vr (A.2) 
i~ 
where log,n is the natural logarithm of actual real money balances. /31, /32 determine the 
impact effects, while the long-run effects can be ascertained by a t and a2• The 
coefficient /34 represents deviations from long-run equilibrium and gives the error 
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correcting properties: if real money balance is below that consistent with desired long-
run holding, real money demand increases. Note that the apperance of the lagged terms 
of b.logy, &, and b.logm on the right hand side depends on the behaviour of the target 
values, log,n*. Also, the test for cointegration is essential for ensuring the non-
existence of the spurious regression problem. 
One special, but common case is the standard ECM that has the following form: 
Lilogmr = /3 0 +/3 1Lilogyr + /3 2&.r + /3 4 (a1 logyr-i +a2zr-i -logm,_1) +vr (A.3) 
Then the PAM is nothing but the standard ECM with the restriction 
/3 4a 1 - /3 1 = /3 4a 2 - /3 2 = 0. The PAM can be also easily derived directly from the 
assumption that the actual change is only a fraction of desired change in real money 
stock, i.e b. logm, == y(Iogm,* - logm,_1) ( 0 < y < 1 ) or log}1n; = (1- (1-y)L) logm, 
where L is a lag operator ( e.g L(logmr)=logm1.1 ). Substituting the last into (A. l) will 
give the PAM 
1 o g m r = ex O y + a 1 y Io g yr + a 2 yz r + ( 1 - y ) 1 o g m r- i + yu r ( A.4) 
Of course, the best is to estimate more general ECMs (with a cointegration test). But 
this requires a rather large sample of time-series data (usually quarterly or monthly). In 
many former CPEs, this kind of data is commonly not available for the period before 
market reform. To deal with annual data over a not very long period, the PAM seems 
to be acceptable as the first attempt in the estimation of demand for money (see Portes 
and Winter 1978, and Feltenstein and Farhadian 1987), although PAM is simple and 
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usually gives a very low speed of adjustment. In order to apply the general EC?vis some 
authors like Burton and Ha (1990) have constructed many quarterly data from the 
annual series based on very specific assumptions. The results, as they mentioned, 'may 
reflect to some extent, the idiosyncrasies of the data'. 
A.2. Demand for money in Vietnam during the 1980s 
In dealing with the data, Vietnam in the 1970s and 1980s is no exception. The 
reunification of the country took place only in 1976 after the war. For many economic 
variables we can obtain, at best, the annual time-series since 1977. There is a need also 
to adjust some monetary variables since the monetary reform was implemented in 
1985. The quality of statistical figures is another serious problem (see for example 
Fforde and Vylder 1988, Kimura 1989). For these reasons, the estimation can be only a 
preliminary attempt at the analysis of money demand behaviour in Vietnam when it 
was mainly a MPE. 
The PAM (Equation A.4) is estimated for three monetary aggregates: household 
deposits HD, currency in circulation CU, and narrow money, also denoted as M 1, but 
defined here as HD+ CU. Note that in CPEs, there is a distinction between t\VO money 
circuits, so it would be incorrect to estimate a money demand when the money supply 
series contains both enterprise deposits as well as the population 's cash holding. The 
real national income indexes are chosen as a proxy for the scale variable due to the 
lack of data of household incomes. Given the fact that interest rates are not market 
determined and the period under consideration was characterized by high inflation. the 
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I· inflation is a quite acceptable variable used for measuring the opportunity cost of 
holding money. And there exit two altenative measures. The conventional way is 
inflation rate n. But recently, it is argued that in the case of high inflation associated 
with the revenue through seigniorage, a kind of the variation in inflation rates 
measured as m'( 1 +n), is a better choice (Calvo and Leiderman 1992, and Easterly et al 
1995). The sources of data for all variables are those indicated in Figures 1 (for 
national income), 4 (for currency in circulation) and 5 (for prices) (Chapter 1, Sections 
1.1 and Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1) and in Table 5 (for household deposits) (Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2.1 ). 
Table A. l presents the results of the OLS estimation in two variants for three real 
monetary aggregates that are measured as the natural logarithm of HD , CU, and M 1 
deflated by free market price indexes (they are denoted as loghd, Iogcu, and Iogml, 
respectively). Variant (a) uses n, which is measured as the change in free market price 
indexes, but variant (b) uses n =m'( I +i:) as an appropriate opportunity cost of holding 
money. In both variants, Iogni is natural logarithm of real national income indexes. 
The figures in parentheses are t-ratios . 
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Table A.1: The PAMs of Demand for Money 
1--'1odel 
Sample 
Variant 
Constant 
logni 
'Tr for( a) and if for (b) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
I (loghd) 
1978-91 
II (logcu) 
1977 - 91 
(a) (b) (a) (b) 
-12.407 
(-2.87) .. 
2.174 
(2.682) ** 
-0.160 
(-1.820) 
0.555 
(2.738)** 
-14.427 
(-3.82) ... 
-12.692 
(-3.65) ••• 
2.644 2.161 
(3.648)*** (3.622/ •• 
-1.841 -0.052 
(-2.895)** (-1.115) 
0.476 
(2.731)** 
0.380 
( 1.885). 
-13.674 
(-4.19)*** 
2.391 
(4.181) ... 
-0.663 
(-1.821)* 
0.351 
( 1.899)* 
III (log ml) 
1978-91 
(a) (b) 
-12.979 
( ,., ,.., -)··· - .) . ..J) 
2.281 
.... 
(3 .313) 
-0.080 
(-1.551) 
0.399 
( l.885f 
-14.377 
(-4.17)*** 
2.603 
(4.170)··· 
-0.966 
(-2.490) .. 
0.348 
(1.874)* 
.............................................. -····-·· ................................................. __ ............................................ _ ........................ ---· ........................ -......................... . 
R-bar-squared 
Overall F-test 
S .E. of regression 
Diagnostic tests: 
Autocorrelation x\ 1) 
Functional form x\1) 
N orrnality X2(2) 
Heteroscedasticityx\ 1) 
0.684 
F(3,9) = 
9.644 *** 
0.429 
0.351 
2.915* 
2.767 
0.549 
0.776 
F(3,9) = 
14.850*** 
0.361 
2.537 
0.503 
0.006 
0.758 
0.806 
F(3,10)= 
19.008··· 
0.255 
0.474 
0.074 
0.051 
0.55E-3 
0.836 
F(3,10)= 
23.127*** 
0.234 
0.035 
0.682 
0.071 
0.070 
0.780 
F(3,9) = 
15.199 
0.283 
0.127 
0.071 
0.114 
0.105 
... 
0.835 
F(3,9) = 
21.251 ••• 
0.245 
0.077 
0.008 
0.975 
0.006 
................................................................................................................................................................. ·-·············· .. ·· .............. _ ........ --............ -......... -............................................... _ ................................................ -....................................... . 
CUSUM-SQ test pass pass pass pass pass pass 
Note: *, **, *** always mean significance at 10%, 5% and l S'o levels respectively. SE of regression is 
the standard error of the regression. The estimation using the general price indexes gives no 
significant changes ( The correlation between the inflation rates of general prices and free 
market prices is 0.99 during 1976-88. Since the 1989-reform, there has been only one price 
index, the market price index). 
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Here the diagnostic tests consist of four tests. The test for serial correlation is the 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, which is conducted by regressing the residuals on their 
lags (here only one lag is used) and the explanatory variables from the model. the 
critical values are drawn from the i-distribution. The functional form test (Ramsay's 
Reset test) is a ge_neral misspecification test and is performed by adding the powers of 
fitted value of the dependent variable as additional regressors to the equation and 
testing whether coefficients of the powers are jointly zero. In our case, this test uses 
only the square of the fitted values. The test for normality of the error term (J arque-
Bera test) is distributed x2 with 2 degree of freedom under the H0 -hypothesis of 
normality (in fact, Jarque-Bera test is only the test for skewness and kurtosis of · 
residuals). The test for heteroscedasticity is White test, which is based on the 
regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values. The critical value is also 
drawn from the i-distribution. 
In all models, the signs of independent variables are right and in general, demand for 
real balances very significantly depends on the real income. The highly significant 
overall F-test indicates that the explanatory variables as a group, explain well the 
demand for real balances. However, the opportunity cost measured as ii in the models 
of variant (b) only is significant. Also, for each model, the variant (b) has higher 
· explanatory power (R-bar-squared) and smaller standard error of regression. There are 
no problems in diagnostic tests for most models , except for the Model I( a), for which 
the functional form test failed. Given also the small number of observations the 
cointegration test cannot be implemented. The test for structural stability is based on 
the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals squared (Cusum-sq) statistic. For all 
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models, the hypothesis of stability cannot be rejected, but the 95 per cent confidence 
. . 
interval is nearly broken at 1986 - the first year of price-salary-money reform and at 
1989 - the year with the substantial increase in household deposits in the cases of 
Model II and Model I, respectively. But when both currency in circulation and 
household deposits are taken into account (the case of Model III), demand for real 
balances is fairly stable . 
Thus, the Models I(b ), II(b ), and ill(b) are more suitable for describing the demand for 
money in Vietnam by the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s. 
It is worth noting that in all models the speeds of adjustment measured as mean lag , 
( 1-y)/y, are not low, as usually expected with the use of PAM (Table A.2). However, 
they have very high income elasticities that although not unusual (see, for example, 
Feltenstein and Farhadian 1987, and Portes and Winter 1978) are not sustainable in the 
very long run. With the annual data and small number of observations , the long-run 
income elasticities seem to be meaningless, so they are not presented here. 
Table A.2: Speeds of Adjustment and Income Elasticities 
Model I (Ioghd) II (Iogcu) III (Iogml) 
Variant (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Speed of adjustment 1.25 0.91 0.61 0.54 0.66 0.53 
(Short-run) Income 2.17 2.64 2.16 2.39 2.28 2.60 
elasticity 
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B. Unit root tests and stationarity of the time series 
In the estimation of demand for money in the first half of the 1990s ( Chapter 5, 
Section 5.2.1), the unit root tests are essential to varify whether the nonstationary 
variables are integrated of the same order, so that there exits any long run demand for 
real balances. The former situation is related to the all series involved in the 
estimation of demand for money: logm (logcu, Iogml, logm2), logy, {JJ =E - id, and Tr, 
where m (cu, ml,m2) is real money, ie. nominal money M (CU, Ml ,M2) deflated by 
CPI, y is real income proxied by real industrial output, E is depreciation rate and id 
time deposit interes! rate, and Tr is inflation rate calculated from the CPI. In the latter 
situation, the question is whether the residuals from cointegration regressions are 
stationary. The estimation of the distributed-lag model in Chapter 5 (Section 5 .1.1) 
also requires the unit root tests for the time series gM ( gCU, gM 1, gM2), gy, {JJ and Tr, 
where gx means growth rate of variable x. 
The unit root tests are performed using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. In order 
to implement ADF test for a series x1, the following regression is estimated via OLS 
method: 
s 
~xr =Co+ [boT] + h1xr-1 + Lci~xr-i + µr (B. l) 
i=I 
~ 
where T is time-trend and s should be chosen to induce the error term µ, into white 
noise. Note that Dickey-Fuller test (DF tests) can be regarded as a special case of the 
ADF test withs= 0 (no lags of .<lxr in the RHS of Equation B.1). The null hypothesis 
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in the ADF test is the existence of a unit root (b 1=0 ). The series Xe is stationary or 
integrated of order zero (XrE I(O)), ie the null hypothesis is rejected, when the statistic 
for b 1 (ADF statistic, calculated as the t-statistic) is significantly negative in 
comparison with the Dickey-Fuller critical value. If Xr ~ I(O), but &tE I(O), then Xe is 
said to be cointegrated of order one (xr E I(l)). 
Table B. l presents the results of the ADF tests (without a time trend) for logcu, 
logml, logm2, logy,W, and 'Ir. The values of ADF statistics are shown corresponding to 
the shortest lag lengths s for which the hypothesis of no autocorrelation up to 12 lags 
can not be rejected at the 5 per cent significance level (Note that the same kind of 
ADF statistics will be shown for the other cases). It is apparent that both W and 'Ir 
belong to I(O), whilst logcu, Iog,nl , logm2, and logy all belong to I( 1 ). Thus, the 
co integration regressions can be run for the variables under considerartion. 
Xr 
Table B.1: ADF Tests for logcu, log,nl, log,n2, logy,lv, and 'Ir 
(Sample period: 1990: 12 - 1994: 12) 
lu=E-id 'Ir 
ADF statistic 
Llxr 
ADF statistic 
Iogcu 
-0.386 
logml 
-0.741 
Iog,n2 
-0.528 
logy 
-1.408 -3.988*** -5.686*** 
, ............. , ................ ............... ---·-········ 
L1logcu L1logml L1logm2 L1logy 
-3.129** -4.188*** -4.705*** -4.770*** 
Note: The approximate Dickey-Fuller critical value at 5 (1) per cent significance level is about -2.93(-
3.5 8). For logcu, logml, logm2 and logy, in fact, all ADF statistics for b 1 from s=0 to s= 12 are not 
significant. The results of the ADF-tests with time trend are the same in terms of acceptance/rejection of 
the null hypothesis of a unit root. 
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The results of the ADF tests for the residuals from cointegration regressions are 
presented in Table B .2. A difference here is that the ADF tests are undenaken without 
constant term and time trend (see Maddala 1992: 607). We denote rescu, resml, 
resm2 the corresponding residuals from the cointegration regressions using logcu, 
logml, and logm2 as dependent variables , respectively. The figures in brackets are DF 
critical values for acceptance/rejection at 5 per cent significance level. Clearly, rescu 
E I(0) over 1992: 10 - 1994: 12, so the long run demand for real currency in circulation 
exists. There is also evidence, although weak, in favour of the stationarity of resml 
over 1992: 10 - 1994: 12 and, hence, the existence of the long run demand for real 
narrow money. 
Table B.2: ADF Tests for rescu, resml, and resm2 
Sample period rescu resml resnz2 
1990: 12-1994: 12 -2.694 (-3.923) -2.770 (-3.923) -2.340 (-3.927) 
1990: 12-1992:9 -2.014 (-4.171) -2. 3 11 ( -4. 1 7 1 ) -2.195 C-4.194) 
1992: 10-1994: 12 -4.384** (-4.114) -4.056* (-4.098) -3.22-+ (-4.098) 
Note: In fact, over the samples 90: 12-94: 12 and 90: 12-92:9, the ADF tests are in favour of 
nonstationarity of residuals since all ADF statistics are not significant. 
Now we show the results of the ADF tests for the series gM (gCU, gMl . gM2), gy,W, 
and TC. Since the results for the series TC and uJ are already known (they E I(0)) , Table 
B.3 presents only the results of the tests for the series gCU, gMJ , gM2. ~nd gy. 
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Table B.3: ADF tests for gCU, gMl, gM2, and gy. 
(sample period 1990: 12 - 1994: 12) 
Xr= gCU gMl gM2 gy 
·········· ............................. ............................ .... .. .............................................. _ ...................... .... ...................... _ ............................................ _ ................................ . 
Statistic for b 1 -5.374*** -5.494*** -4.662*** -4.602*** 
Note: The approximate Dickey-Fuller critical value at 5 (1) per cent significance level 
is -2.93 (-3.58). The results for the ADF-tests with time trend are the same in terms of 
rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root. 
As the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 1 percent level, all these 
variables are stationary. The results are quite expected since gy = ~logy, and if the 
pnces change not much, gM=~logM-log(M/ M(-1) )=log( (MIP(-1) )/(M(-1 )/ P(-
1 )))=logm-log,n(-1 )=~logni, and we know that all ~logm and ~logy belong to I(O). 
C. The procedure for identifying the appropriate lag length of each 
determinant in a distributed-Jag model 
This procedure is based on Akaike' s minimum final prediction error (FPE), which is 
calculated as FPE = (RSS/T)*((T +k+I )l(T-k-1)), where RSS is the regression residual 
sum of squared, T is number of observations, and k is number of the explanatory 
variables. The procedure is written here in the more formal manner than in Hsiao 
(1981). 
Suppose V consists of the determinants of inflation in Model (35) (Chapter 5, Section 
5.1.1): V = ~ gM ( gCU, gMJ, gM2), gy, lf, (JJ r. 
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Step l: Consider all FPEs for the following set of regressions: ~ 'TCr = ao + aJ(L)xr I Xr 
E V and aJ(L) is polynomial in lag operator L with the lags varying from O to the 
highest order of nv ~. 
Step 2: x1 E V and the corresponding lag length n1 are chosen if they correspond to 
minimum FPE from all FPEs in Step 1. This minimum FPE now is denoted by 
FPE(x1,n1). (FPE(.:/,nj), thus, also is minimum from the minimum FPEs for the 
regressions corresponding to each Xr). 
Step 3: Consider all FPEs for i 'TCt = CXo + aJ(L)x1r + a2(L)xr I Xr E V\ x1 , aJ(L)x1t is 
fixed as the choice in Step 2, and a2(L) is polynomial in L with the lags varying from 
0 ton r. 
Step 4: Again x2 E V \ x1 and the corresponding lag length n2 are chosen if they 
minimize the FPE and FPE(x2,n2) < FPE(x
1,n1). 
Repeat the same procedure until all elements of V are examined. As in Step 4, if the 
addition of any of remaining elements of V results in an increase in the FPE value, the 
procedure stops, and the model is limited to the case of the previous step. 
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Table C.1: The minimum FPEs and the choice of the appropriate lag lengths 
Polynomial Model 1: n, = ao + aJ(L)xr Xr E V 
········· ............ ___ ............................................ _ .............................................. ........... ............ ................ -................................................... -.................................................... _ .............................................. -........................ . 
~ m 
FPEmin 
Corresponding 
lag 
gCU 
0.0289 
2 
gMl 
0.0276 
2 
gM2 
0.0219 
5 
0.0309 0.0207 0.0167 
2 4 . nm=6 
Polynomial Model 2: n, = CXo + aJ(L,nJuJr + a2(L)xr Xr E V\uJ 
............................ - ....................... ····-..................................................... ·-·· ......................... --........................ ·-...................... ·-·-..... .. . 
FPEmin 
Corresponding 
lacr 
b 
gCU 
0.0135 
llM =l 
gMJ 
0.0139 
llM=2 
gM2 
0.0149 
llM=3 
~ rf ='lr.J 
0.0158 0.0159 
3 1 
Polyno,nial Models 3: rr, = ao+aJ(L,nc)uJ, + a2(L,nM)gM, + a3(L)x, x, E 
V\( uJ, g J\1) 
Case 
FPEmin 
Corresponding 
la cr 
b 
cu 
0.0129 
3 
Polyno,nial Models 4: 
g_y 
Ml 
0.0128 
ny=3 
M2 
0.0143 
ny=2 
cu 
rf = 'Tr.] 
Ml M2 
0.0125 0.0143 0.0155 
n7te =5 1 I 
Case of CU: rr,=ao+a1(L,nr;)uJ,+a2(L,nM)gMr+a3(L,n,re)rf, + a;(L)gy, 
Cases of Ml and M2: 'lrr=ao+aJ(L,nr)uJr+aiL,nM)gMr+aJ(L,ny)gy,+a;(L)rfr 
~ -If ='Tr.] 
Case cu Ml M2 
FPEmin 0.0118 0.0131 0.0147 
Corresponding ny=2 6 1 
laa 
b 
As common case for monthly time series, nv should be set at 12 months or higher. But 
nv here is set a priori only at 6 months due to the limitation of the sample period (see 
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also some other justifications in Section D). The Table C. l summarizes the results of 
calulation of the minimum FPEs that identify the appropriate lag lengths of the 
determinants of inflation in Model (35) for three cases of using CU, M 1, and M2. 
FPErrun is minimum FPE for the regressions corresponding to each polynomial model 
and each Xr. rt is not included in the specifications for the cases of M 1 and M2 since 
the corresponding minimum FPEs in the last step are greater than those in the previous 
step. As a result, the specifications of Model (35) to be estimated include the-following 
determinants with their lags: for the case of CU: m (nm=6), gCU (nM= 1 ), rt (n7t=5), and 
gy (n1 2); for the case of Ml: m (nu1=6), gMJ(nM=2), and gy (ny=3); for the case of M2: 
uJ (nu1=6), gM2(nM=3), and gy (ny=2). 
D. The appropriateness of the single-equation estimates for Model (35) 
The assessment and interpretation of the estimation results of the specifications of 
Model (35) are implicitly based on the assumption that causation is one-way from the 
right-hand-side (RHS) determinants to inflation without any significant feedback. The 
Granger's test for causality is now implemented to provide a formal testing of this 
possible feedback. 
Following the common procedure for the causality test (see, for example, Sargent 
(1976), Beltas and Jones (1993)), each determinant xE{OJ, gCU, gMJ, gM2, gy J is 
regressed on lagged x and lagged n to permit testing the null hypothesis that n does 
not influence x (ie., that the coefficients on lagged n are zero). The regressions include 
six lagged values of x and six, eight, and twelve lagged values of n. The F-statistics 
i75 
j',l 
for testing the null hypothesis and the implication of causality from inflation to the 
determinants of inflation are reported in Table D. l. There is no problem for the gy. 
Over the period of less than one year, gM and uJ can be regarded as exogenous to the 
movement in prices. Over the longer run, the relationship between these variables and 
the inflation rate becomes more complex with two-way causalities (see also the main 
text for the effect of the RHS determinants on inflation). This suggests that a vector 
autoregressive model (VAR) could be more appropriate for studying the relationship 
between money, exchange rate and interest rate, output and prices if much longer time 
series could be obtained. 
Table D.1: Granger-Causality from Inflation to the Determinants of Inflation 
{jJ gCu aMJ .::, gM2 gy 
F-statistic (6 lags on n) 0.199 0.729 0.682 1.162 0.631 
Causality (n • x ?) no no no no no 
F-statistic (8 lags on n) 1.428 0.795 0.869 I .SOS 0.911 
Causality (n • x ?) no no no no no 
F-statistic ( 12 lags on n) 5.842*** 2.648** 3.461 *** 2.434** 0.668 
Causality (n • x ?) yes yes yes yes no 
The regressions of Model (35) focus, however, only on the possible (long-lasting) 
effects on the inflation rate within a time period much less than one year. There are 
some justifications for this choice. The available data sample covers only slightly 
more than 4 years. More importantly, the choice can be justified by the fact that 
markets in Vietnam are very sensitive and respond quickly to the changes in 
macroeconomic policy as well as to the changes in variables like deposit interest rate, 
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exchange rate, and some outputs (eg., food and foodstuffs, building materials ... ). 
Thus, the single-equation regressions can be regarded as reasonable for analysing the 
inflationary process in the first half of the 1990s. 
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